Subaccount & Yield - BSX Exchange


Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 04/29/2025

Date of Engagement: April 3rd, 2025 - April 11th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

14

Critical

0

High

3

Medium

5

Low

3

Informational

3


1. INTRODUCTION

BSX engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on April 7th, 2025 and ending on April 16th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to smart contracts in the GitHub repository provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.

    • Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.

 

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the BSX team. The main ones were the following:

    • Restrict the transfer of vault share tokens to prevent inconsistencies in the average price tracking.

    • Prevent the transfer of vault share tokens from subaccounts to main accounts during subaccount deletion.

    • Restrict subaccounts from performing swaps that result in the acquisition of vault shares.

    • Add an explicit check to ensure an account cannot be reassigned as a subaccount of itself.

    • Only finalize each operation's authorization once the transfer or withdrawal succeeds, so that failures don't permanently lock out retries.

    • Automatically close or liquidate all of the subaccount's open positions before deleting a subaccount.

    • Include a per‑main‑account nonce to track consumed nonces, so that any old consent signature cannot be replayed after revocation.

    • Record the token balance immediately before and after each ERC-4626 call, calculate the actual asset delta, and require that this observed change equals the returned output.


3. CAVEATS

This assessment only covers the changes introduced between commit d1cad2e and commit 2e8c754 (inclusive). All other parts of the codebase are treated as black boxes, and it is assumed that any required security mechanisms are properly implemented elsewhere in the system. This includes, but is not limited to, input validation, business logic enforcement, and access control.


Differential audits focus on identifying security risks introduced or modified in a specific set of changes. While some components added in the diff may interact with each other or with existing logic, these interactions are only reviewed when they are explicitly visible within the diff itself. Implicit assumptions or cross-component dependencies may fall outside the scope unless clearly surfaced through changes or supporting context. As an example, the feeAmount field in swapYieldAssetPermit was noted as unused during the review. The BSX team confirmed this is expected and that future logic will handle it.


For a more complete understanding of the protocol's security posture and the behavior of interconnected components, a full-scope assessment is recommended.


4. TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.

    • Manual testing by custom scripts.

    • Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph).

    • Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither).

    • Local or public testnet deployment (Foundry, Remix IDE).


5. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

5.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

5.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

6. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: contracts-core
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 2e8c754
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/1000x/BSX1000x.sol
  • contracts/exchange/lib/logic/AccountLogic.sol
  • contracts/exchange/lib/logic/AdminLogic.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks. Furthermore, this assessment was limited to the differential changes between commit d1cad2e and commit 2e8c754. Components outside of the reviewed diff, pre-existing logic not modified by the changes, system-wide interactions not directly surfaced in the diff context, and external assumptions regarding input validation, business rules, and access controls were explicitly out of scope.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

7. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

3

Medium

5

Low

3

Informational

3

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Average price desynchronizes after external vault share movesHighSolved - 04/23/2025
Incorrect price tracking after asset consolidation from subaccount deletionHighSolved - 04/28/2025
Unrestricted acquisition of vault shares by subaccounts during swapsHighSolved - 04/28/2025
Account can be self-converted into a subaccountMediumSolved - 04/22/2025
Nonces consumed on failed operations prevent retriesMediumRisk Accepted - 04/22/2025
Subaccount deletion can be indefinitely blocked by open positionsMediumRisk Accepted - 04/22/2025
Revoked signers can be reauthorized with old consent signaturesMediumRisk Accepted - 04/22/2025
Unverified vault swap outputs can lead to inconsistent asset accountingMediumSolved - 04/28/2025
Unsupported asset pair aborts swap executionLowRisk Accepted - 04/28/2025
Improper balance management due to missing token authorization checksLowRisk Accepted - 04/28/2025
Residual token approval could remain after depositsLowSolved - 04/28/2025
Unbounded supported‑token list loops may exhaust gasInformationalAcknowledged - 04/22/2025
Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loopsInformationalAcknowledged - 04/22/2025
Minor spelling inconsistencies in error documentationInformationalSolved - 04/22/2025

8. Findings & Tech Details

8.1 Average price desynchronizes after external vault share moves

//

High

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.2 Incorrect price tracking after asset consolidation from subaccount deletion

//

High

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.3 Unrestricted acquisition of vault shares by subaccounts during swaps

//

High

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.4 Account can be self-converted into a subaccount

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.5 Nonces consumed on failed operations prevent retries

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.6 Subaccount deletion can be indefinitely blocked by open positions

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.7 Revoked signers can be reauthorized with old consent signatures

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.8 Unverified vault swap outputs can lead to inconsistent asset accounting

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.9 Unsupported asset pair aborts swap execution

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.10 Improper balance management due to missing token authorization checks

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.11 Residual token approval could remain after deposits

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8.12 Unbounded supported‑token list loops may exhaust gas

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.13 Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
contracts/exchange/lib/logic/AccountLogic.sol#L53, L113, L138

8.14 Minor spelling inconsistencies in error documentation

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
References
contracts/exchange/lib/Errors.sol#L36, L188

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.