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Brink - Lendle

Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 09/18/2025

Date of Engagement: July 25th, 2025 - July 31st, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

9

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

0

Low

4

Informational

4

Table of Contents

1. Summary

Brink engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts beginning on July 25th, 2025 and ending on August 12th, 2025. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn assigned 1 full-time security engineer to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineer is an expert in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.


The objectives of this assessment were to:

    • Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.

    • Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks. These were completely addressed by the Brink team. The main ones were:

    • Add access control on strategies implementations.

    • Use abi.encode rather than abi.encodePacked in the factory.

    • Restrict strategy allowances.


3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn conducted a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is crucial for identifying flaws in logic, processes, and implementation, automated testing enhances coverage of smart contracts and quickly detects deviations from established security best practices.


The following phases and associated tools were employed throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the platform's architecture, purpose and use.

    • Manual code review and walkthrough of smart contracts to identify any logical issues.

    • Comprehensive assessment of the safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions within scope that could lead to arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.

    • Local testing using custom scripts (Foundry).

    • Fork testing against main networks (Foundry).

    • Static security analysis of scoped contracts, and imported functions (Slither).


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: brink-v2
(b) Assessed Commit ID: cdb4a0a
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/BrinkVaultFactory.sol
  • contracts/strategies/morpho/MorphoStrategy.sol
  • contracts/strategies/aave/AaveStrategy.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third-party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

0

Low

4

Informational

4

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Aave and Lendle strategies allow unauthorized withdrawsCriticalSolved - 08/19/2025
Salt uses abi.encodePacked with dynamic type (risk of ambiguous hashing)LowSolved - 08/19/2025
Unrestricted dust forwarding method allows minor griefingLowSolved - 08/19/2025
Mint function overwrite the shares requested by the userLowSolved - 08/19/2025
Unrestricted allowance allows malicious strategies to steal depositsLowSolved - 08/19/2025
Vault accepts duplicate strategies at initializationInformationalSolved - 08/22/2025
setStrategist permits zero addressInformationalAcknowledged - 08/19/2025
Missing top-level reentrancy guardsInformationalSolved - 08/19/2025
Reliance on EnumerableSet.values() Ordering Causes Weight/Strategy MisalignmentInformationalSolved - 08/19/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Aave and Lendle strategies allow unauthorized withdraws

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Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/0xb11a/brink-v2/commit/1de4677e8cdd214e76f0a3d85cede110ab840ae4

7.2 Salt uses abi.encodePacked with dynamic type (risk of ambiguous hashing)

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/0xb11a/brink-v2/commit/0369a6a19eab09d98efa5d5a35e027d8a14f6b2d

7.3 Unrestricted dust forwarding method allows minor griefing

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Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/0xb11a/brink-v2/commit/c25558881a9f2930a51ceae023dd0f62cf9ef83c

7.4 Mint function overwrite the shares requested by the user

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Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/0xb11a/brink-v2/commit/82afb299819a42538047d68748e2dc1c9532d53a

7.5 Unrestricted allowance allows malicious strategies to steal deposits

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Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/0xb11a/brink-v2/commit/0ae829120cc7e0db92e3566cb80f464f904f791d

7.6 Vault accepts duplicate strategies at initialization

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/0xb11a/brink-v2/commit/eb6279b8c3919c22bfd3de86c3b3cebd4b7368dc

7.7 setStrategist permits zero address

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.8 Missing top-level reentrancy guards

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/0xb11a/brink-v2/commit/fa6c2b44e7f2a2e58fd8db256fe661a7841edf80

7.9 Reliance on EnumerableSet.values() Ordering Causes Weight/Strategy Misalignment

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Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/0xb11a/brink-v2/commit/99b08dc5053cf16f1a20722bd1733f693e2a3270

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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