Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 07/21/2025
Date of Engagement: July 1st, 2025 - July 4th, 2025
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
6
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
6
OpenEden engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of their smart contracts from July 1st, 2025 to July 4th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the OpenEdenHQ/usdo.tge.audit Github repository provided to Halborn. Further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
Halborn was provided 4 (four) days for the engagement, and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were partially addressed by the OpenEden team. The main ones were the following:
Prevent allocation overwrites after vesting completion by adding timestamp validation to setAllocations().
Add zero-address validation in Eden.initialize to prevent token deployment without a controllable admin.
Remove the unnecessary _update override in Eden.sol to optimize bytecode size and reduce deployment costs.
Remove the redundant decimals override in XEden.sol that duplicates inherited ERC20Upgradeable behavior.
Add treasury percentage validation in EdenPublicAirdropVesting initializer to prevent deployment with invalid values.
Complete NatSpec documentation for all externally callable functions to accelerate audits and integration processes.
The commit 5961045, which introduces the new feature, phased distribution of forfeited tokens between stability mechanisms and treasury management, is outside the scope of this assessment.
Halborn employed a combination of manual, semi-automated, and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. Manual testing is essential for uncovering flaws in logic, process, and implementation, while automated techniques enhance code coverage and quickly identify deviations from security best practices. The following phases and tools were utilized throughout the assessment:
Research into the architecture and purpose of the smart contracts.
Manual code review and walkthrough of the smart contracts.
Manual assessment of critical Solidity variables and functions to identify potential vulnerability classes.
Manual testing using custom scripts.
Static security analysis of the scoped contracts and imported functions using Slither.
Local deployment and testing with Foundry.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
6
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Allocations Can Be Overwritten After Full Vesting | Informational | Acknowledged - 07/16/2025 |
| Missing zero-address check in Eden.initialize | Informational | Solved - 07/11/2025 |
| Unnecessary _update Override | Informational | Solved - 07/11/2025 |
| Decimals override duplicates inherited 18 | Informational | Acknowledged - 07/16/2025 |
| treasuryPercentage unchecked in initializer | Informational | Acknowledged - 07/16/2025 |
| Documentation gaps (NatSpec) | Informational | Solved - 07/16/2025 |
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Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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