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Rujira Staking - THORChain

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 05/02/2025

Date of Engagement: March 31st, 2025 - April 2nd, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

5

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

2

Informational

3

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION

THORChain engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on March 31st, 2025 and ending on April 2th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended

    • Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly acknowledged by the THORChain team. The main ones were the following:

    • Ensure the new converter address is validated, the swap limit is within a safe range, and the binary message is properly formed. Also, emit an event with the updated values to improve transparency and traceability.

    • Enforce stricter checks on denom format and validate token metadata fields like name, symbol, and decimals to ensure they follow expected structure and length constraints.

3. TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.

    • Scanning of Rust files for common vulnerabilities (cargo audit).


4. Caveats

This assessment focused exclusively on the files and logic explicitly defined within the provided scope. While external contract calls and interactions with shared packages were reviewed where relevant, a deeper analysis of their internal behavior was considered out of scope and may warrant a dedicated assessment if those components are critical to the system’s security.

5. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

5.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

5.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

6. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: rujira
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 471d744
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/rujira-staking/src/config.rs
  • contracts/rujira-staking/src/contract.rs
  • contracts/rujira-staking/src/error.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

7. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

2

Informational

3

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Lack of parameter restrictions when updating revenue converter via privileged entry pointLowRisk Accepted - 04/04/2025
Insufficient validation of instantiation inputs may allow misconfigurationLowRisk Accepted - 04/04/2025
Suppressed validation allows multi-denomination inputs to proceed silentlyInformationalAcknowledged - 04/04/2025
Inconsistent calculation and ambiguous labeling of revenue-related fieldsInformationalSolved - 04/28/2025
Unbonding may succeed without returning any tokens to the userInformationalAcknowledged - 04/04/2025

8. Findings & Tech Details

8.1 Lack of parameter restrictions when updating revenue converter via privileged entry point

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.2 Insufficient validation of instantiation inputs may allow misconfiguration

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.3 Suppressed validation allows multi-denomination inputs to proceed silently

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.4 Inconsistent calculation and ambiguous labeling of revenue-related fields

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://gitlab.com/thorchain/rujira/-/commit/bde18fdb02b9b0213e43308c7ebf5b865886ac97

8.5 Unbonding may succeed without returning any tokens to the user

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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Rujira Staking

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