Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 09/14/2025
Date of Engagement: November 26th, 2024 - December 12th, 2024
Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
42
Critical
2
High
2
Medium
3
Low
10
Informational
25
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Assessment summary
- 3. Test approach and methodology
- 4. Risk methodology
- 5. Scope
- 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
- 7. Findings & Tech Details
- 7.1 Total price miscalculation due to rounding error
- 7.2 Incomplete payload validation in whitelist register
- 7.3 Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricing
- 7.4 Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownership
- 7.5 Insufficient signature validation
- 7.6 Bid submission permitted during paused contract state
- 7.7 Lack of name normalization in input handling
- 7.8 Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup
- 7.9 Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validation
- 7.10 Inadequate validation of utf-8 encoding in character length calculation
- 7.11 Unchecked launch time in registrar
- 7.12 Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration
- 7.13 Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncation
- 7.14 Inefficient removal of reserved names from the list
- 7.15 Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservations
- 7.16 Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsing
- 7.17 Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsing
- 7.18 Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops
- 7.19 Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functions
- 7.20 Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in results
- 7.21 Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement results
- 7.22 Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction data
- 7.23 Inconsistent array lengths in data processing
- 7.24 Inconsistent use of encoding methods for keccak256 hash calculation
- 7.25 Improper validation of return data
- 7.26 Validation gaps in delegate approval process
- 7.27 Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacks
- 7.28 Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from nft ownership
- 7.29 Improper handling of odd-length hex strings
- 7.30 Asymmetry in event emission for eth transfers
- 7.31 Lack of zero address check
- 7.32 Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contract
- 7.33 Missing validation for start and end ids in settlement retrieval
- 7.34 Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functions
- 7.35 Unbounded recursion in hash calculation
- 7.36 Bounds validation required for safe array access
- 7.37 Validation required for encrypted data integrity
- 7.38 Unused functions
- 7.39 Redundant code
- 7.40 Potential inconsistent state validation for nft transfers
- 7.41 Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failures
- 7.42 Index validation missing when removing reserved names
1. Introduction
Beranames engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on November 26th, 2024 and ending on December 12th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to smart contracts in the GitHub repository provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
2. Assessment Summary
The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of this assessment is to:
Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.
Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the Beranames team. The main ones were the following:
Modify the price calculation formula to ensure that the total price reflects the actual duration of the domain rental.Ensure that all fields in the register request struct are included in the payload used for signature validation.Include the discount in the price calculation during the name renewal.Ensure that the correct owner is passed when setting reverse record.Use OpenZeppelin's ECDSA library to handle signature unpacking and validation.Include the 'whenNotPaused' modifier to ensure that bidding is disabled when the contract is paused.Normalize all input names by converting them to a consistent format before processing.
3. Test Approach and Methodology
Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (
solgraph).Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (
Slither).Local or public testnet deployment (
Foundry,Remix IDE).
4. RISK METHODOLOGY
Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.
4.1 EXPLOITABILITY
Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
Exploitability is calculated using the following formula:
4.2 IMPACT
Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
Impact is calculated using the following formula:
4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT
Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
Severity Coefficient is obtained by the following product:
The Vulnerability Severity Score is obtained by:
The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
5. SCOPE
REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: beranames-contracts-v2
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 80f21df
(c) Items in scope:
- src/auction/interfaces/IBeraAuctionHouse.sol
- src/auction/interfaces/IWETH.sol
- src/auction/BeraAuctionHouse.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.
