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NfNode Rewards Program - Wayru

Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated Unknown date

Date of Engagement: January 14th, 2025 - February 14th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

7

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

2

Low

3

Informational

2

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Wayru engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their NfNode Rewards Solana program beginning on January 14th, 2025, and ending on January 16th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the Solana Program provided in rewards-system-program GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


The NfNode Rewards Program enables users to claim rewards based on their NfNode operation and ownership. It leverages the Anchor framework to streamline the development of Solana programs. It allows administrators to establish a reward system, fund it with tokens, and manage the reward claiming process. Users, who are NfNode owners or operators, can claim rewards once per day. Each claim requires a partial signature from an administrator, enhancing security. The user claiming the reward is responsible for the transaction fees.


The Wayru team provided an updated version of the NfNode Rewards programa which introduces a new feature that requires users to make a deposit when creating a new NfNode entry. Depending on the NfNode type, the deposit is required at the time of entry creation. For BYOD and WayruHotspot types, the deposit must be made along with the creation of the NfNode entry. For the DON type, no deposit is needed for the owner to claim rewards; however, the deposit is required for the manufacturer or host to be able to claim rewards. Additionally, users must wait a 30-day cooldown period before they can withdraw the deposited amount.


2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 3 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols. This program allows administrators to establish a reward system, fund it with tokens, and manage the reward claiming process. Users, who are NfNode owners or operators, can claim rewards once per day.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.

    • Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

 

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were completely addressed by the Wayru team:

    • Implement a validation to ensure that the Initialize instruction can only be executed by a known and trusted address, such as the program upgrade authority.

    • Add a "owner" field in nfnode_entry to hold the user's address who initializes. Add a check in in update_nfnode and owner_claim_rewards to ensure the user who is signing is the owner of the provided nfnode_entry. Also, add a validation in init_nfnode, update_nfnode and owner_claim_rewardsto ensure the user who is signing is the authority of the user_nft_token_account provided.

    • Implementing a two-step authority transfer functionality and add a validation to ensure the new authority candidate is not the current admin.

    • Add a check to ensure the reward amount and fund amount is strictly greater than zero.

    • Add validations to Verify that the mint's total supply is exactly 1 and its decimal is 0.


3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.

    • Mapping out possible attack vectors

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.

    • Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (

      cargo audit
      ).

    • Local runtime testing (

      solana-test-framework
      )

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORIES
(a) Repository: rewards-system-program
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 9dfab91
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/nfnode-rewards/src/errors.rs
  • programs/nfnode-rewards/src/lib.rs
  • programs/nfnode-rewards/src/state.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
(a) Repository: rewards-system-program
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 3b593b0
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/nfnode-rewards/src
  • programs/nfnode-rewards/src/instructions
  • programs/nfnode-rewards/src/instructions/deposit_tokens.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

2

Low

3

Informational

2

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Program initializer can be front-runMediumSolved - 01/20/2025
Multiple vulnerabilities in reward claiming and NfNode initialization and update processMediumSolved - 01/21/2025
New admin check missingLowSolved - 01/21/2025
Zero amount check missingLowSolved - 01/21/2025
Insufficient validation of NFT mint properties in nfnode entry initializationLowSolved - 02/04/2025
Insufficient validation of mint authority at system initializationInformationalSolved - 02/17/2025
Paused status check missing in pause instructionsInformationalSolved - 01/21/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Program initializer can be front-run

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.2 Multiple vulnerabilities in reward claiming and NfNode initialization and update process

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.3 New admin check missing

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.4 Zero amount check missing

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.5 Insufficient validation of NFT mint properties in nfnode entry initialization

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 Insufficient validation of mint authority at system initialization

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.7 Paused status check missing in pause instructions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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NfNode Rewards Program

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