πŸ—“οΈ Join us January 23rd, 2026 in NYC for ACCESS, a premier digital asset security summitβ†’

Solutions

Company

Resources

Blog

Contact

Login

    • Assurance

      Smart Contract Assessment

      Securing code integrity, protecting digital assets

      Blockchain Layer 1 Assessment

      Assessing protocols, securing blockchain foundations

      Code Security Audit

      Uncovering flaws, strengthening software integrity

      Web Application Penetration Testing

      Exposing weaknesses, fortifying digital defenses

      Cloud Infrastructure Penetration Testing

      Securing configurations, protecting critical environments

      Red Team Exercise

      Simulating real-world attacks, strengthening defenses

      AI Red Teaming

      Testing AI systems against real threats

      AI Security Assessment

      Securing AI models, data, and pipelines

    • Advisory

      AI Advisory

      Guiding secure, strategic AI adoption forward

      Risk Assessment

      From unknown threats to actionable insights

      Blockchain Architecture Assessment

      Optimizing architecture for tomorrow’s networks

      Compliance Readiness

      Stay ready as regulations evolve

      Custody and Key Management Assessment

      Securing the heart of digital custody

      Technical Due Diligence

      See the risks before you invest

      Technical Training

      Empower your teams to secure what matters

    • Who We Are

      The best security engineers in the world

      Careers

      Work with the elite

      Who Trusts Us

      The trusted security advisor for blockchain and financial services industries

      Brand

      Access official logos, fonts, and guidelines

      Service Commitments

      Committed to Protecting Your Data

    • Audits

      In-depth evaluations of smart contracts and blockchain infrastructures

      BVSS

      Blockchain Vulnerability Scoring System

      Disclosures

      All the latest vulnerabilities discovered by Halborn

      Case Studies

      How Halborn’s solutions have empowered clients to overcome security issues

      Reports

      Comprehensive reports and data

  • Blog

  • Contact

  • Login

THIS WEBSITE USES COOKIES

We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners who may combine it with other information that you've provided to them or that they've collected from your use of their services. You consent to our cookies if you continue to use our website. Learn More.

STAY CURRENT WITH HALBORN

Subscribe to the monthly Halborn Digest for our top blogs and videos, major company announcements, new whitepapers, webinar and event invites, and one exclusive interview.

ADVISORY SERVICES

AI AdvisoryRisk AssessmentBlockchain Architecture AssessmentCompliance ReadinessCustody and Key Management AssessmentTechnical Due DiligenceTechnical Training

ASSURANCE SERVICES

AI Security AssessmentAI Red TeamingSmart Contract AssessmentBlockchain Layer 1 AssessmentCode Security AuditWeb Application Penetration TestingCloud Infrastructure Penetration TestingRed Team Exercise

COMPANY

Who We AreWho Trusts UsService CommitmentsCareersBrandBlogContact

RESOURCES

AuditsDisclosuresReportsBVSSCase Studies
Halborn Logo
Privacy PolicyTerms of UseVulnerability Disclosure Policy

Β© Halborn 2026. All rights reserved.

Background

// Security Assessment

07.04.2025 - 08.08.2025

Friendly Casper Token Minter

Casper Association

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

Friendly Casper Token Minter - Casper Association


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 08/13/2025

Date of Engagement: July 4th, 2025 - August 8th, 2025

Summary

95% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

20

Critical

0

High

2

Medium

0

Low

5

Informational

13


Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Missing contract address update functions break protocol when external contracts upgrade
    2. 7.2 Incorrect tax calculation in bonding curve leads to reduced output amount, protocol fee loss and reserve imbalances
    3. 7.3 Malicious tax configuration enables dex pool drainage and blocks wcspr returns
    4. 7.4 Missing getter functions lead to blind trading
    5. 7.5 Excessive token approvals in dex liquidity addition
    6. 7.6 Missing getter function for token metadata
    7. 7.7 Missing upper limit validation for protocol fee configuration
    8. 7.8 Missing zero amount validation in trade function
    9. 7.9 Lacking event emissions for critical parameter changes
    10. 7.10 Missing input validation for graduation parameters
    11. 7.11 Mismatch between entrypoint type signatures and their implementations
    12. 7.12 Unused contract installation function
    13. 7.13 Unnecessary runtime arguments in cep18 initialization
    14. 7.14 Unnecessary type conversion in return statement
    15. 7.15 Unnecessary wrapper function adds code bloat
    16. 7.16 Commented out code and dead code indicates code quality issues
    17. 7.17 Documentation inconsistencies
    18. 7.18 Inconsistent error handling patterns
    19. 7.19 Debug code present in production
    20. 7.20 Inconsistent naming conventions for fee and tax parameters

1. Introduction

Casper Association engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of the DAO contracts, beginning on July 4th, 2025 and ending on August 8th, 2025. This security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts in the csprfun-core contracts GitHub repository.


