Goldivault Diff - Goldilocks


Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 04/01/2025

Date of Engagement: March 21st, 2025 - March 24th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

6

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

1

Informational

5


Goldilocks engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on March 21st, 2025 and ending on March 24th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

1. ASSESMENT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.

    • Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.

No major issues were identified.

2. TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.

    • Manual testing by custom scripts.

    • Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph).

    • Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither).

    • Local or public testnet deployment (Foundry, Remix IDE).


3. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

3.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

3.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

3.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

4. SCOPE

Files and Repository
(a) Repository: goldilocks-core
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 0222634
(c) Items in scope:
  • Goldivault4626.sol
  • Goldivault.sol
  • PointsGoldivault.sol
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

5. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

1

Informational

5

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Usage of direct approve callsLowRisk Accepted
Unlocked pragma compilerInformationalSolved - 03/28/2025
Misleading _unstakableYT logicInformationalSolved - 03/28/2025
Duplicated deposit logicInformationalSolved - 03/27/2025
Missing NonReentrant protectionInformationalSolved - 03/27/2025
Consider using named mappingsInformationalSolved - 03/28/2025

6. Findings & Tech Details

6.1 Usage of direct approve calls

//

Low

Description

In order to allow for the transfer of tokens from one address, the protocol calls the approve function using the IERC20 interface in several places. This approach might be problematic for a few reasons:

  • Some tokens, to protect against approval race conditions, do not allow approving an amount M > 0 when an existing amount N > 0 is already approved.

  • The approve call does not return a boolean.

  • The function reverts if the approval value is larger than uint96.


BVSS
Recommendation

It is recommended to use safeIncreaseAllowance and safeDecreaseAllowance from the SafeERC20 library across the entire protocol, instead of calling approve directly.

Remediation Comment

RISK ACCEPTED: The Goldilocks team accepted the risk. The team will extensively test the deposited assets of the ERC-4626 vault they integrate with to ensure these issues do not apply.


6.2 Unlocked pragma compiler

//

Informational

Description

All the files in scope currently use floating pragma version ^0.8.20, which means that the code can be compiled by any compiler version that is greater than or equal to 0.8.0, and less than 0.9.0.


It is recommended that contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags used during development and testing. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using another pragma. For example, an outdated pragma version might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively.

BVSS
Recommendation

It is recommended to lock the pragma version to the same version used during development and testing.

Remediation Comment

SOLVED: The Goldilocks team solved the issue as recommended.

Remediation Hash

6.3 Misleading _unstakableYT logic

//

Informational

Description

The Goldivault4626 contract provides functionality for staking and unstaking Yield Tokens. When a user redeems their principal, part of the process involves unstaking YT so that YT can be burned or transferred.


When a user calls a function that requires unstaking (e.g. redeemOwnership), the contract determines how many tokens to unstake by calling unstakableYT function. The returned value from unstakableYT is passed to _unstakeYT, which ultimately adjusts the ytStaked[user] balance and transfers the tokens out:

 function _unstakableYT(address user, uint256 unstakeAmount) internal view returns (uint256) {
    uint256 _ytStaked = ytStaked[user];
    if(_ytStaked == 0) {
      return 0;
    }
    else if(unstakeAmount > _ytStaked) {
      return unstakeAmount - _ytStaked;
    }
    else {
      return unstakeAmount;      
    }
  }

When unstakeAmount exceeds ytStaked, the function returns unstakeAmount - ytStaked. This can be misleading because returning the difference does not represent what can be unstaked, rather, it’s the shortfall between the requested amount and the user’s staked balance. 


Subsequent calls to _unstakeYT will revert anyway if that returned value exceeds the user’s actual stake:

  function _unstakeYT(uint256 amount) internal {
    if(amount > ytStaked[msg.sender]) revert InvalidUnstake();
    ytStaked[msg.sender] -= amount;
    totalYtStaked -= amount;
    SafeTransferLib.safeTransfer(yt, msg.sender, amount);
    emit YTUnstake(msg.sender, amount);
  }

BVSS
Recommendation

It is recommended to remove the mentioned function.

Remediation Comment

SOLVED: The Goldilocks team solved the issue. The _unstakableYT function was removed.

Remediation Hash

6.4 Duplicated deposit logic

//

Informational

Description

The deposit function implemented in the Goldivault4626 contract, replicates the same logic that the internal _deposit function, which can introduce unnecessary redundancy and potential for inconsistencies. In both places, the code does the following:

    if(amount == 0) revert InvalidDeposit();
    SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(depositToken, msg.sender, address(this), amount);
    ERC20(depositToken).approve(depositVault, amount);
    ERC4626(depositVault).deposit(amount, address(this));
    depositTokenAmount += amount;
    OwnershipToken(ot).mintOT(msg.sender, amount);
    YieldToken(yt).mintYT(msg.sender, amount);
    _updateClaimableUnderlying(msg.sender);
    _stakeYT(amount);
    emit Deposit(msg.sender, amount);

When other parts of the contract (for example, buyYT) require depositing, they already call the internal _deposit directly, re-running the same series of steps.

BVSS
Recommendation

It is recommended to streamline the deposit process by making the public deposit function internally invoke _deposit, removing duplicate logic.

Remediation Comment

SOLVED: The Goldilocks team solved the issue as recommended. The internal _deposit function was separated from the external one.

Remediation Hash

6.5 Missing NonReentrant protection

//

Informational

Description

While most state-changing functions in the contract include a nonReentrant modifier, the stakeYT and unstakeYT functions do not, which can open a window for potential reentrancy attacks.


  /// @notice Stakes YT
  function stakeYT(uint256 amount) external {
    _updateClaimableUnderlying(msg.sender);
    _stakeYT(amount);
  }

  /// @notice Unstakes YT
  function unstakeYT(uint256 amount) external {
    _updateClaimableUnderlying(msg.sender);
    uint256 unstakableAmount = _unstakableYT(msg.sender, amount);
    _unstakeYT(unstakableAmount);
  }

BVSS
Recommendation

It is recommended to add the nonReentrant modifier to stakeYT and unstakeYT functions.

Remediation Comment

SOLVED: The Goldilocks team solved the issue as recommended.

Remediation Hash

6.6 Consider using named mappings

//

Informational

Description

The project is using Solidity version greater than 0.8.18, which supports named mappings. Using named mappings can improve the readability and maintainability of the code by making the purpose of each mapping clearer. This practice will enhance code readability and make the purpose of each mapping more explicit.

BVSS
Recommendation

Consider refactoring the mappings to use named arguments.


For example, on Goldivault4626, instead of declaring:

mapping(address => uint256) public ytStaked; 

The mapping could be declared as: 

mapping(address user => uint256 amount) public ytStaked; 

Remediation Comment

SOLVED: The Goldilocks team solved the issue as recommended.

Remediation Hash

7. Automated Testing

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the scoped contracts. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABI and binary formats, Slither was run on the all-scoped contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.


The security team assessed all findings identified by the Slither software and everything was categorized as false positives.








Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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