Treasury Vesting - BlockDAG


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated Unknown date

Date of Engagement: February 5th, 2025 - February 7th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

12

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

5

Low

3

Informational

3


1. Introduction

BlockDAG engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on smart contracts beginning on February 5th, 2025 and ending on February 7th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

2. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn dedicated 3 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to evaluate the security of the smart contract.

The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols

The purpose of this assessment is to:

    • Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.

    • Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were all addressed by the BlockDAG team. The main ones were the following:

    • Implement Correct logic for token distribution

    • Ensure accurate accounting for multi sig approvals

    • Strengthening validation during token allocation

    • Implement proper access control on release functions.

    • Add an expiry mechanism to time-lock operations.

    • Add explicit category validation at the start of the executeAddCategory function.

    • Disable the initializer in the implementation contract.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual, semi-automated and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into architecture and purpose.

    • Smart contract manual code review and walk-through.

    • Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any vulnerability classes

    • Manual testing by custom scripts.

    • Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither)

    • Local deployment and testing ( Foundry)

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(b) Assessed Commit ID: V2
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/TreasuryVesting.sol
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

5

Low

3

Informational

3

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
No Token Distribution in BatchRelease Due to Premature State UpdatesCriticalSolved - 02/18/2025
Total Amount Limit Can Be Bypassed During AllocationsMediumSolved - 02/12/2025
Missing Access Control on Token Release FunctionsMediumSolved - 02/12/2025
Cleanup Reverts for Pause/Unpause ApprovalsMediumSolved - 02/18/2025
Double-Counting in Multi-Signature Approval for Users with Multiple RolesMediumSolved - 02/18/2025
Operator Approvals Equal to Admin ApprovalsMediumSolved - 02/18/2025
Timelock Operations Without ExpiryLowSolved - 02/12/2025
Missing Category ValidationLowSolved - 02/12/2025
Initializer Not DisabledLowSolved - 02/12/2025
Insufficient Validation Of Vesting DurationInformationalSolved - 02/12/2025
Centralization RisksInformationalSolved - 02/12/2025
Redundant ConstantsInformationalSolved - 02/18/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 No Token Distribution in BatchRelease Due to Premature State Updates

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.2 Total Amount Limit Can Be Bypassed During Allocations

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.3 Missing Access Control on Token Release Functions

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.4 Cleanup Reverts for Pause/Unpause Approvals

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.5 Double-Counting in Multi-Signature Approval for Users with Multiple Roles

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 Operator Approvals Equal to Admin Approvals

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.7 Timelock Operations Without Expiry

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.8 Missing Category Validation

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.9 Initializer Not Disabled

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.10 Insufficient Validation Of Vesting Duration

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.11 Centralization Risks

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.12 Redundant Constants

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.