The engagement involved a detailed, line-by-line security review of all smart contracts within the Friendly Casper Token Minter ecosystem. This included analysis of the contract code, entry point implementations, bonding curve mechanics, DEX integration, and related administrative controls.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn's team of blockchain security specialists conducted a rigorous smart contract audit on the Friendly Casper Token Minter ecosystem. The review involved a cross-functional team of experts working over a 4 week period to uncover deeply embedded logic flaws, economic design risks, and practical implementation bugs. The primary goal was to stress-test the security posture for token issuance and trading.

The overall architecture demonstrates robust on-chain controls and correct use of Casper primitives. Most critical business logic passed all functional test cases, supporting safe minting, trading, and graduation to DEX liquidity.

However, the audit identified important areas for improvement, which have been partially addressed:

    • Insufficient input validation. Some functions accept parameters (like tax or fee rates) that can break economic incentives or degrade product safety.

    • Unexposed getter/setter functions and excessive token approvalsβ€”potentially reducing transparency and exposing contracts to privilege escalation or attack in edge cases.

    • Lack of event emissions, inconsistent error handling, and documentation gapsβ€”reducing upgrade transparency and maintainability.

    • Numerous minor code hygiene issues: debug code, commented/dead code, naming mismatches.



3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn employs a combined approach of manual code review and automated security testing to ensure a balanced assessment of efficiency, thoroughness, and practicality within the scope of the smart contract review. Manual testing is essential for uncovering logical flaws, process weaknesses, and implementation issues, while automated techniques expand coverage and rapidly identify security best practice violations. The following phases and tools were utilized throughout the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and usage of the platform.

    • Manual code review and walkthrough.

    • Manual assessment of critical Rust variables and functions to evaluate their use and safety, focusing on identifying potential arithmeticrelated vulnerabilities.

    • Verification of cross-contract call controls.

    • Review of architecture-related logical controls.

    • Scanning Rust files for vulnerabilities using cargo audit)

    • Analysis and review of unit tests and integration tests.

    • Deployment to testnet via casper-client.


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+βˆ‘mIβˆ’max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4βˆ‘mIβ€‹βˆ’max(mI​)​

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EICβˆ—10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EICβˆ—10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: csprfun-core
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 0dde699
(c) Items in scope:
  • contract/src/cep18/lib.rs
  • contract/src/main.rs
  • contract/src/utils.rs
  • contract/src/cep18_entry_points.rs
  • contract/src/bonding_curve.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/utils.rs
  • contract/src/entry_points.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/events.rs
  • contract/src/cep18_utils.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/balances.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/security.rs
  • contract/src/events.rs
  • contract/src/constants.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/constants.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/error.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/modalities.rs
  • contract/src/error.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/allowances.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/mod.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/main.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/entry_points.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/utils.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/events.rs
  • wrap-approve-trade-session-code/src/main.rs
  • wrap-approve-create-session-code/src/main.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/security.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/constants.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/error.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/balances.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/modalities.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/allowances.rs
  • wrap-create-token-create-lp-session-code/src/lib.rs
  • contract/src/cep18/lib.rs
  • contract/src/main.rs
  • contract/src/utils.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
  • 97fce36
  • ab42490
  • 6f916d0
  • 86b789c
  • a8f1a70
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

2

Medium

0

Low

5

Informational

13

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Missing Contract Address Update Functions Break Protocol When External Contracts UpgradeHighSolved - 07/16/2025
Incorrect Tax Calculation in Bonding Curve Leads to Reduced Output Amount, Protocol Fee Loss and Reserve ImbalancesHighSolved - 07/16/2025
Malicious Tax Configuration Enables DEX Pool Drainage and Blocks WCSPR ReturnsLowRisk Accepted - 07/16/2025
Missing Getter Functions Lead to Blind TradingLowSolved - 07/16/2025
Excessive Token Approvals in DEX Liquidity AdditionLowPartially Solved - 07/16/2025
Missing Getter Function for Token MetadataLowSolved - 07/16/2025
Missing Upper Limit Validation for Protocol Fee ConfigurationLowNot Solved
Missing Zero Amount Validation in Trade FunctionInformationalAcknowledged
Lacking Event Emissions for Critical Parameter ChangesInformationalAcknowledged
Missing Input Validation For Graduation ParametersInformationalAcknowledged
Mismatch Between EntryPoint Type Signatures and Their ImplementationsInformationalSolved - 07/17/2025
Unused Contract Installation FunctionInformationalAcknowledged
Unnecessary Runtime Arguments in CEP18 InitializationInformationalAcknowledged
Unnecessary Type Conversion in Return StatementInformationalAcknowledged
Unnecessary Wrapper Function Adds Code BloatInformationalAcknowledged
Commented Out Code and Dead Code Indicates Code Quality IssuesInformationalAcknowledged
Documentation InconsistenciesInformationalAcknowledged
Inconsistent Error Handling PatternsInformationalAcknowledged
Debug Code Present in ProductionInformationalSolved - 07/16/2025
Inconsistent Naming Conventions For Fee and Tax ParametersInformationalAcknowledged

