Blueprint: Glow Assessment Audit | Blueprint Finance

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

About this report

Assessment Type

Assurance Assessment

Date of Engagement

December 13th, 2024 - March 14th, 2025

Source Code

glow-v1 glow-v1 glow-v1 lookup-table-registry

Assessed Commit ID

47367ed https://github.com/Blueprint-Finance/glow-v1/pull/1218 https://github.com/Blueprint-Finance/glow-v1/pull/1196 923f5a3

Severity Breakdown

1Partially Solved
1Acknowledged
14Solved
16All Findings

Critical0
High0
Medium1
- 1Solved
Low7
- 5Solved
- 1P. Solved
- 1Ack.
Informational8
- 8Solved

undefined#

Introduction#

Blueprint Finance engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Glow V1 and Lookup Table Registry Solana programs beginning on December 13th, 2024, and ending on February 28th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the Solana Programs provided in glow-v1 and lookup-table-registry GitHub repositories. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The Glow V1 program is a noncustodial borrowing and lending protocol consisting of four interconnected programs:

Airspace – Implements a permission system that isolates markets and controls which programs users in those markets can interact with.
Metadata – Manages program metadata, including enabled trading/deposit tokens and oracle information.
Margin – Allows users to interact with other programs using lower collateral than required for direct interaction.
Margin-Pool – Implements a variable-rate lending and borrowing pools.

The Lookup Table Registry is a program for creating and tracking address lookup tables.

During the security assessment, the Glow team implemented two code updates:

Removed the control program previously used for bootstrapping and configuring margin pools.
Added support for the pull-based Pyth oracle architecture.

Assessment Summary#

Halborn was provided 11 weeks for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified some security concerns that were mostly addressed by the Glow team. The main ones were the following:

Verify that registry accounts can be closed only by a dedicated authority.
Implement two step authority transfer.
Make sure the administrator cannot transfer positions to different user.
Properly verify instruction parameters.
Validate mint extensions to avoid potentially dangerous extensions.
Make sure the liquidator are incentivized to restore accounts to healthy state.
Prevent the airspace authorities to manipulate arbitrary metadata accounts.
Optimize reallocations by ensuring new memory is not zeroed twice.

Test Approach and Methodology#

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

- Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

- Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.

- Mapping out possible attack vectors

- Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.

- Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (

cargo audit

- Local runtime testing (

solana-test-framework

Risk Methodology#

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

5.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
Attack Origin (AO)	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

5.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N)	0
	Low (C:L)	0.25
	Medium (C:M)	0.5
	High (C:H)	0.75
	Critical (C:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical (A:C)	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium (Y:M)	0.5
	High (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:C)	1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C)	1.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
9 - 10	7 - 8.9	4.5 - 6.9	2 - 4.4	0 - 1.9

Scope#

(a) Repository:glow-v1

(b) Assessed Commit ID:47367edfc3b2097835ea1dd2d8af5f71867eefda

Show out-of-scope files (99)

