MAKE CSPR.name - Casper Association

Prepared by:

HALBORN

Last Updated 07/03/2025

Date of Engagement: May 29th, 2025 - June 17th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

1. Introduction
2. Assessment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Missing token count increment bypasses max supply limit
7.2 Lack of subdomain name validation
7.3 Users can set unowned names as primary in reverse resolution
7.4 Integer overflow in expiration logic may cause incorrect reverts or premature expirations
7.5 Missing refund mechanism for excess cspr
7.6 Lacking pausability mechanism
7.7 Missing error definitions in contract schema
7.8 Incorrect access control in whitelist revocation
7.9 Double cleanup of default resolver during token transfer
7.10 Unnecessary storage write on revoke for non-whitelisted addresses
7.11 Reverse resolver allows unnecessary primary name updates
7.12 Missing label validation allows registration of structurally invalid and unusable domains
7.13 Missing validation of contract addresses
7.14 Unneeded admin role assignment in registrar deployment
7.15 Incorrect naming can lead to logic errors or misuse
7.16 Lacking event emission
7.17 Inconsistencies in documentation
7.18 Unnecessary clone

8. Automated Testing

1. Introduction

MAKE engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of their CSPR.name contracts on the Casper Network, from May 29th, 2025, to June 16th, 2025. The scope of this assessment was limited to the repository identified by a specific commit hash, with additional details provided in the Scope section of this report.

CSPR.name is a Web3 naming service built on the Casper Network. It enables users to replace complex hexadecimal account identifiers with human-readable names (e.g., smith.cspr), functioning similarly to how Web2 DNS translates IP addresses into domain names.

2. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn assigned a dedicated, full-time security engineer to evaluate the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer possesses advanced expertise in blockchain and smart contract security, with extensive skills in penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and comprehensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The objectives of this assessment are to:

Verify that the contract functionalities operate as intended
Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the contracts

Overall, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce risks and their potential impact, which have been addressed by the MAKE team. The primary recommendations include:

Increment the minted_tokens_count variable within the mint function after each successful token minting.
Enforce strict subdomain validation by verifying that the extracted token_name matches a DNS-label pattern using a regex.
Ensure that the resolved address of the primary name matches the caller’s address to guarantee that only the legitimate owner can set reverse resolution for their address.
Enable overflow checks in release mode to safeguard the expiration logic from potential integer overflows.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn employed a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to ensure a comprehensive, efficient evaluation of the smart contracts. Manual testing aimed to identify logical, procedural, and implementation flaws, while automated testing enhanced coverage and rapidly detected deviations from security best practices. The assessment employed the following phases and tools:

Research into the architecture, purpose, and usage of the protocol.
Manual code review and walkthrough.
Manual assessment of critical Rust variables and functions to identify potential arithmetic vulnerabilities.
Evaluation of cross-contract call controls.
Logical control review based on the overall architecture.
Scanning Rust files for known vulnerabilities using cargo audit.
Integration testing within a local testing environment.

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S)	1 0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H)	1 0.67 0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H)	1 0.67 0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Availability (A)	None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F)	1 0.5 0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U)	1.25 1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY

(a) Repository: cspr-name-contracts

(b) Assessed Commit ID: 3a14be5

src/data_structures.rs
src/contracts/registrar.rs
src/contracts/name_token.rs

↓ Expand ↓

Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

Remediation Commit ID:

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

Security analysis	Risk level	Remediation Date
Missing Token Count Increment Bypasses Max Supply Limit	Medium	Solved - 06/30/2025
Lack of Subdomain Name Validation	Medium	Solved - 06/30/2025
Users Can Set Unowned Names as Primary in Reverse Resolution	Medium	Solved - 06/30/2025
Integer Overflow in Expiration Logic May Cause Incorrect Reverts or Premature Expirations	Low	Solved - 06/30/2025
Missing Refund Mechanism For Excess CSPR	Low	Solved - 06/30/2025
Lacking Pausability Mechanism	Low	Solved - 06/30/2025
Missing Error Definitions in Contract Schema	Low	Solved - 06/30/2025
Incorrect Access Control in Whitelist Revocation	Low	Solved - 06/30/2025
Double Cleanup of Default Resolver During Token Transfer	Informational	Solved - 06/30/2025
Unnecessary Storage Write on Revoke for Non-Whitelisted Addresses	Informational	Solved - 06/30/2025
Reverse Resolver Allows Unnecessary Primary Name Updates	Informational	Solved - 06/30/2025
Missing Label Validation Allows Registration of Structurally Invalid and Unusable Domains	Informational	Solved - 06/30/2025
Missing Validation Of Contract Addresses	Informational	Solved - 06/30/2025
Unneeded Admin Role Assignment in Registrar Deployment	Informational	Solved - 06/30/2025
Incorrect Naming Can Lead to Logic Errors or Misuse	Informational	Solved - 07/02/2025
Lacking Event Emission	Informational	Solved - 06/30/2025
Inconsistencies In Documentation	Informational	Solved - 06/30/2025
Unnecessary Clone	Informational	Solved - 06/30/2025

https://github.com/make-software/cspr-name-contracts/commit/a04d9b692e4691b9b25a372bf66fb537fdd75338

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

1. Introduction
2. Assessment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Missing token count increment bypasses max supply limit
7.2 Lack of subdomain name validation
7.3 Users can set unowned names as primary in reverse resolution
7.4 Integer overflow in expiration logic may cause incorrect reverts or premature expirations
7.5 Missing refund mechanism for excess cspr
7.6 Lacking pausability mechanism
7.7 Missing error definitions in contract schema
7.8 Incorrect access control in whitelist revocation
7.9 Double cleanup of default resolver during token transfer
7.10 Unnecessary storage write on revoke for non-whitelisted addresses
7.11 Reverse resolver allows unnecessary primary name updates
7.12 Missing label validation allows registration of structurally invalid and unusable domains
7.13 Missing validation of contract addresses
7.14 Unneeded admin role assignment in registrar deployment
7.15 Incorrect naming can lead to logic errors or misuse
7.16 Lacking event emission
7.17 Inconsistencies in documentation
7.18 Unnecessary clone

MAKE CSPR.name

Casper Association

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Assessment Summary

3. Test Approach and Methodology

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Attack Cost (AC):

Attack Complexity (AX):

Metrics:

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Integrity (I):

Availability (A):

Deposit (D):

Yield (Y):

Metrics:

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Scope (S):

Metrics:

5. SCOPE

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Missing Token Count Increment Bypasses Max Supply Limit

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.2 Lack of Subdomain Name Validation

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.3 Users Can Set Unowned Names as Primary in Reverse Resolution

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.4 Integer Overflow in Expiration Logic May Cause Incorrect Reverts or Premature Expirations

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.5 Missing Refund Mechanism For Excess CSPR

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.6 Lacking Pausability Mechanism

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.7 Missing Error Definitions in Contract Schema

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.8 Incorrect Access Control in Whitelist Revocation

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.9 Double Cleanup of Default Resolver During Token Transfer

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash