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RECC - Smithii

Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 09/19/2025

Date of Engagement: July 29th, 2025 - August 4th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

10

Critical

2

High

0

Medium

2

Low

3

Informational

3

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Smithii engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of the RECC programs from 29th July to 4th August, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository recc-program, commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


The RECC Program is a Real World Asset (RWA) investment platform that enables investors to participate in real estate opportunities. Anyone can list projects on the platform, and investors can contribute funds to these projects in exchange for earnings once the business is completed in the real world. The platform also supports the creation of external markets, allowing investors to exit their positions early.


2. Assessment Summary


Halborn was provided 5 days for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineers to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineers are blockchain and smart contract security experts with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the Solana Program.

    • Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the Smithii team. The main ones were the following:

    • Store the contribution token mint in the 'fundraise' PDA during 'create_fundraise', and add a check in 'contribute' to ensure the supplied 'contribution_mint' matches the one stored in the fundraise account.

    • Validate that 'clmm_program' passed in 'migrate' instruction matches raydium CLMM Program ID.

    • Move the initial Raydium CLMM pool creation and initialization logic to the 'create_fundraise' instruction.

    • Remove the current balance check 'is_vault_ata_credited' in claim instruction.

    • Ensure that the 'project' account provided in the 'claim' instruction matches the 'project' key stored in the 'fundraise' PDA.

    • Utilize CreateV1CpiBuilder from the 'mpl-token-metadata' provided by the Metaplex Token Metadata program. Additionally, the program should validate that the 'contribution_mint' does not have the TransferFee extension enabled.


3. Test Approach and Methodology


Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.

    • Mapping out possible attack vectors.

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.

    • Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (cargo audit).

    • Local runtime testing (anchor test).


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: RECC-Program
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 2acbe81
(c) Items in scope:
  • program/Cargo.toml
  • program/src/instructions/withdraw.rs
  • program/src/instructions/create.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
  • b39f4c0
  • eb0bf45
  • 2608d37
  • 9851e03
  • e673649
  • 728b731
  • 46ba3cf
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

2

High

0

Medium

2

Low

3

Informational

3

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Missing Validation on Contribution Mint Enables Vault Drain and Raydium LP TheftCriticalSolved - 07/31/2025
Missing Validation on clmm_program Allows Fundraise Vault DrainCriticalSolved - 09/08/2025
Unrestricted migrate Invocation Before Target Reached Causes Fund MisallocationMediumSolved - 09/08/2025
First Claim Can Block All Subsequent Claims MediumSolved - 09/06/2025
Missing validation in claim instruction allow pre-mature withdraw of locked fundsLowSolved - 07/31/2025
Pool Front-Running Blocks External Market CreationLowSolved - 09/08/2025
Token-2022 LP Mint and Transfer Fee Extension Not Properly SupportedLowSolved - 09/08/2025
Missing Validation in Multiple InstructionsInformationalPartially Solved - 09/08/2025
Users Can Bypass Protocol Fees by Claiming Small AmountsInformationalSolved - 09/08/2025
Unused Accounts and Redundant PDA DerivationsInformationalSolved - 09/08/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Missing Validation on Contribution Mint Enables Vault Drain and Raydium LP Theft

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.2 Missing Validation on clmm_program Allows Fundraise Vault Drain

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.3 Unrestricted migrate Invocation Before Target Reached Causes Fund Misallocation

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.4 First Claim Can Block All Subsequent Claims

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.5 Missing validation in claim instruction allow pre-mature withdraw of locked funds

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.6 Pool Front-Running Blocks External Market Creation

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.7 Token-2022 LP Mint and Transfer Fee Extension Not Properly Supported

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.8 Missing Validation in Multiple Instructions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.9 Users Can Bypass Protocol Fees by Claiming Small Amounts

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.10 Unused Accounts and Redundant PDA Derivations

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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