Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 02/26/2025
Date of Engagement: December 26th, 2024 - December 27th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
3
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
1
Informational
2
Jigsaw Protocol
engaged Halborn
to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on December 26th, 2024 and ending on December 27th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
The Jigsaw Protocol
codebase in scope mainly consists of a smart contract that enables users of the Jigsaw Protocol to invest their collateral into the Dinero protocol to generate yield and rewards.
Halborn
was provided 2 days for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn
identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were addressed by the Jigsaw Protocol team
:
Consider removing either tokenIn or weth and use a single reference consistently throughout the contract. Alternatively, ensure that tokenIn is always equal to weth. Add explicit documentation to clarify the token usage.
Update the Natspec documentation for the initialize() function in the DineroStrategy contract to accurately describe the function's tokenOut parameter.
Consider replacing all revert strings with custom errors.
Halborn
performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into architecture, purpose and use of the platform.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could led to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.
Local testing with custom scripts (Foundry
).
Fork testing against main networks (Foundry
).
Static analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions (Slither
).
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality (C) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
---|---|---|
Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
Severity | Score Value Range |
---|---|
Critical | 9 - 10 |
High | 7 - 8.9 |
Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
Low | 2 - 4.4 |
Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
1
Informational
2
Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
---|---|---|
Inconsistent token usage between WETH and TokenIn | Low | Solved - 01/17/2025 |
Incorrect Natspec documentation | Informational | Solved - 02/17/2025 |
Use of revert strings over custom errors | Informational | Acknowledged - 02/07/2025 |
//
The contract demonstrates inconsistent usage between tokenIn
and weth
variables, which could lead to confusion and potential issues:
1. While the contract documentation indicates WETH is used as the input token, the contract maintains separate declarations for tokenIn
and weth
.
/**
* @notice The wETH token is utilized as the input token, which is later unwrapped to ETH and re-wrapped to
* facilitate Dinero investments.
*/
address public override tokenIn;
/**
* @notice wETH address used for strategy
*/
IWETH9 public weth;
2. The deposit()
function validates _asset
against tokenIn
, but then uses the weth
address for withdrawals:
function deposit(
address _asset,
uint256 _amount,
address _recipient,
bytes calldata
) external override nonReentrant onlyValidAmount(_amount) onlyStrategyManager returns (uint256, uint256) {
require(_asset == tokenIn, "3001");
uint256 balanceBefore = IERC20(tokenOut).balanceOf(_recipient);
IHolding(_recipient).transfer({ _token: _asset, _to: address(this), _amount: _amount });
// Swap wETH to ETH.
weth.withdraw(_amount);
// Deposit ETH to mint pxETH and stakes pxETH for autocompounding.
pirexEth.deposit{ value: _amount }({ receiver: _recipient, shouldCompound: true });
uint256 shares = IERC20(tokenOut).balanceOf(_recipient) - balanceBefore;
recipients[_recipient].investedAmount += _amount;
recipients[_recipient].totalShares += shares;
// Mint Strategy's receipt tokens to allow later withdrawal.
_mint({
_receiptToken: receiptToken,
_recipient: _recipient,
_amount: shares,
_tokenDecimals: IERC20Metadata(tokenOut).decimals()
});
// Register `_recipient`'s deposit operation to generate jigsaw rewards.
jigsawStaker.deposit({ _user: _recipient, _amount: shares });
emit Deposit({
asset: _asset,
tokenIn: tokenIn,
assetAmount: _amount,
tokenInAmount: _amount,
shares: shares,
recipient: _recipient
});
return (shares, _amount);
}
3. The withdraw()
function shows similar inconsistency by using tokenIn
for transfers and balance checks, while also referencing weth
:
function withdraw(
uint256 _shares,
address _recipient,
address _asset,
bytes calldata
) external override nonReentrant onlyStrategyManager returns (uint256, uint256) {
require(_asset == tokenIn, "3001");
require(_shares <= IERC20(tokenOut).balanceOf(_recipient), "2002");
WithdrawParams memory params = WithdrawParams({
shareRatio: 0,
investment: 0,
balanceBefore: 0,
balanceAfter: 0,
balanceDiff: 0,
performanceFee: 0
});
// Calculate the ratio between all user's shares and the amount of shares used for withdrawal.
params.shareRatio = OperationsLib.getRatio({
numerator: _shares,
denominator: recipients[_recipient].totalShares,
precision: IERC20Metadata(tokenOut).decimals(),
rounding: OperationsLib.Rounding.Floor
});
// Burn Strategy's receipt tokens used for withdrawal.