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Missing Contract Address Update Functions Break Protocol When External Contracts Upgrade

//

High

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:C/I:N/D:H/Y:M (8.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/FriendlyMarket/csprfun-core/commit/97fce36cc81f3a76c12bddcbfc719f699da0e40f

7.2 Incorrect Tax Calculation in Bonding Curve Leads to Reduced Output Amount, Protocol Fee Loss and Reserve Imbalances

//

High

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:C/D:M/Y:M (8.4)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/FriendlyMarket/csprfun-core/commit/ab4249021fd5eb002321f1bba1379ab18b363273

7.3 Malicious Tax Configuration Enables DEX Pool Drainage and Blocks WCSPR Returns

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:C/C:N/A:N/I:M/D:H/Y:M (4.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.4 Missing Getter Functions Lead to Blind Trading

//

Low

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:P/S:U/C:N/A:M/I:M/D:M/Y:N (3.8)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/FriendlyMarket/csprfun-core/commit/6f916d052131c854de26f7038055b8de2267facf

7.5 Excessive Token Approvals in DEX Liquidity Addition

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:C/Y:N (3.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/FriendlyMarket/csprfun-core/commit/6f916d052131c854de26f7038055b8de2267facf

7.6 Missing Getter Function for Token Metadata

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/FriendlyMarket/csprfun-core/commit/6f916d052131c854de26f7038055b8de2267facf

7.7 Missing Upper Limit Validation for Protocol Fee Configuration

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:C/I:N/D:H/Y:N (2.4)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.8 Missing Zero Amount Validation in Trade Function

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:L/D:N/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.9 Lacking Event Emissions for Critical Parameter Changes

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (1.7)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.10 Missing Input Validation For Graduation Parameters

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:M/R:F/S:U/C:N/A:H/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.3)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.11 Mismatch Between EntryPoint Type Signatures and Their Implementations

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/FriendlyMarket/csprfun-core/commit/86b789cf97f498118668f2a12d4fca700fd8cdb7

7.12 Unused Contract Installation Function

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.13 Unnecessary Runtime Arguments in CEP18 Initialization

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.14 Unnecessary Type Conversion in Return Statement

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.15 Unnecessary Wrapper Function Adds Code Bloat

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.16 Commented Out Code and Dead Code Indicates Code Quality Issues

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.17 Documentation Inconsistencies

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.18 Inconsistent Error Handling Patterns

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.19 Debug Code Present in Production

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/FriendlyMarket/csprfun-core/commit/a8f1a70318afeeb324cf190acb85bc783f25604f

7.20 Inconsistent Naming Conventions For Fee and Tax Parameters

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Missing contract address update functions break protocol when external contracts upgrade
    2. 7.2 Incorrect tax calculation in bonding curve leads to reduced output amount, protocol fee loss and reserve imbalances
    3. 7.3 Malicious tax configuration enables dex pool drainage and blocks wcspr returns
    4. 7.4 Missing getter functions lead to blind trading
    5. 7.5 Excessive token approvals in dex liquidity addition
    6. 7.6 Missing getter function for token metadata
    7. 7.7 Missing upper limit validation for protocol fee configuration
    8. 7.8 Missing zero amount validation in trade function
    9. 7.9 Lacking event emissions for critical parameter changes
    10. 7.10 Missing input validation for graduation parameters
    11. 7.11 Mismatch between entrypoint type signatures and their implementations
    12. 7.12 Unused contract installation function
    13. 7.13 Unnecessary runtime arguments in cep18 initialization
    14. 7.14 Unnecessary type conversion in return statement
    15. 7.15 Unnecessary wrapper function adds code bloat
    16. 7.16 Commented out code and dead code indicates code quality issues
    17. 7.17 Documentation inconsistencies
    18. 7.18 Inconsistent error handling patterns
    19. 7.19 Debug code present in production
    20. 7.20 Inconsistent naming conventions for fee and tax parameters

// Download the full report

Friendly Casper Token Minter

* Use Google Chrome for best results

** Check "Background Graphics" in the print settings if needed