Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 09/16/2025
Date of Engagement: August 26th, 2024 - September 20th, 2024
Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
27
Critical
4
High
1
Medium
5
Low
12
Informational
5
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Assessment summary
- 3. Test approach and methodology
- 4. Risk methodology
- 5. Scope
- 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
- 7. Findings & Tech Details
- 7.1 Unrestricted growth of pubkeyshares hashmap can lead to out-of-memory (oom)
- 7.2 Message::forwardmulrequest potential ddos
- 7.3 Inadequate validation of messages in dkg protocol
- 7.4 Deadlock in dkg
- 7.5 Lack of validation for threshold parameters in update_threshold function
- 7.6 Incorrect threshold check for multiplication verification in process_verification function
- 7.7 Incomplete election state update and lack of error handling in conduct_election function
- 7.8 Panic in polynomial generation from seed
- 7.9 Out-of-bounds access due to empty vectors
- 7.10 Missing t,n validation in network initialization
- 7.11 Non-constant time cryptographic operations in pointtrait
- 7.12 Missing error handling for encode() in process_verification function
- 7.13 Lack of i/o lock for file operations in storekeyshares handling
- 7.14 Missing synchronization for shared state in electionenginestate
- 7.15 Insecure rng for polynomial coefficients
- 7.16 Sensitive data exposure through logging of seed value
- 7.17 Misconfigurations in gossip initialization
- 7.18 Lack of peer blacklisting in gossipsub engine
- 7.19 Unchecked return values in request and subscription handlers
- 7.20 Insufficient error handling in handle_store_reshared_received_pubshare
- 7.21 Missing update of total nodes in add_node function
- 7.22 Multiple overflows in polynomial operations
- 7.23 Invalid threshold calculation in calculate_threshold function
- 7.24 Function naming and state update issue in check_election_status
- 7.25 Missing degree constraints in polynomial creation function
- 7.26 Insecure fallback to local random number generation
- 7.27 Use of non-cryptographically secure random number generators in dkg nodes
- 8. Automated Testing
1. Introduction
Holonym engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their Rust codebase from September 2, 2024, to September 27, 2024. The assessment focused on the specific crates listed in the provided GitHub repository and included relevant commit hashes. More details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
2. Assessment Summary
The Halborn team was allocated four weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the crates and the overall codebase. The security engineer is an expert in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract auditing, as well as extensive knowledge of various blockchain protocols.
The purpose of this assessment is to:
Ensure that codebase functions operate as intended
Identify potential security issues within codebase
3. Test Approach and Methodology
Halborn Performed a combination of the manual view of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of the codebase assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation, automated testing techniques. They can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research on the architecture, purpose, and usage of the Human network.
Manual code reading and walkthroughs to gain an understanding of the overall design and potential vulnerabilities.
Manual assessment of critical Rust variables and functions to identify arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.
Testing for race conditions and thread safety in the Rust actor framework.
Audit of the DKG (Distributed Key Generation) cryptographic protocol to ensure robustness against potential attacks.
Review of libp2p configuration and security to validate network communication integrity.
Security testing of cryptographic primitives to ensure they meet industry standards.
Scanning Rust files for vulnerabilities using Cargo Audit, identifying outdated dependencies and known security issues.
Checking for unsafe code usage with Cargo Geiger to minimize risks associated with unsafe Rust features.
Analysis of node communication and message integrity to mitigate risks from malicious nodes.
Review of error handling and logging practices to ensure sensitive information is not exposed.
Testing for denial-of-service vulnerabilities and resilience against resource exhaustion attacks.
4. RISK METHODOLOGY
Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.
4.1 EXPLOITABILITY
Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
Exploitability is calculated using the following formula:
4.2 IMPACT
Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Impact is calculated using the following formula:
4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT
Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
Severity Coefficient is obtained by the following product:
The Vulnerability Severity Score is obtained by:
The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
5. SCOPE
REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: decentralization
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 518213f
(c) Items in scope:
- ./actors/src/actor_manager.rs
- ./actors/src/election_actor.rs
- ./actors/src/lib.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Remediation Commit ID:
- https://github.com/holonym-foundation/decentralization/blob/main-net-alpha_v1/mishti/crates/actors/src/gossip_engine_actor.rs#L402C72-L402C73~L414
- 75df6a4
- https://github.com/holonym-foundation/decentralization/blob/fix-audit/mishti/crates/cryptography/src/polynomial.rs
- 64e8c4b
- https://github.com/holonym-foundation/decentralization/blob/main-net-alpha_v1/mishti/crates/actors/src/dkg_engine_actor.rs#L1440~L1443
- https://github.com/holonym-foundation/decentralization/blob/fix-audit/mishti/crates/cryptography/src/polynomial.rs#L40_L53
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.