_burn({
_receiptToken: receiptToken,
_recipient: _recipient,
_shares: _shares,
_totalShares: recipients[_recipient].totalShares,
_tokenDecimals: IERC20Metadata(tokenOut).decimals()
});
// To accurately compute the protocol's fees from the yield generated by the strategy, we first need to
// determine the percentage of the initial investment being withdrawn. This allows us to assess whether any
// yield has been generated beyond the initial investment.
params.investment =
(recipients[_recipient].investedAmount * params.shareRatio) / (10 ** IERC20Metadata(tokenOut).decimals());
params.balanceBefore = IERC20(tokenIn).balanceOf(_recipient);
// Redeem pxETH via the AutoPirexEth contract using the recipient's `IHolding` contract.
(bool success, bytes memory returnData) = IHolding(_recipient).genericCall({
_contract: address(autoPirexEth),
_call: abi.encodeCall(IAutoPxEth.redeem, (_shares, address(this), _recipient))
});
// Ensure the external call was successful and decode any potential revert reason.
require(success, OperationsLib.getRevertMsg(returnData));
// Decode the returned data to get the amount of pxETH withdrawn from the AutoPirexEth contract.
uint256 pxEthWithdrawn = abi.decode(returnData, (uint256));
// Use the PirexEth contract to instantly redeem the withdrawn pxETH for ETH.
(uint256 postFeeAmount,) = pirexEth.instantRedeemWithPxEth(pxEthWithdrawn, address(this));
// Swap ETH back to WETH.
weth.deposit{ value: postFeeAmount }();
// Transfer WETH to the `_recipient`.
IERC20(tokenIn).safeTransfer(_recipient, postFeeAmount);
// Take protocol's fee if any.
params.balanceDiff = IERC20(tokenIn).balanceOf(_recipient) - params.balanceBefore;
(params.performanceFee,,) = _getStrategyManager().strategyInfo(address(this));
if (params.balanceDiff > params.investment && params.performanceFee != 0) {
uint256 rewardAmount = params.balanceDiff - params.investment;
uint256 fee = OperationsLib.getFeeAbsolute(rewardAmount, params.performanceFee);
if (fee > 0) {
address feeAddr = _getManager().feeAddress();
emit FeeTaken(tokenIn, feeAddr, fee);
IHolding(_recipient).transfer(tokenIn, feeAddr, fee);
}
}
recipients[_recipient].totalShares -= _shares;
recipients[_recipient].investedAmount = params.investment > recipients[_recipient].investedAmount
? 0
: recipients[_recipient].investedAmount - params.investment;
emit Withdraw({ asset: _asset, recipient: _recipient, shares: _shares, amount: params.balanceDiff });
// Register `_recipient`'s withdrawal operation to stop generating jigsaw rewards.
jigsawStaker.withdraw({ _user: _recipient, _amount: _shares });
return (params.balanceDiff, params.investment);
}
This inconsistency could lead to the disruption of the strategies in case the tokens are not aligned correctly. Additionally it introduces unnecessary complexity and potential for future errors.
Consider removing either tokenIn
or weth
and use a single reference consistently throughout the contract. Alternatively, ensure that tokenIn
is always equal to weth
. Add explicit documentation to clarify the token usage.
SOLVED: The Jigsaw Protocol team solved this finding in commit 3b62613
by following the mentioned recommendation.
//
The Natspec documentation for the initialize()
function is incorrect, as it refers to the initialize()
function of the AaveStrategy
contract.
* - tokenOut: The address of the Aave receipt token (aToken).
Update the Natspec documentation for the initialize()
function in the DineroStrategy
contract to accurately describe the function's tokenOut
parameter.
SOLVED: The Jigsaw Protocol team solved this finding in commit 8dc99e4
by following the mentioned recommendation.
//
Throughout the file in scope, there are several instances of use of revert strings over custom errors.
In Solidity development, replacing hard-coded revert message strings with the Error()
syntax is an optimization strategy that can significantly reduce gas costs. Hard-coded strings, stored on the blockchain, increase the size and cost of deploying and executing contracts.
The Error()
syntax allows for the definition of reusable, parameterized custom errors, leading to a more efficient use of storage and reduced gas consumption. This approach not only optimizes gas usage during deployment and interaction with the contract but also enhances code maintainability and readability by providing clearer, context-specific error information.
Consider replacing all revert strings with custom errors. For example:
error ConditionNotMet();
if (!condition) revert ConditionNotMet();
For more reference, see here.
ACKNOWLEDGED: The Jigsaw Protocol team made a business decision to acknowledge this finding and not alter the contracts.
Halborn
used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the smart contracts in scope. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn
verified the smart contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their abis and binary format, Slither was run against the contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.
The security team assessed all findings identified by the Slither software, however, findings with related to external dependencies are not included in the below results for the sake of report readability.
The findings obtained as a result of the Slither scan were reviewed, and the majority were not included in the report because they were determined as false positives.
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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