Mobile App iOS & Android Blackbox - Sol Strategies


Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 04/21/2025

Date of Engagement: March 17th, 2025 - April 4th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

16

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

2

Low

12

Informational

2


1. Summary

2. Introduction

SOL Strategies engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of their Android / iOS wallet mobile applications. The security assessment was scoped to Sol Strategies provided mobile applications. The client team provided both mobile apps and the respective files to conduct security testing using tools to scan, detect, validate possible vulnerabilities found and report the findings at the end of the engagement.

3. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn was provided 3 weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the assets in scope. The security engineer is a penetration testing expert with advanced knowledge in web, mobile Android and iOS, recon, discovery & infrastructure penetration testing.

The goals of our security assessments are to improve the quality of the systems we review and to target sufficient remediation to help protect users.

In summary, Halborn identified multiple issues, including the possibility of performing a fingerprint authentication bypass, allowing potential attackers to bypass biometric authentication, compromising account security. The Android app is vulnerable to tapjacking attacks, where malicious overlays could trick users into performing unintended actions. Additionally, the Orangefin backend is missing some important security headers.

Both iOS and Android apps have WebViews that can load unrestricted origins, exposing the apps to potential malicious content. Additionally, there are various bypass mechanisms such as the lack of certificate pinning (Android app) and root / jailbreak detection bypass, alongside the lack of anti-hooking and anti-debugging protections on both iOS and Android apps. This leaves the apps vulnerable to reverse engineering and tampering. Additionally, the apps present incorrect security configurations, such as the possibility of performing app backups in Android or a weak ATS configuration in the iOS app. Fingerprint-related vulnerabilities found on Android app (fingerprint authentication bypass and lack of re-authentication when new fingerprint added) could not be reproduced in the iOS app due to limitations of the testing device, however, they are likely to be also present in the iOS app.

Addressing all these vulnerabilities is nevertheless recommended to enhance the overall security and integrity of both applications.

Scope

The security assessment was scoped to:

    • Orangefin - 1.0.0 - Android

    • Orangefin - 1.0.0 - iOS

4. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of the pentest. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process and implementation; automated testing techniques assist enhance coverage of the infrastructure and can quickly identify flaws in it.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Storing private keys and assets securely

    • Application logic flaws

    • Areas where insufficient validation allows for hostile input

    • Application of cryptography to protect secrets

    • Brute-force attempts

    • Input handling

    • Fuzzing of input parameters

    • Technology stack-specific vulnerabilities and code assessment

    • Known vulnerabilities in 3rd party/OSS dependencies.

    • Mapping Content and Functionality of API

    • Application Logic Flaw

    • Access Handling

    • Authentication/Authorization Flaw

    • Response Manipulation

    • Hardcoded credentials or API keys

    • Sensitive data leakage

    • Ensure sensitive data secure storage

    • Secure communications for network communication


5. RISK METHODOLOGY

Halborn assesses the severity of findings using either the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) framework or the Impact/Likelihood Risk scale, depending on the engagement. CVSS is an industry standard framework for communicating characteristics and severity of vulnerabilities in software. Details can be found in the CVSS Specification Document published by F.I.R.S.T.
Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn scored on the Impact/Likelihood Risk scale are measured by the LIKELIHOOD of a security incident and the IMPACT should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.
RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD
  • 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
  • 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
  • 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
  • 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
  • 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.
RISK SCALE - IMPACT
  • 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
  • 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
  • 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
  • 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
  • 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.
The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.
Critical
High
Medium
Low
Informational
  • 10 - CRITICAL
  • 9 - 8 - HIGH
  • 7 - 6 - MEDIUM
  • 5 - 4 - LOW
  • 3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

6. SCOPE

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

7. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

2

Low

12

Informational

2

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
ANDROID - TAPJACKINGMediumSolved - 04/11/2025
BACKEND - MISSING IMPORTANT SECURITY HEADERSMediumSolved - 04/11/2025
ANDROID - LACK OF ANTI-HOOK ANTI-DEBUG MECHANISMSLowPartially Solved - 04/16/2025
ANDROID - WEBVIEWS CAN LOAD UNRESTRICTED ORIGINSLowFuture Release - 04/16/2025
IOS - LACK OF JAILBREAK DETECTION MECHANISMLowFuture Release - 04/16/2025
IOS - LACK OF ANTI-HOOK ANTI-DEBUG MECHANISMSLowFuture Release
IOS - SENSITIVE DATA LOGGED IN CACHELowFuture Release - 04/16/2025
IOS - WEBVIEWS CAN LOAD UNRESTRICTED ORIGINSLowFuture Release - 04/16/2025
ANDROID - FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION BYPASSLowPartially Solved - 04/16/2025
ANDROID - LACK OF RE-AUTHENTICATION WHEN NEW FINGERPRINT ADDEDLowFuture Release - 04/16/2025
BACKEND - ENDPOINT PUBLICLY AVAILABLELowSolved - 03/26/2025
IOS - ATS WEAK CONFIGURATIONLowSolved - 04/11/2025
ANDROID - LACK OF CERTIFICATE PINNINGLowFuture Release - 04/16/2025
ANDROID - APPLICATION ALLOWS DATA BACKUPLowSolved - 04/11/2025
ANDROID - LACK OF ROOT DETECTION MECHANISMInformationalPartially Solved - 04/11/2025
IOS - CERTIFICATE PINNING BYPASSInformationalFuture Release - 04/16/2025

8. Findings & Tech Details

8.1 ANDROID - TAPJACKING

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N(4.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.2 BACKEND - MISSING IMPORTANT SECURITY HEADERS

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N(4.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References

8.3 ANDROID - LACK OF ANTI-HOOK ANTI-DEBUG MECHANISMS

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N(3.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References

8.4 ANDROID - WEBVIEWS CAN LOAD UNRESTRICTED ORIGINS

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N(3.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.5 IOS - LACK OF JAILBREAK DETECTION MECHANISM

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N(3.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.6 IOS - LACK OF ANTI-HOOK ANTI-DEBUG MECHANISMS

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N(3.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.8 IOS - WEBVIEWS CAN LOAD UNRESTRICTED ORIGINS

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N(3.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.9 ANDROID - FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION BYPASS

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N(3.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References

8.10 ANDROID - LACK OF RE-AUTHENTICATION WHEN NEW FINGERPRINT ADDED

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N(3.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.11 BACKEND - ENDPOINT PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N(2.6)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.12 IOS - ATS WEAK CONFIGURATION

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N(2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.14 ANDROID - APPLICATION ALLOWS DATA BACKUP

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N(2.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.16 IOS - CERTIFICATE PINNING BYPASS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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