Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
- 0Risk Accepted
- 1Future Release
- 4Solved
- 5All Findings
- Critical2
- 2Solved
- High0
- Medium0
- Low2
- 1Solved
- 1F. Release
- Informational1
- 1Solved
Introduction#
Ripple engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on XRP Ledger (XRPL) feature amendments beginning on Jan 31, 2025 and ending on Feb 13, 2025, focusing on PR #5060. The feature introduces a new transaction type Batch that enables atomic execution of multiple transactions, supporting various modes of operation including all-or-nothing, only-one, until-failure, and independent execution patterns.
Assessment Summary#
The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the node. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert in advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The scope of this audit encompasses:
The new Batch transaction type and its fields
Multi-account transaction signing mechanisms
Inner transaction security controls
Fee calculation and processing
Transaction integrity and atomicity guarantees
Test Approach and Methodology#
Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the Batch Transaction feature security assessment. The following phases and tools were used:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the Batch Transaction feature through extensive documentation review.
Manual code review and walkthrough to identify potential logic issues in transaction processing and security controls.
Security control testing for signature verification, fee processing, and atomic execution guarantees.
Implementation verification of inner transaction controls and batch mode operations.
Trust model validation for both single-account and multi-account transaction scenarios.
Documentation analysis covering security considerations and implementation guidelines.
Functional testing of transaction processing flows and error handling mechanisms.
Edge case testing for complex transaction scenarios and failure modes.
Review of error handling and recovery mechanisms.
Risk Methodology#
4.1 EXPLOITABILITY
Attack Origin (AO):
Attack Cost (AC):
Attack Complexity (AX):
Metrics:
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) | 1 |
| Specific (AO:S) | 0.2 | |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AC:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AC:H) | 0.33 | |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AX:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AX:H) | 0.33 |
4.2 IMPACT
Confidentiality (C):
Integrity (I):
Availability (A):
Deposit (D):
Yield (Y):
Metrics:
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) | 0 |
| Low (C:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (C:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (C:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (C:C) | 1 | |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) | 0 |
| Low (I:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (I:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (I:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (I:C) | 1 | |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) | 0 |
| Low (A:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (A:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (A:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (A:C) | 1 | |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) | 0 |
| Low (D:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (D:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (D:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (D:C) | 1 | |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) | 0 |
| Low (Y:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (Y:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (Y:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (Y:C) | 1 |
4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT
Reversibility (R):
Scope (S):
Metrics:
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) | 1 |
| Partial (R:P) | 0.5 | |
| Full (R:F) | 0.25 | |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) | 1.25 |
| Unchanged (S:U) | 1 |
| Critical | High | Medium | Low | Informational |
| 9 - 10 | 7 - 8.9 | 4.5 - 6.9 | 2 - 4.4 | 0 - 1.9 |
Scope#
Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#
# | Title | Severity | Score | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fee Manipulation in Batch Transaction | Critical | 10.0 | Solved | |
| Unbounded Resource Consumption in Fee Calculation | Critical | 9.4 | Solved03/10/2025 | |
| Missing sequence number enforcement in preflight | Low | 2.5 | Solved03/10/2025 | |
| Missing OnBehalfOf Transactions Check | Low | 2.5 | Future Release03/10/2025 | |
| Integer Overflow | Informational | 0.0 | Solved03/10/2025 |
Findings & Tech Details#
Description
Proof of Concept
Recommendation
Description
Proof of Concept
Recommendation
Description
Recommendation
Description
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Description
Recommendation
Disclaimer#
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
