- Assurance
  Smart Contract Assessment
  Securing code integrity, protecting digital assets
  Smart Contract Assessment
  Securing code integrity, protecting digital assets
  Blockchain Layer 1 Assessment
  Assessing protocols, securing blockchain foundations
  Blockchain Layer 1 Assessment
  Assessing protocols, securing blockchain foundations
  Code Security Audit
  Uncovering flaws, strengthening software integrity
  Code Security Audit
  Uncovering flaws, strengthening software integrity
  Web Application Penetration Testing
  Exposing weaknesses, fortifying digital defenses
  Web Application Penetration Testing
  Exposing weaknesses, fortifying digital defenses
  Cloud Infrastructure Penetration Testing
  Securing configurations, protecting critical environments
  Cloud Infrastructure Penetration Testing
  Securing configurations, protecting critical environments
  Red Team Exercise
  Simulating real-world attacks, strengthening defenses
  Red Team Exercise
  Simulating real-world attacks, strengthening defenses
  AI Red Teaming
  Testing AI systems against real threats
  AI Red Teaming
  Testing AI systems against real threats
  AI Security Assessment
  Securing AI models, data, and pipelines
  AI Security Assessment
  Securing AI models, data, and pipelines
- Advisory
  AI Advisory
  Guiding secure, strategic AI adoption forward
  AI Advisory
  Guiding secure, strategic AI adoption forward
  Risk Assessment
  From unknown threats to actionable insights
  Risk Assessment
  From unknown threats to actionable insights
  Blockchain Architecture Assessment
  Optimizing architecture for tomorrow’s networks
  Blockchain Architecture Assessment
  Optimizing architecture for tomorrow’s networks
  Compliance Readiness
  Stay ready as regulations evolve
  Compliance Readiness
  Stay ready as regulations evolve
  Custody and Key Management Assessment
  Securing the heart of digital custody
  Custody and Key Management Assessment
  Securing the heart of digital custody
  Technical Due Diligence
  See the risks before you invest
  Technical Due Diligence
  See the risks before you invest
  Technical Training
  Empower your teams to secure what matters
  Technical Training
  Empower your teams to secure what matters

Mamo PR - Moonwell

Prepared by:

HALBORN

Last Updated 06/26/2025

Date of Engagement: June 18th, 2025 - June 18th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

1. Summary
2. Introduction
3. Assessment summary
4. Test approach and methodology
5. Storage collision assessment
6. Risk methodology
7. Scope
8. Assessment summary & findings overview
9. Findings & Tech Details

9.1 Excess value becomes irrecoverable
9.2 Missing reentrancy protection in strategymulticall
9.3 Single-step ownership transfer process
9.4 Owner can renounce ownership
9.5 Inaccurate natspec comments
9.6 Unused imports
9.7 Use of revert strings instead of custom errors
9.8 Redundant named return
9.9 Style guide optimizations

10. Automated Testing

1. Summary

2. Introduction

Moonwell engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on June 18th, 2025 and ending on June 19th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hash and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The smart contracts under review consisted of StrategyFactory, a Factory contract for creating new strategy instances with configurable parameters, and StrategyMulticall, a contract to allow efficient batch updates and generic multicalls to strategies. Furthermore, the security review also added the upgrade of the SlippagePriceChecker contract to make sure no risks were introduced nor storage collisions.

3. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 2 days for the engagement, and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The objectives of this assessment were to

Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were completely addressed by the Moonwell team. The main ones were the following:

Consider refunding excess funds in genericMulticall() or add a withdraw functionallity.
Add a reentrancy protection to the genericMulticall() function in StrategyMulticall.

4. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

Research into architecture and purpose.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph).
Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions (slither).
Testnet deployment (Foundry).