6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview
Critical
2
High
2
Medium
3
Low
10
Informational
25
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Total price miscalculation due to rounding error | Critical | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Incomplete payload validation in whitelist register | Critical | Solved - 12/16/2024 |
| Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricing | High | Solved - 12/15/2024 |
| Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownership | High | Solved - 12/16/2024 |
| Insufficient signature validation | Medium | Solved - 12/16/2024 |
| Bid submission permitted during paused contract state | Medium | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Lack of name normalization in input handling | Medium | Risk Accepted - 12/17/2024 |
| Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup | Low | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validation | Low | Risk Accepted - 12/17/2024 |
| Inadequate validation of UTF-8 encoding in character length calculation | Low | Solved - 01/01/2025 |
| Unchecked launch time in registrar | Low | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration | Low | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncation | Low | Solved - 12/19/2024 |
| Inefficient removal of reserved names from the list | Low | Solved - 12/15/2024 |
| Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservations | Low | Solved - 12/15/2024 |
| Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsing | Low | Solved - 12/26/2024 |
| Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsing | Low | Solved - 12/26/2024 |
| Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops | Informational | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functions | Informational | Solved - 01/01/2025 |
| Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in results | Informational | Solved - 12/19/2024 |
| Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement results | Informational | Solved - 12/19/2024 |
| Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction data | Informational | Solved - 12/19/2024 |
| Inconsistent array lengths in data processing | Informational | Solved - 12/26/2024 |
| Inconsistent use of encoding methods for Keccak256 hash calculation | Informational | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Improper validation of return data | Informational | Solved - 01/26/2024 |
| Validation gaps in delegate approval process | Informational | Solved - 01/06/2025 |
| Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacks | Informational | Solved - 12/19/2024 |
| Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from NFT ownership | Informational | Solved - 01/07/2025 |
| Improper handling of odd-length hex strings | Informational | Solved - 12/26/2024 |
| Asymmetry in event emission for ETH transfers | Informational | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Lack of zero address check | Informational | Solved - 12/26/2024 |
| Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contract | Informational | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Missing validation for start and end IDs in settlement retrieval | Informational | Solved - 12/19/2024 |
| Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functions | Informational | Solved - 12/19/2024 |
| Unbounded recursion in hash calculation | Informational | Solved - 01/01/2025 |
| Bounds validation required for safe array access | Informational | Solved - 12/26/2024 |
| Validation required for encrypted data integrity | Informational | Solved - 12/26/2024 |
| Unused functions | Informational | Solved - 01/07/2025 |
| Redundant code | Informational | Solved - 12/15/2024 |
| Potential inconsistent state validation for NFT transfers | Informational | Solved - 12/11/2024 |
| Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failures | Informational | Solved - 12/26/2024 |
| Index validation missing when removing reserved names | Informational | Solved - 12/15/2024 |
7. Findings & Tech Details
7.1 Total price miscalculation due to rounding error
//Critical
Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.2 Incomplete payload validation in whitelist register
//Critical
Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.3 Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricing
//High
Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.4 Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownership
//High
Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.5 Insufficient signature validation
//Medium
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.6 Bid submission permitted during paused contract state
//Medium
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.7 Lack of name normalization in input handling
//Medium
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.8 Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.9 Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validation
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.10 Inadequate validation of UTF-8 encoding in character length calculation
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.11 Unchecked launch time in registrar
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.12 Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.13 Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncation
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.14 Inefficient removal of reserved names from the list
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.15 Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservations
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.16 Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsing
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.17 Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsing
//Low
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.18 Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.19 Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functions
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.20 Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in results
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.21 Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement results
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.22 Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction data
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.23 Inconsistent array lengths in data processing
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.24 Inconsistent use of encoding methods for Keccak256 hash calculation
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.25 Improper validation of return data
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.26 Validation gaps in delegate approval process
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.27 Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacks
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.28 Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from NFT ownership
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.29 Improper handling of odd-length hex strings
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.30 Asymmetry in event emission for ETH transfers
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.31 Lack of zero address check
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.32 Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contract
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.33 Missing validation for start and end IDs in settlement retrieval
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.34 Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functions
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.35 Unbounded recursion in hash calculation
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.36 Bounds validation required for safe array access
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.37 Validation required for encrypted data integrity
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.38 Unused functions
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.39 Redundant code
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.40 Potential inconsistent state validation for NFT transfers
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.41 Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failures
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
7.42 Index validation missing when removing reserved names
//Informational
Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Assessment summary
- 3. Test approach and methodology
- 4. Risk methodology
- 5. Scope
- 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
- 7. Findings & Tech Details
- 7.1 Total price miscalculation due to rounding error
- 7.2 Incomplete payload validation in whitelist register
- 7.3 Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricing
- 7.4 Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownership
- 7.5 Insufficient signature validation
- 7.6 Bid submission permitted during paused contract state
- 7.7 Lack of name normalization in input handling
- 7.8 Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup
- 7.9 Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validation
- 7.10 Inadequate validation of utf-8 encoding in character length calculation
- 7.11 Unchecked launch time in registrar
- 7.12 Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration
- 7.13 Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncation
- 7.14 Inefficient removal of reserved names from the list
- 7.15 Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservations
- 7.16 Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsing
- 7.17 Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsing
- 7.18 Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops
- 7.19 Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functions
- 7.20 Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in results
- 7.21 Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement results
- 7.22 Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction data
- 7.23 Inconsistent array lengths in data processing
- 7.24 Inconsistent use of encoding methods for keccak256 hash calculation
- 7.25 Improper validation of return data
- 7.26 Validation gaps in delegate approval process
- 7.27 Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacks
- 7.28 Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from nft ownership
- 7.29 Improper handling of odd-length hex strings
- 7.30 Asymmetry in event emission for eth transfers
- 7.31 Lack of zero address check
- 7.32 Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contract
- 7.33 Missing validation for start and end ids in settlement retrieval
- 7.34 Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functions
- 7.35 Unbounded recursion in hash calculation
- 7.36 Bounds validation required for safe array access
- 7.37 Validation required for encrypted data integrity
- 7.38 Unused functions
- 7.39 Redundant code
- 7.40 Potential inconsistent state validation for nft transfers
- 7.41 Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failures
- 7.42 Index validation missing when removing reserved names
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Beranames - Beranames Name Service (BNS) Contracts v2
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