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RUJI Trade (FIN) - THORChain

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 05/02/2025

Date of Engagement: January 23rd, 2025 - February 7th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

10

Critical

2

High

0

Medium

3

Low

2

Informational

3

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

THORChain engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of the Rujira Trade (FIN) contracts, beginning on January 23rd, 2025 and ending on February 7th, 2025. This security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts in the Rujira GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


Rujira Trade (FIN) is a fully on-chain, decentralized orderbook DEX that combines an O(1) matching algorithm with liquidity from multiple sources, including Rujira's AMM pools (BOW) and THORChain’s Base Layer liquidity.


2. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended

    • Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were partially addressed by the Rujira team. The main ones were the following:

    • Ensure sum and product parameters are correctly set after a partial distribution.

    • Properly reset parameters after a pool reset.

    • Remove unnecessary decimal scaling in normalized_price.

    • Handle missing decimals fields in QueryPoolResponse.

    • Adjust swap calculations to properly refund or account for excess offer amounts.



3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

    • Research into architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Manual code read and walk through.

    • Manual Assessment of use and safety for the critical Rust variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.

    • Architecture related logical controls.

    • Cross contract call controls.

    • Scanning of Rust files for vulnerabilities(cargo audit)

    • Review and improvement of integration tests.

    • Verification of integration tests and implementation of new ones.


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: rujira
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 9158579
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/rujira-fin/src/events.rs
  • contracts/rujira-fin/src/order.rs
  • contracts/rujira-fin/src/error.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

2

High

0

Medium

3

Low

2

Informational

3

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Exponential Growth in Filled Amounts After Partial DistributionCriticalSolved - 02/02/2025
Users Can Claim Excess Funds After Pool ResetCriticalSolved - 02/04/2025
Redundant Normalization May Cause Incorrect Oracle PricesMediumSolved - 02/14/2025
Missing `decimals` Field Causes Parsing Failures in QueryPoolResponseMediumNot Applicable - 04/04/2025
Swap Overpayment Leads to Loss for BuyersMediumRisk Accepted - 04/11/2025
Users Are Forced to Create an Order to Withdraw Their Filled AmountLowSolved - 04/01/2025
Missing Validations Allow Invalid ConfigurationsLowSolved - 04/01/2025
Small Orders Are Removed from the SystemInformationalSolved - 02/14/2025
Lack of Fund Validation Before Market Maker Swap ExecutionInformationalAcknowledged - 04/11/2025
Prevent Unnecessary Market Maker Quote After Offer is FulfilledInformationalSolved - 02/14/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Exponential Growth in Filled Amounts After Partial Distribution

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/bde18fdb02b9b0213e43308c7ebf5b865886ac97

7.2 Users Can Claim Excess Funds After Pool Reset

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/bde18fdb02b9b0213e43308c7ebf5b865886ac97

7.3 Redundant Normalization May Cause Incorrect Oracle Prices

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/bde18fdb02b9b0213e43308c7ebf5b865886ac97

7.4 Missing `decimals` Field Causes Parsing Failures in QueryPoolResponse

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.5 Swap Overpayment Leads to Loss for Buyers

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 Users Are Forced to Create an Order to Withdraw Their Filled Amount

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/bde18fdb02b9b0213e43308c7ebf5b865886ac97

7.7 Missing Validations Allow Invalid Configurations

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/bde18fdb02b9b0213e43308c7ebf5b865886ac97

7.8 Small Orders Are Removed from the System

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/bde18fdb02b9b0213e43308c7ebf5b865886ac97

7.9 Lack of Fund Validation Before Market Maker Swap Execution

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.10 Prevent Unnecessary Market Maker Quote After Offer is Fulfilled

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/bde18fdb02b9b0213e43308c7ebf5b865886ac97

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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RUJI Trade (FIN)

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