Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 07/22/2025
Date of Engagement: March 21st, 2025 - April 3rd, 2025
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
6
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
4
Informational
2
Molecula Protocol engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on March 10th, 2025 and ending on April 3rd, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team.
The team at Halborn was provided 19 days for the engagement and assigned a security engineer to evaluate the security of the smart contract.
The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of this assessment is to:
Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.
Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were partially addressed by the Molecula Protocol team. The main ones were the following:
Implement a mechanism to send dust amount to owner instead of reverting.
Use try-catch to prevent front-running attack on multi-redeem
Implement mechanisms to prevent front/back-running an oracle change.
Implement a 2-Step ownership pattern.
Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph).
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither,Aderyn).
Local or public testnet deployment (Foundry, Remix IDE).ontent goes here.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
4
Informational
2
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Incorrect Static Call in Migration Function Breaks Cross-Contract Migration | Low | Not Applicable - 04/09/2025 |
| Sandwich Attack Opportunity in Oracle Price Updates | Low | Solved - 04/09/2025 |
| Permanent Denial of Token Cleanup | Low | Solved - 07/10/2025 |
| Adversary Can Disrupt Multi-Redeem Operations | Low | Acknowledged - 07/10/2025 |
| Centralization of Privileges | Informational | Solved - 04/09/2025 |
| Absence of Two-Step Ownership Transfer Pattern | Informational | Acknowledged - 04/09/2025 |
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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