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Gov Token - OpenEden

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 07/21/2025

Date of Engagement: July 1st, 2025 - July 4th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

6

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

6

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

OpenEden engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of their smart contracts from July 1st, 2025 to July 4th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the OpenEdenHQ/usdo.tge.audit Github repository provided to Halborn. Further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 4 (four) days for the engagement, and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.

    • Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were partially addressed by the OpenEden team. The main ones were the following: 

    • Prevent allocation overwrites after vesting completion by adding timestamp validation to setAllocations().

    • Add zero-address validation in Eden.initialize to prevent token deployment without a controllable admin.

    • Remove the unnecessary _update override in Eden.sol to optimize bytecode size and reduce deployment costs.

    • Remove the redundant decimals override in XEden.sol that duplicates inherited ERC20Upgradeable behavior.

    • Add treasury percentage validation in EdenPublicAirdropVesting initializer to prevent deployment with invalid values.

    • Complete NatSpec documentation for all externally callable functions to accelerate audits and integration processes.

3. Caveats

The commit 5961045, which introduces the new feature, phased distribution of forfeited tokens between stability mechanisms and treasury management, is outside the scope of this assessment.

4. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn employed a combination of manual, semi-automated, and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. Manual testing is essential for uncovering flaws in logic, process, and implementation, while automated techniques enhance code coverage and quickly identify deviations from security best practices. The following phases and tools were utilized throughout the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture and purpose of the smart contracts.

    • Manual code review and walkthrough of the smart contracts.

    • Manual assessment of critical Solidity variables and functions to identify potential vulnerability classes.

    • Manual testing using custom scripts.

    • Static security analysis of the scoped contracts and imported functions using Slither.

    • Local deployment and testing with Foundry.


5. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

5.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

5.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

6. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: usdo.tge.audit
(b) Assessed Commit ID: a648e67
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/Eden.sol
  • contracts/EdenInsiderAirdropVesting.sol
  • contracts/RedemptionController.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

7. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

6

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Allocations Can Be Overwritten After Full VestingInformationalAcknowledged - 07/16/2025
Missing zero-address check in Eden.initializeInformationalSolved - 07/11/2025
Unnecessary _update OverrideInformationalSolved - 07/11/2025
Decimals override duplicates inherited 18InformationalAcknowledged - 07/16/2025
treasuryPercentage unchecked in initializerInformationalAcknowledged - 07/16/2025
Documentation gaps (NatSpec)InformationalSolved - 07/16/2025

8. Findings & Tech Details

8.1 Allocations Can Be Overwritten After Full Vesting

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.2 Missing zero-address check in Eden.initialize

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/OpenEdenHQ/usdo.tge.audit/commit/28d3a844115ae4e88f9bfc1e15302ee662f8199a

8.3 Unnecessary _update Override

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/OpenEdenHQ/usdo.tge.audit/commit/d0e783f377979cecde487547f264903cd35fb1f7

8.4 Decimals override duplicates inherited 18

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.5 treasuryPercentage unchecked in initializer

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.6 Documentation gaps (NatSpec)

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/OpenEdenHQ/usdo.tge.audit/commit/d0e783f377979cecde487547f264903cd35fb1f7

9. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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