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Background

// Security Assessment

09.02.2024 - 09.20.2024

HUB v1

Blueprint Finance

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

HUB v1 - Blueprint Finance

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated Unknown date

Date of Engagement: September 2nd, 2024 - September 20th, 2024

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

31

Critical

3

High

1

Medium

5

Low

5

Informational

17

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Incorrect balance updates in erc721logic and internals
    2. 7.2 Lack of access control in pong handlers
    3. 7.3 Missing access control in policy termination blueprint
    4. 7.4 Incorrect namespace used on boolean commit
    5. 7.5 Missing validation for loan owner
    6. 7.6 Lack of validation for accesscontrolmanager contract in concretestorage
    7. 7.7 Missing check for response handler address
    8. 7.8 Missing handling of delete and increment
    9. 7.9 Missing operations in config and registry pong handlers.
    10. 7.10 Missing name initialization in erc721logic constructor
    11. 7.11 Non-atomic packet id may result in collisions
    12. 7.12 Missing underflow handling
    13. 7.13 Single step ownership transfer process
    14. 7.14 Missing validation for consistent chainid and eid
    15. 7.15 Lack of configurability in multisigwallet
    16. 7.16 Missing use of internal erc721 functions
    17. 7.17 Unused config pong handler
    18. 7.18 Use of hardcoded values instead of enums
    19. 7.19 Inefficient role checking
    20. 7.20 Unnecessary immutable namespace variable
    21. 7.21 Hardcoded value instead of enum
    22. 7.22 Lack of distinction between delete and setting value to 0
    23. 7.23 Entropy reduction may lead to collisions
    24. 7.24 Potential hash collisions in namespace constants due to 4-byte limitation
    25. 7.25 Unused function in configmanager
    26. 7.26 Unused functions in registrymanager
    27. 7.27 Empty packet gap
    28. 7.28 Redundant onlyrole modifier
    29. 7.29 Inefficient placement of amountsupply check
    30. 7.30 Lack of events for state changes
    31. 7.31 Ownership assumptions

1. Introduction

Concrete engaged our security analysis team to conduct a comprehensive security audit of their smart contract ecosystem. The primary aim was to meticulously assess the security architecture of the smart contracts to pinpoint vulnerabilities, evaluate existing security protocols, and offer actionable insights to bolster security and operational efficacy of their smart contract framework. Our assessment was strictly confined to the smart contracts provided, ensuring a focused and exhaustive analysis of their security features.

2. Assessment Summary

Our engagement with Blueprint spanned a 3-week period, during which we dedicated one full-time security engineer equipped with extensive experience in blockchain security, advanced penetration testing capabilities, and profound knowledge of various blockchain protocols. The objectives of this assessment were to:

- Verify the correct functionality of smart contract operations.

- Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.

- Provide recommendations to enhance the security and efficiency of the smart contracts.


In summary, Halborn identified several security concerns that were mostly addressed by the Concrete team.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Our testing strategy employed a blend of manual and automated techniques to ensure a thorough evaluation. While manual testing was pivotal for uncovering logical and implementation flaws, automated testing offered broad code coverage and rapid identification of common vulnerabilities. The testing process included:

- A detailed examination of the smart contracts' architecture and intended functionality.

- Comprehensive manual code reviews and walkthroughs.

- Functional and connectivity analysis utilizing tools like Solgraph.

- Customized script-based manual testing and testnet deployment using Foundry.

This executive summary encapsulates the pivotal findings and recommendations from our security assessment of Blueprint smart contract ecosystem. By addressing the identified issues and implementing the recommended fixes, Blueprint can significantly boost the security, reliability, and trustworthiness of its smart contract platform.

