Ripple - Smart Contract Audit - Permissioned Domains - Ripple


Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 06/27/2025

Date of Engagement: December 23rd, 2024 - January 10th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

2

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

2


1. Introduction

Ripple engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on XRP Ledger (XRPL) feature amendments, beginning on December 23rd, 2024 and ending on January 10th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the features provided to the Halborn team.


Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


The Permissioned Domains feature introduced a new transaction type and structures to allow the creation of domains whitelisting specific credential bearers to send and receive transactions within that permissioned domain.

2. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the node. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that the new features operate as intended.

    • Identify potential security issues with the new features.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were acknowledged by the Ripple team: 

    • Improve the error handling.

    • Mind of unaccepted and expired credentials when implementing additional Permissioned Domain features.


3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the node security assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.

    • Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions.


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

Files and Repository
(a) Repository: rippled
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 971aaa6
(c) Items in scope:
  • src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/PermissionedDomainSet.cpp
  • src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/PermissionedDomainDelete.cpp
  • src/xrpld/app/misc/CredentialHelpers.cp
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies.
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

2

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Lack of error handlingInformationalAcknowledged - 02/13/2025
Expired and non accepted credentials could be part of the domainInformationalAcknowledged - 02/13/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Lack of error handling

//

Informational

Description

When creating a permissioned domain via the PermissionedDomainSet transaction, the creator needs to pass an array of credential objects to the transaction. This array is validated against duplicates during the preliminary verifications, and used to construct the permissioned domain object in a second part.


During the permissioned domain object creation, the function iterates through each credential objects of the parameters and inserts them in a map. If the object is already present, an empty map would be returned. While the code is in this state protected against duplicates due to the aforementioned verification, it would gain to be more robust and return an error instead of an empty map to handle codebase updates without potential bugs.


Code Location

  • src/xrpld/app/misc/CredentialHelpers.cpp: the following snippet shows the aforementioned preliminary verification, ensuring that the credential array does not contain duplicates.

auto [it, ins] = duplicates.insert(sha512Half(issuer, ct));
if (!ins)
{
    JLOG(j.trace()) << "Malformed transaction: "
                        "duplicates in credenentials.";
    return temMALFORMED;
}

  • src/xrpld/app/misc/CredentialHelpers.cpp: the function returns an empty map if a duplicate is found, and could be improved by returning an error.

std::set<std::pair<AccountID, Slice>>
makeSorted(STArray const& credentials)
{
    std::set<std::pair<AccountID, Slice>> out;
    for (auto const& cred : credentials)
    {
        auto [it, ins] = out.emplace(cred[sfIssuer], cred[sfCredentialType]);
        if (!ins)
            return {};
    }
    return out;
}

  • src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/PermissionedDomainSet.cpp: the permissioned domain object creation invokes the above function, not checking for empty content either.

TER
PermissionedDomainSet::doApply() // @note apply the transaction to the ledger
{
    // @note not sure the need to check if the ownerSle exists since
    // it's initialized in the transactor
    auto const ownerSle = view().peek(keylet::account(account_));
    if (!ownerSle)
        return tefINTERNAL;  // LCOV_EXCL_LINE

    auto const sortedTxCredentials =
        credentials::makeSorted(ctx_.tx.getFieldArray(sfAcceptedCredentials));
    STArray sortedLE(sfAcceptedCredentials, sortedTxCredentials.size());
    for (auto const& p : sortedTxCredentials)
    {
        auto cred = STObject::makeInnerObject(sfCredential);
        cred.setAccountID(sfIssuer, p.first);
        cred.setFieldVL(sfCredentialType, p.second);
        sortedLE.push_back(std::move(cred));
    }
BVSS
Recommendation

It is recommended to return an error instead of an empty map.

Remediation Comment

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Ripple team acknowledged this finding.

7.2 Expired and non accepted credentials could be part of the domain

//

Informational

Description

The permissioned domain object contains a list of credentials objects with only the credential_type and the issuer fields set. This allows anyone is possession of matching credentials to be part of the domain. Expired credentials are not automatically deleted from the subject account if no transactions occur, and even non-accepted credentials could be possibly accepted as part of the domain without the subject approval either.


This would allow, depending on the PermissionedDomain further implementation, to perform unauthorized actions on the subject. At the time of the assessment, this feature was still under development and this finding does not report an actual vulnerability, rather a suggestion for future development.


Code Location

  • src/xrpld/app/tx/detail/PermissionedDomainSet.cpp: the following snippets show that accepted credentials are using sfIssuer and sfCredentialType as only filters.

STArray sortedLE(sfAcceptedCredentials, sortedTxCredentials.size());
for (auto const& p : sortedTxCredentials)
{
    auto cred = STObject::makeInnerObject(sfCredential);
    cred.setAccountID(sfIssuer, p.first);
    cred.setFieldVL(sfCredentialType, p.second);
    sortedLE.push_back(std::move(cred));
}
BVSS
Recommendation

It is recommended to mind the expirations and non-acceptance of credentials for the upcoming implementations using the PermissionedDomains.

Remediation Comment

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Ripple team acknowledged this finding.

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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Ripple - Smart Contract Audit - Permissioned Domains

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