Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 05/23/2025
Date of Engagement: December 9th, 2024 - December 19th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
4
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
4
UNCX engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on a set of changes int their LP Locker Solana program beginning on March 11th, 2024, and ending on March 20th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the Solana Program provided in solana-lp-locker-monorepo GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
This set of changes is based on a new extension of the calculation of the intrinsic growth of an LP position due to commissions to allow a user who has locked LP to claim this commission component while keeping the initial main LP locked.
Halborn was provided 8 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn did not identify any significant security risks. However, some improvements were highlighted as best practices, which were acknowledged by the UNCX team:
Add a check to validate the authority of user_token_coin and user_token_pc token accounts.
Add validation to reject default public keys in change_owner and set_dev and remove the redundant check in in confirm_pending_admin
Remove redundant fields in LpFeeCalc and TokenLock if they are not expected to be consumed in the program.
Add a check before the fee calculation process to ensure that current_locked_amount is greater than zero and create a specific error case to explicitly handle the scenario where it is not.
Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
Mapping out possible attack vectors
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (
cargo audit).Local runtime testing (
cargo test-bpf )| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
4
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Pc and Coin token accounts authority check missing | Informational | Acknowledged - 05/23/2025 |
| Redundant checks and missing completed validation in role transition instructions | Informational | Acknowledged - 05/23/2025 |
| Redundant fields in LpFeeCalc and TokenLock | Informational | Not Applicable |
| Missing validation for current_locked_amount before fee calculation | Informational | Not Applicable |
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Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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