Beranames - Beranames Name Service (BNS) Contracts v2 Audit | Beranames

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

About this report

Assessment Type

Assurance Assessment

Date of Engagement

November 26th, 2024 - December 12th, 2024

Source Code

beranames-contracts-v2

Assessed Commit ID

80f21df

Severity Breakdown

0Acknowledged
2Risk Accepted
40Solved
42All Findings

Critical2
- 2Solved
High2
- 2Solved
Medium3
- 2Solved
- 1Risk A.
Low10
- 9Solved
- 1Risk A.
Informational25
- 25Solved

Introduction#

Beranames engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on November 26th, 2024 and ending on December 12th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to smart contracts in the GitHub repository provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

Assessment Summary#

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.
Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the Beranames team. The main ones were the following:

Modify the price calculation formula to ensure that the total price reflects the actual duration of the domain rental.
Ensure that all fields in the register request struct are included in the payload used for signature validation.
Include the discount in the price calculation during the name renewal.
Ensure that the correct owner is passed when setting reverse record.
Use OpenZeppelin's ECDSA library to handle signature unpacking and validation.
Include the 'whenNotPaused' modifier to ensure that bidding is disabled when the contract is paused.
Normalize all input names by converting them to a consistent format before processing.

Test Approach and Methodology#

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph).
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither).
Local or public testnet deployment (Foundry, Remix IDE).

Risk Methodology#

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
Attack Origin (AO)	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N)	0
	Low (C:L)	0.25
	Medium (C:M)	0.5
	High (C:H)	0.75
	Critical (C:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical (A:C)	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium (Y:M)	0.5
	High (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:C)	1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C)	1.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
9 - 10	7 - 8.9	4.5 - 6.9	2 - 4.4	0 - 1.9

Scope#

(a) Repository:beranames-contracts-v2

(b) Assessed Commit ID:80f21df2a97ba43f4c0e5bf7a86f15633185cf05

47 files

src

47 files

auction

3 files

interfaces

2 files

IBeraAuctionHouse.sol

solidity

IWETH.sol

solidity

BeraAuctionHouse.sol

solidity

registrar

13 files

interfaces

4 files

IPriceOracle.sol

solidity

IReservedRegistry.sol

solidity

IReverseRegistrar.sol

solidity

IWhitelistValidator.sol

solidity

Out-of-Scope:Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#

#	Title	Severity	Score	Status
HAL-01	Total price miscalculation due to rounding error	Critical	9.4	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-02	Incomplete payload validation in whitelist register	Critical	9.4	Solved12/16/2024
HAL-03	Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricing	High	7.5	Solved12/15/2024
HAL-04	Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownership	High	7.5	Solved12/16/2024
HAL-05	Insufficient signature validation	Medium	6.3	Solved12/16/2024
HAL-06	Bid submission permitted during paused contract state	Medium	6.3	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-07	Lack of name normalization in input handling	Medium	6.3	Risk Accepted12/17/2024
HAL-08	Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup	Low	4.2	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-09	Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validation	Low	4.2	Risk Accepted12/17/2024
HAL-10	Inadequate validation of UTF-8 encoding in character length calculation	Low	4.2	Solved01/01/2025
HAL-11	Unchecked launch time in registrar	Low	3.4	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-12	Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration	Low	3.4	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-13	Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncation	Low	3.4	Solved12/19/2024
HAL-14	Inefficient removal of reserved names from the list	Low	2.5	Solved12/15/2024
HAL-15	Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservations	Low	2.1	Solved12/15/2024
HAL-16	Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsing	Low	2.1	Solved12/26/2024
HAL-17	Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsing	Low	2.1	Solved12/26/2024
HAL-18	Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops	Informational	1.7	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-19	Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functions	Informational	1.7	Solved01/01/2025
HAL-20	Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in results	Informational	1.7	Solved12/19/2024
HAL-21	Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement results	Informational	1.7	Solved12/19/2024
HAL-22	Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction data	Informational	1.7	Solved12/19/2024
HAL-23	Inconsistent array lengths in data processing	Informational	1.7	Solved12/26/2024
HAL-24	Inconsistent use of encoding methods for Keccak256 hash calculation	Informational	1.6	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-25	Improper validation of return data	Informational	1.6	Solved01/26/2024
HAL-26	Validation gaps in delegate approval process	Informational	1.6	Solved01/06/2025
HAL-27	Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacks	Informational	1.1	Solved12/19/2024
HAL-28	Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from NFT ownership	Informational	1.0	Solved01/07/2025
HAL-29	Improper handling of odd-length hex strings	Informational	1.0	Solved12/26/2024
HAL-30	Asymmetry in event emission for ETH transfers	Informational	0.8	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-31	Lack of zero address check	Informational	0.8	Solved12/26/2024
HAL-32	Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contract	Informational	0.8	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-33	Missing validation for start and end IDs in settlement retrieval	Informational	0.8	Solved12/19/2024
HAL-34	Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functions	Informational	0.8	Solved12/19/2024
HAL-35	Unbounded recursion in hash calculation	Informational	0.8	Solved01/01/2025
HAL-36	Bounds validation required for safe array access	Informational	0.8	Solved12/26/2024
HAL-37	Validation required for encrypted data integrity	Informational	0.8	Solved12/26/2024
HAL-38	Unused functions	Informational	0.3	Solved01/07/2025
HAL-39	Redundant code	Informational	0.3	Solved12/15/2024
HAL-40	Potential inconsistent state validation for NFT transfers	Informational	0.3	Solved12/11/2024
HAL-41	Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failures	Informational	0.3	Solved12/26/2024
HAL-42	Index validation missing when removing reserved names	Informational	0.0	Solved12/15/2024

