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Background

// Security Assessment

11.26.2024 - 12.12.2024

Beranames - Beranames Name Service (BNS) Contracts v2

Beranames

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

Beranames - Beranames Name Service (BNS) Contracts v2 - Beranames

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 09/14/2025

Date of Engagement: November 26th, 2024 - December 12th, 2024

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

42

Critical

2

High

2

Medium

3

Low

10

Informational

25

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Total price miscalculation due to rounding error
    2. 7.2 Incomplete payload validation in whitelist register
    3. 7.3 Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricing
    4. 7.4 Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownership
    5. 7.5 Insufficient signature validation
    6. 7.6 Bid submission permitted during paused contract state
    7. 7.7 Lack of name normalization in input handling
    8. 7.8 Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup
    9. 7.9 Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validation
    10. 7.10 Inadequate validation of utf-8 encoding in character length calculation
    11. 7.11 Unchecked launch time in registrar
    12. 7.12 Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration
    13. 7.13 Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncation
    14. 7.14 Inefficient removal of reserved names from the list
    15. 7.15 Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservations
    16. 7.16 Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsing
    17. 7.17 Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsing
    18. 7.18 Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops
    19. 7.19 Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functions
    20. 7.20 Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in results
    21. 7.21 Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement results
    22. 7.22 Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction data
    23. 7.23 Inconsistent array lengths in data processing
    24. 7.24 Inconsistent use of encoding methods for keccak256 hash calculation
    25. 7.25 Improper validation of return data
    26. 7.26 Validation gaps in delegate approval process
    27. 7.27 Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacks
    28. 7.28 Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from nft ownership
    29. 7.29 Improper handling of odd-length hex strings
    30. 7.30 Asymmetry in event emission for eth transfers
    31. 7.31 Lack of zero address check
    32. 7.32 Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contract
    33. 7.33 Missing validation for start and end ids in settlement retrieval
    34. 7.34 Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functions
    35. 7.35 Unbounded recursion in hash calculation
    36. 7.36 Bounds validation required for safe array access
    37. 7.37 Validation required for encrypted data integrity
    38. 7.38 Unused functions
    39. 7.39 Redundant code
    40. 7.40 Potential inconsistent state validation for nft transfers
    41. 7.41 Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failures
    42. 7.42 Index validation missing when removing reserved names

1. Introduction

Beranames engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on November 26th, 2024 and ending on December 12th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to smart contracts in the GitHub repository provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

2. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.

    • Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the Beranames team. The main ones were the following: 

    • Modify the price calculation formula to ensure that the total price reflects the actual duration of the domain rental.

    • Ensure that all fields in the register request struct are included in the payload used for signature validation.

    • Include the discount in the price calculation during the name renewal.

    • Ensure that the correct owner is passed when setting reverse record.

    • Use OpenZeppelin's ECDSA library to handle signature unpacking and validation.

    • Include the 'whenNotPaused' modifier to ensure that bidding is disabled when the contract is paused.

    • Normalize all input names by converting them to a consistent format before processing.


3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.

    • Manual testing by custom scripts.

    • Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph).

    • Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither).

    • Local or public testnet deployment (Foundry, Remix IDE).