189 files

90 files

libraries / rust / instructions / src

1 file

airspace.rs

rust

programs

87 files

airspace

14 files

src

12 files

instructions

9 files

airspace_create.rs

rust

airspace_permit_create.rs

rust

airspace_permit_issuer_create.rs

rust

airspace_permit_issuer_revoke.rs

rust

airspace_permit_revoke.rs

rust

.90 files

libraries1 file

rust1 file

instructions1 file

src1 file

airspace.rsrust

programs87 files

airspace14 files

src12 files

instructions9 files

airspace_create.rsrust

airspace_permit_create.rsrust

airspace_permit_issuer_create.rsrust

airspace_permit_issuer_revoke.rsrust

airspace_permit_revoke.rsrust

airspace_set_authority.rsrust

create_governor_id.rsrust

mod.rsrust

set_governor.rsrust

events.rsrust

lib.rsrust

state.rsrust

Cargo.tomltoml

Xargo.tomltoml

control8 files

src6 files

instructions3 files

configure_margin_pool.rsrust

create_authority.rsrust

create_margin_pool.rsrust

events.rsrust

instructions.rsrust

lib.rsrust

Cargo.tomltoml

Xargo.tomltoml

margin41 files

src39 files

instructions28 files

admin2 files

admin_transfer_position.rsrust

mod.rsrust

configure5 files

configure_account_airspace.rsrust

configure_adapter.rsrust

configure_permit.rsrust

configure_token.rsrust

mod.rsrust

lookup_tables4 files

append_to_lookup.rsrust

create_lookup_table.rsrust

init_lookup_registry.rsrust

mod.rsrust

positions5 files

create_deposit_position.rsrust

mod.rsrust

refresh_deposit_position.rsrust

refresh_position_config.rsrust

transfer_deposit.rsrust

accounting_invoke.rsrust

adapter_invoke.rsrust

close_account.rsrust

close_position.rsrust

create_account.rsrust

liquidate_begin.rsrust

liquidate_end.rsrust

liquidator_invoke.rsrust

register_position.rsrust

update_position_balance.rsrust

verify_healthy.rsrust

verify_unhealthy.rsrust

state3 files

account1 file

positions.rsrust

account.rsrust

config.rsrust

adapter.rsrust

events.rsrust

instructions.rsrust

lib.rsrust

seeds.rsrust

state.rsrust

syscall.rsrust

util.rsrust

Cargo.tomltoml

Xargo.tomltoml

margin-pool21 files

src19 files

instructions14 files

admin2 files

admin_transfer_loan.rsrust

mod.rsrust

close_loan.rsrust

collect.rsrust

configure.rsrust

create_pool.rsrust

deposit.rsrust

margin_borrow_v2.rsrust

margin_borrow.rsrust

margin_refresh_position.rsrust

margin_repay.rsrust

register_loan.rsrust

repay.rsrust

withdraw.rsrust

events.rsrust

instructions.rsrust

lib.rsrust

state.rsrust

util.rsrust

Cargo.tomltoml

Xargo.tomltoml

metadata3 files

src1 file

lib.rsrust

Cargo.tomltoml

Xargo.tomltoml

Anchor.tomltoml

Cargo.tomltoml

Additional scope:./libraries/rust/program-proc-macros/Cargo.toml,./libraries/rust/program-proc-macros/src/lib.rs,./libraries/rust/program-proc-macros/src/mem.rs,./libraries/rust/instructions/Cargo.toml,./libraries/rust/instructions/src/margin.rs,./libraries/rust/instructions/src/control.rs,./libraries/rust/instructions/src/lib.rs,./libraries/rust/instructions/src/test_service.rs,./libraries/rust/instructions/src/margin_pool.rs,./libraries/rust/tools/Cargo.toml,./libraries/rust/tools/src/lookup_tables.rs,./libraries/rust/tools/src/lib.rs,./libraries/rust/solana-client/Cargo.toml,./libraries/rust/program-common/Cargo.toml,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/pod.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/number_128.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/fp32.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/number.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/log.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/lib.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/functions.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/serialization.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/interest_pricing.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/traits.rs,./libraries/rust/program-common/src/valuation.rs

Out-of-Scope:third party dependencies and economic attacks.

(a) Repository:glow-v1

(b) Assessed Commit ID:https://github.com/Blueprint-Finance/glow-v1/pull/1218

Show out-of-scope files (99)

182 files

83 files

libraries / rust / instructions / src

1 file

airspace.rs

rust

programs

80 files

airspace

14 files

src

12 files

instructions

9 files

airspace_create.rs

rust

airspace_permit_create.rs

rust

airspace_permit_issuer_create.rs

rust

airspace_permit_issuer_revoke.rs

rust

airspace_permit_revoke.rs

rust

Out-of-Scope:third party dependencies and economic attacks.

(a) Repository:glow-v1

(b) Assessed Commit ID:https://github.com/Blueprint-Finance/glow-v1/pull/1196

Show out-of-scope files (99)

182 files

83 files

libraries / rust / instructions / src

1 file

airspace.rs

rust

programs

80 files

airspace

14 files

src

12 files

instructions

9 files

airspace_create.rs

rust

airspace_permit_create.rs

rust

airspace_permit_issuer_create.rs

rust

airspace_permit_issuer_revoke.rs

rust

airspace_permit_revoke.rs

rust

Out-of-Scope:third party dependencies and economic attacks.

(a) Repository:lookup-table-registry

(b) Assessed Commit ID:923f5a3850e49b886bd09ac7f618c0917890e552

Show out-of-scope files (27)

33 files

6 files

programs / lookup-table-registry

4 files

src

2 files

lib.rs

rust

state.rs

rust

Cargo.toml

toml

Xargo.toml

toml

Anchor.toml

toml

Cargo.toml

toml

Out-of-Scope:third party dependencies and economic attacks.

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#

#	Title	Severity	Score	Status
HAL-01	Registry account can be closed by an arbitrary user	Medium	5.0	Solved02/18/2025
HAL-02	Two step authority transfer not implemented	Low	2.5	Solved02/24/2025
HAL-03	Realloc re-initialization wastes compute units	Low	2.5	Solved02/20/2025
HAL-04	Missing mint extensions validation	Low	2.5	Partially Solved03/13/2025
HAL-05	Airspace authorities can manipulate arbitrary metadata accounts	Low	2.0	Solved03/09/2025
HAL-06	Administrator can transfer positions to another user	Low	2.0	Acknowledged03/04/2025
HAL-07	Unverified program parameters leading to misconfiguration risks	Low	2.0	Solved03/09/2025
HAL-08	Liquidators may leave liquidated accounts unhealthy	Low	2.0	Solved03/15/2025
HAL-09	Permit revocation of a revoked regulator cannot be done by anyone as intended	Informational	1.3	Solved01/22/2025
HAL-10	Fee owner cannot withraw fees	Informational	0.6	Solved03/02/2025
HAL-11	Risk of undefined behavior due to stack overflow	Informational	0.6	Solved02/19/2025
HAL-12	PermitIssuerRevoke helper function uses incorrect instruction data	Informational	0.0	Solved02/27/2025
HAL-13	Unnecessary unsafe code	Informational	0.0	Solved02/27/2025
HAL-14	Unused TokenConfig fields result in incorrect token standard determination	Informational	0.0	Solved12/19/2024
HAL-15	Risk of incorrect interest rate calculation	Informational	0.0	Solved02/27/2025
HAL-16	Risk of unhandled panics	Informational	0.0	Solved03/03/2025

Findings & Tech Details#

HAL-01Solved

9. Automated Testing#

Disclaimer#

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.