5. Storage collision Assessment

Storage collision study was performed as part of this security review. The original SlippagePriceChecker only used Slot 0 and Slot 1:

forge inspect src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker storage 

╭-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------╮
| Name              | Type                                                                      | Slot | Offset | Bytes | Contract                                          |
+===========================================================================================================================================================================+
| tokenOracleData   | mapping(address => struct ISlippagePriceChecker.TokenFeedConfiguration[]) | 0    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
|-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------|
| maxTimePriceValid | mapping(address => uint256)                                               | 1    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
╰-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------╯

The new SlippagePriceChecker uses Slot 0, Slot 1 and Slot 2:

forge inspect src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker storage

╭---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------╮
| Name                | Type                                                                                          | Slot | Offset | Bytes | Contract                                          |
+=================================================================================================================================================================================================+
| tokenOracleData     | mapping(address => struct ISlippagePriceChecker.TokenFeedConfiguration[])                     | 0    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
|---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------|
| maxTimePriceValid   | mapping(address => uint256)                                                                   | 1    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
|---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------|
| tokenPairOracleData | mapping(address => mapping(address => struct ISlippagePriceChecker.TokenFeedConfiguration[])) | 2    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
╰---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------╯

Therefore, no potential collisions were observed.

6. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

6.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S)	1 0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H)	1 0.67 0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H)	1 0.67 0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

6.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Availability (A)	None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

6.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F)	1 0.5 0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U)	1.25 1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9

7. SCOPE

REPOSITORY

(a) Repository: mamo-contracts

(b) Assessed Commit ID: c75d06a

src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol
src/StrategyFactory.sol
src/StrategyMulticall.sol

Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

Remediation Commit ID:

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

8. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

Security analysis	Risk level	Remediation Date
Excess Value Becomes Irrecoverable	Medium	Solved - 06/20/2025
Missing Reentrancy Protection in StrategyMulticall	Low	Solved - 06/23/2025
Single-step Ownership Transfer Process	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Owner Can Renounce Ownership	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Inaccurate NatSpec Comments	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Unused Imports	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Use of Revert Strings Instead of Custom Errors	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Redundant Named Return	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Style Guide Optimizations	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025

9. Findings & Tech Details

9.1 Excess Value Becomes Irrecoverable

Medium

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:M/Y:N (5.0)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

https://github.com/moonwell-fi/mamo-contracts/commit/37bc9da4f038bb1602817d734681e4d043d2b2e9

9.2 Missing Reentrancy Protection in StrategyMulticall

Low

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (2.5)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

10. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

1. Summary
2. Introduction
3. Assessment summary
4. Test approach and methodology
5. Storage collision assessment
6. Risk methodology
7. Scope
8. Assessment summary & findings overview
9. Findings & Tech Details

9.1 Excess value becomes irrecoverable
9.2 Missing reentrancy protection in strategymulticall
9.3 Single-step ownership transfer process
9.4 Owner can renounce ownership
9.5 Inaccurate natspec comments
9.6 Unused imports
9.7 Use of revert strings instead of custom errors
9.8 Redundant named return
9.9 Style guide optimizations

10. Automated Testing

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← Back to Audits

Mamo PR - Moonwell

Prepared by:

HALBORN

Last Updated 06/26/2025

Date of Engagement: June 18th, 2025 - June 18th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

1. Summary
2. Introduction
3. Assessment summary
4. Test approach and methodology
5. Storage collision assessment
6. Risk methodology
7. Scope
8. Assessment summary & findings overview
9. Findings & Tech Details

9.1 Excess value becomes irrecoverable
9.2 Missing reentrancy protection in strategymulticall
9.3 Single-step ownership transfer process
9.4 Owner can renounce ownership
9.5 Inaccurate natspec comments
9.6 Unused imports
9.7 Use of revert strings instead of custom errors
9.8 Redundant named return
9.9 Style guide optimizations

10. Automated Testing

1. Summary

2. Introduction

3. Assessment Summary

The objectives of this assessment were to

Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were completely addressed by the Moonwell team. The main ones were the following:

Consider refunding excess funds in genericMulticall() or add a withdraw functionallity.
Add a reentrancy protection to the genericMulticall() function in StrategyMulticall.

4. Test Approach and Methodology

Research into architecture and purpose.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph).
Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions (slither).
Testnet deployment (Foundry).

