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Background

// Security Assessment

12.30.2025 - 02.05.2026

Smart Contracts

Alula Finance

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← Back to Audits

Smart Contracts - Alula Finance


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 03/10/2026

Date of Engagement: December 30th, 2025 - February 5th, 2026

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

32

Critical

6

High

3

Medium

10

Low

8

Informational

5


Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Scope
  • 4. Findings overview

1. INTRODUCTION

Alula Finance engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on December 30th, 2025 and ending on February 5th, 2026. The security assessment was scoped to smart contracts in the GitHub repository provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.

    • Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.

 

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the Alula Finance team. The main ones were the following:

    • Prevent the pool balance from increasing without a proportional issuance of ownership shares, ensuring that every nonzero contribution results in a corresponding share allocation and avoiding scenarios where contributors receive no ownership.

    • Ensure that the pool balance is decremented by the exact amount of distributed take rate fees whenever fees are paid out.

    • Ensure that collateral and debt values are always normalized to a consistent internal scale before any health, utilization or liquidation logic is applied.

    • Restrict market state changes to explicitly authorized actors, requiring approval from a privileged role such as protocol administration or governance before allowing any update to the market state.

    • Ensure that referrer incentives are fully accounted for by consistently calculating and transferring the corresponding amounts whenever referral fees are charged and by validating that such fees always result in an actual payout.

    • Update pool liquidity accounting consistently during debt repayment in liquidation.

    • Require explicit consent from the intended recipient before executing any flash loan, guaranteeing that the receiver has approved the operation or the initiating party and preventing third parties from triggering flash loans without authorization.

    • Ensure that the oracle price is strictly greater than zero and revert execution when a zero price is returned.

    • Avoid using spot reserve ratios as an oracle output for value sensitive decisions.

3. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: alula
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 1738844
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/aggregated-oracle
  • contracts/controlled_insurance_fund
  • contracts/market
  • contracts/market_manager
  • contracts/soroswap_sep_40_adapter
  • contracts/aggregated-oracle
  • contracts/controlled_insurance_fund
  • contracts/market
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
  • b70df6b
  • 15e950d
  • 8dc56ed
  • 572c882
  • 43bc4e7
  • 28a534c
  • https://gist.github.com/khomiakmaxim/f8c9f274d59db08a9f11cd4dbf317be2
  • 0188b55
  • c87a0cb
  • 89faf76
  • 6622ad5
  • 2f2c48d
  • b7d772a
  • f6cd1ae
  • 54f9292
  • fa540f1
  • 8858751
  • 1fb38f7
  • dee7c67
  • 69c9868
  • 06a7aa3
  • 8c230a5
  • ebbeef5
  • b959775
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

4. Findings Overview

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation
Share inflation via donation enables repeated value capture in new poolsCriticalSolved - 02/12/2026
Distributed fees do not reduce available liquidity accountingCriticalSolved - 02/16/2026
Inconsistent asset value scaling across core protocol operationsCriticalSolved - 02/25/2026
Unrestricted external control of market operational stateCriticalSolved - 02/16/2026
Referrer fees charged but never distributedCriticalSolved - 03/01/2026
Liquidation repayments desynchronize pool liquidity accountingCriticalSolved - 02/19/2026
Unauthorized fee draining from flash loan receiversHighPartially Solved - 01/26/2026
Zero oracle price is accepted as valid and propagated to valuation logicHighSolved - 02/16/2026
Spot reserve price can be manipulated and used as an oracle outputHighRisk Accepted - 02/16/2026
Pool supply limit can be bypassed via donationMediumSolved - 02/12/2026
Global protocol state can be irreversibly erased by an administrative actionMediumSolved - 02/17/2026
Liquidity fragmentation through multiple pools for the same assetMediumSolved - 03/01/2026
Multiply pair configuration allows identical underlying assets on both sidesMediumSolved - 03/01/2026
Reserved fee liquidity can be treated as withdrawable or lendable liquidityMediumSolved - 02/17/2026
Swap execution does not allow user defined minimum output protectionMediumSolved - 02/18/2026
Leveraged deposit can misaccount borrow and referrer feesMediumSolved - 03/05/2026
Repay fee can prevent full debt closure in leveraged withdrawal flowMediumSolved - 03/05/2026
Leveraged withdrawal can consume tokens already accounted as withdraw feesMediumSolved - 03/05/2026
Small collateral deposits can be forcibly removed through bad debt coverageMediumSolved - 03/03/2026
Missing validation of transfer amounts before executionLowRisk Accepted - 03/04/2026
Centralized market upgrades blocked by misaligned authorizationLowSolved - 03/01/2026
Unbounded bootstrap configuration can degrade interest accrual and block pool operationsLowSolved - 02/18/2026
Overlapping bootstrap periods alter liquidity release behaviorLowSolved - 02/18/2026
Hardcoded external router address reduces integration safety and upgrade flexibilityLowSolved - 02/18/2026
Liquidations can revert due to negative accrued interest accountingLowSolved - 02/19/2026
Swap allows identical input and output tokensLowSolved - 02/18/2026
Rounding effects can produce zero token side effects despite positive input amountsLowSolved - 03/02/2026
Zero amount operations trigger unnecessary state changesInformationalSolved - 03/03/2026
Unbounded scarcity fee configuration can block withdrawalsInformationalSolved - 02/12/2026
Simulation path may diverge from actual withdrawal behaviorInformationalPartially Solved - 03/01/2026
State changing operations execute without emitting eventsInformationalSolved - 02/17/2026
Unused functionsInformationalSolved - 02/12/2026

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Scope
  • 4. Findings overview

// Download the full report

Smart Contracts

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