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4∑mI​−max(mI​)​

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EIC∗10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: sc_hub-v1
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 5ff8b67
(c) Items in scope:
  • src/registry/RegistryManager.sol
  • src/blueprints/implementations/LenderBlueprint.sol
  • src/libraries/StorageHandlerLib.sol
  • src/blueprints/implementations/ProtectionBlueprint.sol
  • src/token/ERC721LogicContract.sol
  • src/storage/ConcreteStorage.sol
  • src/primitives/BasePongHandler.sol
  • src/blueprints/implementations/PolicyTerminationBlueprint.sol
  • src/primitives/ERC721_Internals.sol
  • src/multiSigWallet/MultiSigWallet.sol
  • src/blueprints/BaseBlueprint.sol
  • src/config/ConfigManager.sol
  • src/errors/Errors.sol
  • src/primitives/CreateUserBlueprint.sol
  • src/protocol/Protocol.sol
  • src/primitives/EnableConcreteLite.sol
  • src/constants/Tables.sol
  • src/primitives/PacketIdHandler.sol
  • src/storage/interfaces/IStorageOperations.sol
  • src/primitives/EVMAddressValidation.sol
  • src/primitives/GetConcreteLiteEncoding.sol
  • src/accessControl/AccessControlManager.sol
  • src/primitives/ValidateProtection.sol
  • src/registry/RegistryManagerEvents.sol
  • src/types/Enums.sol
  • src/primitives/RemoteChainHandler.sol
  • src/blueprints/BlueprintResolver.sol
  • src/storage/ConcreteStorageConnector.sol
  • src/blueprints/implementations/ProtectionBlueprintEvents.sol
  • src/protocol/PauseStatus.sol
  • src/registry/interfaces/IRegistryManager.sol
  • src/primitives/LoanToken_OwnerOf.sol
  • src/primitives/GetChainEndpoint.sol
  • src/pongHandler/PongHandlerImplementation.sol
  • src/constants/Namespaces.sol
  • src/primitives/GetLoanTokens.sol
  • src/primitives/GetEndpoint.sol
  • src/primitives/SetBorrowToken.sol
  • src/accessControl/OnlyRole.sol
  • src/constants/ProtocolConstants.sol
  • src/blueprints/implementations/PolicyTerminationBlueprintEvents.sol
  • src/primitives/ERC721_Constructor.sol
  • src/types/Structs.sol
  • src/multiSigWallet/MultiSigWalletEvents.sol
  • src/blueprints/implementations/LenderBlueprintEvents.sol
  • src/blueprints/interfaces/IRegistry.sol
  • src/storage/interfaces/IConcreteStorage.sol
  • src/config/ConfigManagerEvents.sol
  • src/storage/ConcreteStorageEvents.sol
  • src/protocol/interfaces/IProtocol.sol
  • src/blueprints/interfaces/IPongHandler.sol
  • src/primitives/ERC721_Events.sol
  • src/constants/Roles.sol
  • src/accessControl/AccessControlManagerEvents.sol
  • src/primitives/BasePongHandlerEvents.sol
  • src/config/interfaces/IConfigManager.sol
  • src/registry/RegistryManager.sol
  • src/blueprints/implementations/LenderBlueprint.sol
  • src/libraries/StorageHandlerLib.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

3

High

1

Medium

5

Low

5

Informational

17

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Incorrect Balance Updates in ERC721Logic and InternalsCriticalSolved - 09/26/2024
Lack of Access Control in Pong handlersCriticalSolved - 09/19/2024
Missing Access Control in Policy termination blueprintCriticalSolved - 09/19/2024
Incorrect Namespace Used On Boolean CommitHighSolved - 09/19/2024
Missing Validation for Loan OwnerMediumRisk Accepted
Lack of Validation for AccessControlManager Contract in ConcreteStorageMediumSolved - 09/19/2024
Missing Check for Response Handler AddressMediumSolved - 09/19/2024
Missing Handling of DELETE and INCREMENTMediumRisk Accepted
Missing operations in config and registry pong handlers.MediumSolved - 09/19/2024
Missing Name Initialization in ERC721Logic ConstructorLowSolved - 09/19/2024
Non-Atomic packet ID May Result in CollisionsLowNot Applicable
Missing Underflow HandlingLowRisk Accepted
Single step ownership transfer processLowRisk Accepted
Missing Validation for Consistent chainId and eidLowRisk Accepted
Lack of Configurability in MultiSigWalletInformationalAcknowledged
Missing Use of Internal ERC721 FunctionsInformationalSolved - 09/19/2024
Unused Config Pong HandlerInformationalSolved - 09/19/2024
Use of Hardcoded Values Instead of EnumsInformationalSolved - 09/26/2024
Inefficient Role CheckingInformationalSolved - 09/19/2024
Unnecessary immutable namespace variableInformationalSolved - 09/26/2024
Hardcoded Value Instead of EnumInformationalSolved - 09/19/2024
Lack of Distinction Between DELETE and Setting Value to 0InformationalAcknowledged
Entropy Reduction May Lead to CollisionsInformationalAcknowledged
Potential Hash Collisions in Namespace Constants Due to 4-Byte LimitationInformationalAcknowledged
Unused Function in ConfigManagerInformationalSolved - 09/19/2024
Unused Functions in RegistryManagerInformationalSolved - 09/19/2024
Empty Packet GapInformationalNot Applicable
Redundant onlyRole ModifierInformationalSolved - 09/19/2024
Inefficient Placement of amountSupply checkInformationalSolved - 09/19/2024
Lack of Events for State ChangesInformationalAcknowledged
Ownership AssumptionsInformationalAcknowledged