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4∑mI​−max(mI​)​

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EIC∗10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: beranames-contracts-v2
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 80f21df
(c) Items in scope:
  • src/auction/interfaces/IBeraAuctionHouse.sol
  • src/auction/interfaces/IWETH.sol
  • src/auction/BeraAuctionHouse.sol
  • src/registrar/interfaces/IPriceOracle.sol
  • src/registrar/interfaces/IReservedRegistry.sol
  • src/registrar/interfaces/IReverseRegistrar.sol
  • src/registrar/interfaces/IWhitelistValidator.sol
  • src/registrar/types/BaseRegistrar.sol
  • src/registrar/types/Controllable.sol
  • src/registrar/types/PriceOracle.sol
  • src/registrar/types/ReservedRegistry.sol
  • src/registrar/types/ReverseClaimer.sol
  • src/registrar/types/WhitelistValidator.sol
  • src/registrar/types/bArtioPriceOracle.sol
  • src/registrar/Registrar.sol
  • src/registrar/ReverseRegistrar.sol
  • src/registry/interfaces/BNS.sol
  • src/registry/Registry.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/IABIResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/IAddrResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/IAddressResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/IContentHashResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/IExtendedResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/IInterfaceResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/IMulticallable.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/INameResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/IPubkeyResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/ITextResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/interfaces/IVersionableResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/libraries/BytesUtils.sol
  • src/resolver/libraries/HexUtils.sol
  • src/resolver/libraries/LowLevelCallUtils.sol
  • src/resolver/libraries/NameEncoder.sol
  • src/resolver/profiles/ABIResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/profiles/AddrResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/profiles/ContentHashResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/profiles/ExtendedResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/profiles/InterfaceResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/profiles/NameResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/profiles/PubkeyResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/profiles/TextResolver.sol
  • src/resolver/types/Multicallable.sol
  • src/resolver/types/ResolverBase.sol
  • src/resolver/Resolver.sol
  • src/resolver/UniversalResolver.sol
  • src/utils/Constants.sol
  • src/utils/StringUtils.sol
  • src/auction/interfaces/IBeraAuctionHouse.sol
  • src/auction/interfaces/IWETH.sol
  • src/auction/BeraAuctionHouse.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

2

High

2

Medium

3

Low

10

Informational

25

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Total price miscalculation due to rounding errorCriticalSolved - 12/11/2024
Incomplete payload validation in whitelist registerCriticalSolved - 12/16/2024
Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricingHighSolved - 12/15/2024
Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownershipHighSolved - 12/16/2024
Insufficient signature validationMediumSolved - 12/16/2024
Bid submission permitted during paused contract stateMediumSolved - 12/11/2024
Lack of name normalization in input handlingMediumRisk Accepted - 12/17/2024
Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setupLowSolved - 12/11/2024
Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validationLowRisk Accepted - 12/17/2024
Inadequate validation of UTF-8 encoding in character length calculationLowSolved - 01/01/2025
Unchecked launch time in registrarLowSolved - 12/11/2024
Missing validation for initial time buffer configurationLowSolved - 12/11/2024
Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncationLowSolved - 12/19/2024
Inefficient removal of reserved names from the listLowSolved - 12/15/2024
Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservationsLowSolved - 12/15/2024
Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsingLowSolved - 12/26/2024
Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsingLowSolved - 12/26/2024
Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loopsInformationalSolved - 12/11/2024
Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functionsInformationalSolved - 01/01/2025
Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in resultsInformationalSolved - 12/19/2024
Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement resultsInformationalSolved - 12/19/2024
Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction dataInformationalSolved - 12/19/2024
Inconsistent array lengths in data processingInformationalSolved - 12/26/2024
Inconsistent use of encoding methods for Keccak256 hash calculationInformationalSolved - 12/11/2024
Improper validation of return dataInformationalSolved - 01/26/2024
Validation gaps in delegate approval processInformationalSolved - 01/06/2025
Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacksInformationalSolved - 12/19/2024
Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from NFT ownershipInformationalSolved - 01/07/2025
Improper handling of odd-length hex stringsInformationalSolved - 12/26/2024
Asymmetry in event emission for ETH transfersInformationalSolved - 12/11/2024
Lack of zero address checkInformationalSolved - 12/26/2024
Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contractInformationalSolved - 12/11/2024
Missing validation for start and end IDs in settlement retrievalInformationalSolved - 12/19/2024
Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functionsInformationalSolved - 12/19/2024
Unbounded recursion in hash calculationInformationalSolved - 01/01/2025
Bounds validation required for safe array accessInformationalSolved - 12/26/2024
Validation required for encrypted data integrityInformationalSolved - 12/26/2024
Unused functionsInformationalSolved - 01/07/2025
Redundant codeInformationalSolved - 12/15/2024
Potential inconsistent state validation for NFT transfersInformationalSolved - 12/11/2024
Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failuresInformationalSolved - 12/26/2024
Index validation missing when removing reserved namesInformationalSolved - 12/15/2024

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Total price miscalculation due to rounding error

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:H/Y:N (9.4)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.2 Incomplete payload validation in whitelist register

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:H/I:H/D:N/Y:N (9.4)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.3 Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricing

//

High

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:H/Y:N (7.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.4 Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownership

//

High

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:N (7.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.5 Insufficient signature validation

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:H/Y:N (6.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 Bid submission permitted during paused contract state