6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview
Critical
4
High
1
Medium
5
Low
12
Informational
5
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Unrestricted Growth of PubkeyShares HashMap Can Lead to Out-of-Memory (OOM) | Critical | Solved - 03/08/2025 |
| Message::ForwardMulRequest Potential DDoS | Critical | Solved - 06/04/2025 |
| Inadequate Validation of Messages in DKG Protocol | Critical | Solved - 03/08/2025 |
| Deadlock in DKG | Critical | Solved - 03/08/2025 |
| Lack of Validation for Threshold Parameters in update_threshold Function | High | Solved - 02/13/2025 |
| Incorrect Threshold Check for Multiplication Verification in process_verification Function | Medium | Solved - 03/08/2025 |
| Incomplete Election State Update and Lack of Error Handling in conduct_election Function | Medium | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Panic in Polynomial Generation from Seed | Medium | Solved - 06/11/2025 |
| Out-of-Bounds Access Due to Empty Vectors | Medium | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Missing t,n Validation in Network Initialization | Medium | Solved - 03/08/2025 |
| Non-Constant Time Cryptographic Operations In PointTrait | Low | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Missing Error Handling for encode() in process_verification Function | Low | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Lack of I/O Lock for File Operations in StoreKeyShares Handling | Low | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Missing Synchronization for Shared State in ElectionEngineState | Low | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Insecure RNG for Polynomial Coefficients | Low | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Sensitive Data Exposure Through Logging of Seed Value | Low | Solved - 10/10/2024 |
| Misconfigurations in gossip Initialization | Low | Solved - 03/08/2025 |
| Lack of Peer Blacklisting in Gossipsub Engine | Low | Solved - 03/08/2025 |
| Unchecked Return Values in Request and Subscription Handlers | Low | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Insufficient Error Handling in handle_store_reshared_received_pubshare | Low | Solved - 06/04/2025 |
| Missing Update of Total Nodes in add_node Function | Low | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Multiple Overflows in Polynomial Operations | Low | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Invalid Threshold Calculation in calculate_threshold Function | Informational | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Function Naming and State Update Issue in check_election_status | Informational | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Missing Degree Constraints in Polynomial Creation Function | Informational | Solved - 06/01/2025 |
| Insecure Fallback to Local Random Number Generation | Informational | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
| Use of Non-Cryptographically Secure Random Number Generators in dkg nodes | Informational | Not Applicable - 03/08/2025 |
7. Findings & Tech Details
7.1 Unrestricted Growth of PubkeyShares HashMap Can Lead to Out-of-Memory (OOM)
//Critical
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.2 Message::ForwardMulRequest Potential DDoS
//Critical
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
7.3 Inadequate Validation of Messages in DKG Protocol
//Critical
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.4 Deadlock in DKG
//Critical
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.5 Lack of Validation for Threshold Parameters in update_threshold Function
//High
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
7.6 Incorrect Threshold Check for Multiplication Verification in process_verification Function
//Medium
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.7 Incomplete Election State Update and Lack of Error Handling in conduct_election Function
//Medium
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.8 Panic in Polynomial Generation from Seed
//Medium
Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
7.9 Out-of-Bounds Access Due to Empty Vectors
//Medium
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.10 Missing t,n Validation in Network Initialization
//Medium
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.11 Non-Constant Time Cryptographic Operations In PointTrait
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.12 Missing Error Handling for encode() in process_verification Function
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.13 Lack of I/O Lock for File Operations in StoreKeyShares Handling
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.14 Missing Synchronization for Shared State in ElectionEngineState
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.15 Insecure RNG for Polynomial Coefficients
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.16 Sensitive Data Exposure Through Logging of Seed Value
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
7.17 Misconfigurations in gossip Initialization
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.18 Lack of Peer Blacklisting in Gossipsub Engine
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.19 Unchecked Return Values in Request and Subscription Handlers
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.20 Insufficient Error Handling in handle_store_reshared_received_pubshare
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
7.21 Missing Update of Total Nodes in add_node Function
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.22 Multiple Overflows in Polynomial Operations
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.23 Invalid Threshold Calculation in calculate_threshold Function
//Informational
Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.24 Function Naming and State Update Issue in check_election_status
//Informational
Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.25 Missing Degree Constraints in Polynomial Creation Function
//Informational
Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
7.26 Insecure Fallback to Local Random Number Generation
//Informational
Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.27 Use of Non-Cryptographically Secure Random Number Generators in dkg nodes
//Informational
Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
8. Automated Testing
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Assessment summary
- 3. Test approach and methodology
- 4. Risk methodology
- 5. Scope
- 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
- 7. Findings & Tech Details
- 7.1 Unrestricted growth of pubkeyshares hashmap can lead to out-of-memory (oom)
- 7.2 Message::forwardmulrequest potential ddos
- 7.3 Inadequate validation of messages in dkg protocol
- 7.4 Deadlock in dkg
- 7.5 Lack of validation for threshold parameters in update_threshold function
- 7.6 Incorrect threshold check for multiplication verification in process_verification function
- 7.7 Incomplete election state update and lack of error handling in conduct_election function
- 7.8 Panic in polynomial generation from seed
- 7.9 Out-of-bounds access due to empty vectors
- 7.10 Missing t,n validation in network initialization
- 7.11 Non-constant time cryptographic operations in pointtrait
- 7.12 Missing error handling for encode() in process_verification function
- 7.13 Lack of i/o lock for file operations in storekeyshares handling
- 7.14 Missing synchronization for shared state in electionenginestate
- 7.15 Insecure rng for polynomial coefficients
- 7.16 Sensitive data exposure through logging of seed value
- 7.17 Misconfigurations in gossip initialization
- 7.18 Lack of peer blacklisting in gossipsub engine
- 7.19 Unchecked return values in request and subscription handlers
- 7.20 Insufficient error handling in handle_store_reshared_received_pubshare
- 7.21 Missing update of total nodes in add_node function
- 7.22 Multiple overflows in polynomial operations
- 7.23 Invalid threshold calculation in calculate_threshold function
- 7.24 Function naming and state update issue in check_election_status
- 7.25 Missing degree constraints in polynomial creation function
- 7.26 Insecure fallback to local random number generation
- 7.27 Use of non-cryptographically secure random number generators in dkg nodes
- 8. Automated Testing
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