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Incorrect Balance Updates in ERC721Logic and Internals

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:C/A:M/D:C/Y:C/R:N/S:C (10.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.2 Lack of Access Control in Pong handlers

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:C/A:C/D:C/Y:C/R:N/S:C (10.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.3 Missing Access Control in Policy termination blueprint

//

Critical

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:C/A:C/D:C/Y:C/R:N/S:C (10.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.4 Incorrect Namespace Used On Boolean Commit

//

High

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (7.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.5 Missing Validation for Loan Owner

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:C/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:P/S:C (6.6)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 Lack of Validation for AccessControlManager Contract in ConcreteStorage

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:C/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:P/S:C (6.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.7 Missing Check for Response Handler Address

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:C/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:P/S:C (6.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.8 Missing Handling of DELETE and INCREMENT

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (6.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.9 Missing operations in config and registry pong handlers.

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (6.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References

7.10 Missing Name Initialization in ERC721Logic Constructor

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:P/S:U (3.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.11 Non-Atomic packet ID May Result in Collisions

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:P/S:U (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.12 Missing Underflow Handling

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.13 Single step ownership transfer process

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:M/D:N/Y:N/R:P/S:U (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.14 Missing Validation for Consistent chainId and eid

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:F/S:C (2.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.15 Lack of Configurability in MultiSigWallet

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:H/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.9)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.16 Missing Use of Internal ERC721 Functions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:F/S:U (1.9)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.17 Unused Config Pong Handler

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (1.9)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.18 Use of Hardcoded Values Instead of Enums

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.19 Inefficient Role Checking

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (1.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.20 Unnecessary immutable namespace variable

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.21 Hardcoded Value Instead of Enum

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:L/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.22 Lack of Distinction Between DELETE and Setting Value to 0

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.23 Entropy Reduction May Lead to Collisions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.24 Potential Hash Collisions in Namespace Constants Due to 4-Byte Limitation

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.25 Unused Function in ConfigManager

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.26 Unused Functions in RegistryManager

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.27 Empty Packet Gap

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (1.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References

7.28 Redundant onlyRole Modifier

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:M/A:N/D:M/Y:N/R:P/S:U (0.6)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.29 Inefficient Placement of amountSupply check

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (0.6)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.30 Lack of Events for State Changes

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.31 Ownership Assumptions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Incorrect balance updates in erc721logic and internals
    2. 7.2 Lack of access control in pong handlers
    3. 7.3 Missing access control in policy termination blueprint
    4. 7.4 Incorrect namespace used on boolean commit
    5. 7.5 Missing validation for loan owner
    6. 7.6 Lack of validation for accesscontrolmanager contract in concretestorage
    7. 7.7 Missing check for response handler address
    8. 7.8 Missing handling of delete and increment
    9. 7.9 Missing operations in config and registry pong handlers.
    10. 7.10 Missing name initialization in erc721logic constructor
    11. 7.11 Non-atomic packet id may result in collisions
    12. 7.12 Missing underflow handling
    13. 7.13 Single step ownership transfer process
    14. 7.14 Missing validation for consistent chainid and eid
    15. 7.15 Lack of configurability in multisigwallet
    16. 7.16 Missing use of internal erc721 functions
    17. 7.17 Unused config pong handler
    18. 7.18 Use of hardcoded values instead of enums
    19. 7.19 Inefficient role checking
    20. 7.20 Unnecessary immutable namespace variable
    21. 7.21 Hardcoded value instead of enum
    22. 7.22 Lack of distinction between delete and setting value to 0
    23. 7.23 Entropy reduction may lead to collisions
    24. 7.24 Potential hash collisions in namespace constants due to 4-byte limitation
    25. 7.25 Unused function in configmanager
    26. 7.26 Unused functions in registrymanager
    27. 7.27 Empty packet gap
    28. 7.28 Redundant onlyrole modifier
    29. 7.29 Inefficient placement of amountsupply check
    30. 7.30 Lack of events for state changes
    31. 7.31 Ownership assumptions

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