5. Storage collision Assessment

Storage collision study was performed as part of this security review. The original SlippagePriceChecker only used Slot 0 and Slot 1:

forge inspect src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker storage 

╭-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------╮
| Name              | Type                                                                      | Slot | Offset | Bytes | Contract                                          |
+===========================================================================================================================================================================+
| tokenOracleData   | mapping(address => struct ISlippagePriceChecker.TokenFeedConfiguration[]) | 0    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
|-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------|
| maxTimePriceValid | mapping(address => uint256)                                               | 1    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
╰-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------╯

The new SlippagePriceChecker uses Slot 0, Slot 1 and Slot 2:

forge inspect src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker storage

╭---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------╮
| Name                | Type                                                                                          | Slot | Offset | Bytes | Contract                                          |
+=================================================================================================================================================================================================+
| tokenOracleData     | mapping(address => struct ISlippagePriceChecker.TokenFeedConfiguration[])                     | 0    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
|---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------|
| maxTimePriceValid   | mapping(address => uint256)                                                                   | 1    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
|---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------|
| tokenPairOracleData | mapping(address => mapping(address => struct ISlippagePriceChecker.TokenFeedConfiguration[])) | 2    | 0      | 32    | src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol:SlippagePriceChecker |
╰---------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+------+--------+-------+---------------------------------------------------╯

Therefore, no potential collisions were observed.

6. RISK METHODOLOGY

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

6.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Attack Complexity (AX):

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S)	1 0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H)	1 0.67 0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H)	1 0.67 0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

6.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Integrity (I):

Availability (A):

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Availability (A)	None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

6.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F)	1 0.5 0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U)	1.25 1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9

7. SCOPE

REPOSITORY

(a) Repository: mamo-contracts

(b) Assessed Commit ID: c75d06a

src/SlippagePriceChecker.sol
src/StrategyFactory.sol
src/StrategyMulticall.sol

Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

Remediation Commit ID:

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

8. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

Security analysis	Risk level	Remediation Date
Excess Value Becomes Irrecoverable	Medium	Solved - 06/20/2025
Missing Reentrancy Protection in StrategyMulticall	Low	Solved - 06/23/2025
Single-step Ownership Transfer Process	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Owner Can Renounce Ownership	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Inaccurate NatSpec Comments	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Unused Imports	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Use of Revert Strings Instead of Custom Errors	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Redundant Named Return	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025
Style Guide Optimizations	Informational	Acknowledged - 06/25/2025

9. Findings & Tech Details

9.1 Excess Value Becomes Irrecoverable

Medium

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:M/Y:N (5.0)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

https://github.com/moonwell-fi/mamo-contracts/commit/37bc9da4f038bb1602817d734681e4d043d2b2e9

9.2 Missing Reentrancy Protection in StrategyMulticall

Low

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (2.5)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

10. Automated Testing

1. Summary
2. Introduction
3. Assessment summary
4. Test approach and methodology
5. Storage collision assessment
6. Risk methodology
7. Scope
8. Assessment summary & findings overview
9. Findings & Tech Details

9.1 Excess value becomes irrecoverable
9.2 Missing reentrancy protection in strategymulticall
9.3 Single-step ownership transfer process
9.4 Owner can renounce ownership
9.5 Inaccurate natspec comments
9.6 Unused imports
9.7 Use of revert strings instead of custom errors
9.8 Redundant named return
9.9 Style guide optimizations

Mamo PR

Moonwell

Table of Contents

1. Summary

2. Introduction

3. Assessment Summary

4. Test Approach and Methodology

5. Storage collision Assessment

6. RISK METHODOLOGY

6.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Attack Cost (AC):

Attack Complexity (AX):

Metrics:

6.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Integrity (I):

Availability (A):

Deposit (D):

Yield (Y):

Metrics:

6.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Scope (S):

Metrics:

7. SCOPE

8. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

9. Findings & Tech Details

9.1 Excess Value Becomes Irrecoverable

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

9.2 Missing Reentrancy Protection in StrategyMulticall

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

9.3 Single-step Ownership Transfer Process

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

9.4 Owner Can Renounce Ownership

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

9.5 Inaccurate NatSpec Comments

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

9.6 Unused Imports

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

9.7 Use of Revert Strings Instead of Custom Errors

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

9.8 Redundant Named Return

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

9.9 Style Guide Optimizations

Description

BVSS

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

10. Automated Testing

Table of Contents

Mamo PR

Moonwell

Table of Contents