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N (6.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.7 Lack of name normalization in input handling

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:H/Y:N (6.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.8 Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N (4.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.9 Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validation

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N (4.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.10 Inadequate validation of UTF-8 encoding in character length calculation

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N (4.2)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.11 Unchecked launch time in registrar

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N (3.4)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.12 Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N (3.4)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.13 Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncation

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:M/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:N (3.4)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.14 Inefficient removal of reserved names from the list

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.15 Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservations

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:L/Y:N (2.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.16 Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsing

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:N (2.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.17 Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsing

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:N (2.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.18 Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.19 Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.20 Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in results

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.21 Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement results

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.22 Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction data

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.23 Inconsistent array lengths in data processing

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.24 Inconsistent use of encoding methods for Keccak256 hash calculation

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N (1.6)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.25 Improper validation of return data

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:M/I:N/D:N/Y:N (1.6)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.26 Validation gaps in delegate approval process

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N (1.6)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.27 Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacks

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:M/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:N/Y:N (1.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.28 Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from NFT ownership

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:P/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:M/Y:N (1.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.29 Improper handling of odd-length hex strings

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:L/D:N/Y:N (1.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.30 Asymmetry in event emission for ETH transfers

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.31 Lack of zero address check

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.32 Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contract

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.33 Missing validation for start and end IDs in settlement retrieval

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.34 Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.35 Unbounded recursion in hash calculation

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.36 Bounds validation required for safe array access

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.37 Validation required for encrypted data integrity

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.38 Unused functions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.39 Redundant code

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (0.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.40 Potential inconsistent state validation for NFT transfers

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (0.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.41 Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failures

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:H/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (0.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.42 Index validation missing when removing reserved names

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Total price miscalculation due to rounding error
    2. 7.2 Incomplete payload validation in whitelist register
    3. 7.3 Discount discrepancy in renewal and registration pricing
    4. 7.4 Incorrect assignment of reverse record ownership
    5. 7.5 Insufficient signature validation
    6. 7.6 Bid submission permitted during paused contract state
    7. 7.7 Lack of name normalization in input handling
    8. 7.8 Potential misconfiguration of reserve price in auction setup
    9. 7.9 Potential ineffectiveness in bid increment validation
    10. 7.10 Inadequate validation of utf-8 encoding in character length calculation
    11. 7.11 Unchecked launch time in registrar
    12. 7.12 Missing validation for initial time buffer configuration
    13. 7.13 Potential overflow in price conversion due to silent truncation
    14. 7.14 Inefficient removal of reserved names from the list
    15. 7.15 Inefficient handling of duplicate name reservations
    16. 7.16 Unsafe index handling in hexadecimal parsing
    17. 7.17 Incomplete length validation in hexadecimal parsing
    18. 7.18 Suboptimal gas usage due to post-increment in loops
    19. 7.19 Inefficient array allocation in settlement retrieval functions
    20. 7.20 Inclusion of uninitialized settlement data in results
    21. 7.21 Inclusion of unsettled auctions in settlement results
    22. 7.22 Inconsistent handling of uninitialized auction data
    23. 7.23 Inconsistent array lengths in data processing
    24. 7.24 Inconsistent use of encoding methods for keccak256 hash calculation
    25. 7.25 Improper validation of return data
    26. 7.26 Validation gaps in delegate approval process
    27. 7.27 Missing protection against potential reentrancy attacks
    28. 7.28 Registry ownership transfer allows divergence from nft ownership
    29. 7.29 Improper handling of odd-length hex strings
    30. 7.30 Asymmetry in event emission for eth transfers
    31. 7.31 Lack of zero address check
    32. 7.32 Potential issue with casting msg.value to uint128 in auction contract
    33. 7.33 Missing validation for start and end ids in settlement retrieval
    34. 7.34 Lack of range validation in settlement retrieval functions
    35. 7.35 Unbounded recursion in hash calculation
    36. 7.36 Bounds validation required for safe array access
    37. 7.37 Validation required for encrypted data integrity
    38. 7.38 Unused functions
    39. 7.39 Redundant code
    40. 7.40 Potential inconsistent state validation for nft transfers
    41. 7.41 Lack of error transparency in delegatecall failures
    42. 7.42 Index validation missing when removing reserved names

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Beranames - Beranames Name Service (BNS) Contracts v2

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