Findings & Tech Details#

HAL-01Solved

Total price miscalculation due to rounding error

Critical

9.4AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:H/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:H/Y:N

Description

Proof of Concept

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-02Solved

Incomplete payload validation in whitelist register

Critical

9.4AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:H/I:H/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:H/I:H/D:N/Y:N

Description

Proof of Concept

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-03Solved

Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricing

High

7.5AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:H/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:H/Y:N

Description

Proof of Concept

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-04Solved

Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownership

High

7.5AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:N

Description

Proof of Concept

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-05Solved

Insufficient signature validation

Medium

6.3AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:H/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:H/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-06Solved

Bid submission permitted during paused contract state

Medium

6.3AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-07Risk Accepted

Lack of name normalization in input handling

Medium

6.3AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:H/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:H/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-08Solved

Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup

Low

4.2AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-09Risk Accepted

Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validation

Low

4.2AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-10Solved

Inadequate validation of UTF-8 encoding in character length calculation

Low

4.2AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-11Solved

Unchecked launch time in registrar

Low

3.4AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-12Solved

Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration

Low

3.4AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-13Solved

Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncation

Low

3.4AO:A/AC:M/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:M/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-14Solved

Inefficient removal of reserved names from the list

Low

2.5AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-15Solved

Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservations

Low

2.1AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:L/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:L/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-16Solved

Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsing

Low

2.1AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-17Solved

Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsing

Low

2.1AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-18Solved

Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops

Informational

1.7AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-19Solved

Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functions

Informational

1.7AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-20Solved

Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in results

Informational

1.7AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-21Solved

Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement results

Informational

1.7AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-22Solved

Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction data

Informational

1.7AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-23Solved

Inconsistent array lengths in data processing

Informational

1.7AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-24Solved

Inconsistent use of encoding methods for Keccak256 hash calculation

Informational

1.6AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-25Solved

Improper validation of return data

Informational

1.6AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:M/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:M/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-26Solved

Validation gaps in delegate approval process

Informational

1.6AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-27Solved

Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacks

Informational

1.1AO:A/AC:M/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:M/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-28Solved

Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from NFT ownership

Informational

1.0AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:P/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:P/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-29Solved

Improper handling of odd-length hex strings

Informational

1.0AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-30Solved

Asymmetry in event emission for ETH transfers

Informational

0.8AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-31Solved

Lack of zero address check

Informational

0.8AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-32Solved

Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contract

Informational

0.8AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-33Solved

Missing validation for start and end IDs in settlement retrieval

Informational

0.8AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-34Solved

Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functions

Informational

0.8AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-35Solved

Unbounded recursion in hash calculation

Informational

0.8AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-36Solved

Bounds validation required for safe array access

Informational

0.8AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-37Solved

Validation required for encrypted data integrity

Informational

0.8AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

HAL-38Solved

Unused functions

Informational

0.3AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N

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HAL-39Solved

Redundant code

Informational

0.3AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:NAO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N

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HAL-40Solved

Potential inconsistent state validation for NFT transfers

Informational

0.3AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N

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HAL-41Solved

Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failures

Informational

0.3AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N

Description

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HAL-42Solved

Index validation missing when removing reserved names

Informational

0.0AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

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Disclaimer#

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.