Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 09/18/2025
Date of Engagement: July 25th, 2025 - July 31st, 2025
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
9
Critical
1
High
0
Medium
0
Low
4
Informational
4
Brink engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts beginning on July 25th, 2025 and ending on August 12th, 2025. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.
Halborn assigned 1 full-time security engineer to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineer is an expert in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The objectives of this assessment were to:
Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.
Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks. These were completely addressed by the Brink team. The main ones were:
Add access control on strategies implementations.
Use abi.encode rather than abi.encodePacked in the factory.
Restrict strategy allowances.
Halborn conducted a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is crucial for identifying flaws in logic, processes, and implementation, automated testing enhances coverage of smart contracts and quickly detects deviations from established security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were employed throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the platform's architecture, purpose and use.
Manual code review and walkthrough of smart contracts to identify any logical issues.
Comprehensive assessment of the safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions within scope that could lead to arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.
Local testing using custom scripts (Foundry).
Fork testing against main networks (Foundry).
Static security analysis of scoped contracts, and imported functions (Slither).
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
1
High
0
Medium
0
Low
4
Informational
4
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Aave and Lendle strategies allow unauthorized withdraws | Critical | Solved - 08/19/2025 |
| Salt uses abi.encodePacked with dynamic type (risk of ambiguous hashing) | Low | Solved - 08/19/2025 |
| Unrestricted dust forwarding method allows minor griefing | Low | Solved - 08/19/2025 |
| Mint function overwrite the shares requested by the user | Low | Solved - 08/19/2025 |
| Unrestricted allowance allows malicious strategies to steal deposits | Low | Solved - 08/19/2025 |
| Vault accepts duplicate strategies at initialization | Informational | Solved - 08/22/2025 |
| setStrategist permits zero address | Informational | Acknowledged - 08/19/2025 |
| Missing top-level reentrancy guards | Informational | Solved - 08/19/2025 |
| Reliance on EnumerableSet.values() Ordering Causes Weight/Strategy Misalignment | Informational | Solved - 08/19/2025 |
//Critical
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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