Odradev/Casper- Trade - Casper Association


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 12/03/2025

Date of Engagement: November 6th, 2025 - November 14th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

9

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

1

Low

1

Informational

6


1. Introduction

Casper Association engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of the Casper Trade smart contracts, beginning on November 6th, 2025 and ending on November 14th, 2025. This security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts in the casper-trade GitHub repository based on the Odra framework version 2.4.1.


The engagement involved a detailed, line-by-line security review of all core modules that compose the Casper Trade DEX, a Uniswap V2–style automated market maker (AMM) implemented in Rust for the Casper network. The assessment included review of the Factory, Pair, and Router modules, as well as auxiliary components such as the Callee interface, SampleToken (CEP-18 implementation), utility helpers, and CLI deployment scripts.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn's team of blockchain security specialists conducted a rigorous smart contract audit of the Casper Trade DEX architecture. The review was performed over a 9-day period by experts in Web3 security and Rust-based frameworks for Casper. The primary goal was to evaluate the security and correctness of the AMM core logic, pair creation flow, liquidity management, and routing mechanisms.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which have been completely addressed by the Odra team. The main ones were the following:

    • Add strict access control to set/update the protocol fee receiver (and validate the destination), emit events, and add tests to prevent unauthorized fee redirection/theft.

    • Enforce a canonical token order (e.g., sort by address) or remap inputs before computing shares/reserves to prevent reserve mismatches and price distortion.

    • Validate create_pair inputs to reject zero or identical token addresses and revert with explicit errors, plus unit tests.

    • Add decimal-adjustment getters and unique LP token identifiers to ensure correct TWAP interpretation and distinguishable liquidity tokens across pairs.

    • Replace misleading authorization errors with explicit ones, standardize pair labeling to match canonical token order, and add clear revert messages in the initial mint.

    • Emit events for critical operations such as skim and fee updates to enhance auditability, monitoring, and protocol transparency.


3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn employs a combined approach of manual code review and automated security testing to ensure a comprehensive and practical evaluation of smart contract security and correctness. Manual review focuses on identifying logic flaws, process weaknesses, and unsafe assumptions, while automated tools provide broad coverage and static analysis support.

The following phases and tools were utilized during the assessment:

    • Research and documentation review to understand the Odra architecture, DEX purpose, and module relationships.

    • Manual inspection of Rust source code for all key modules (Factory, Pair, Router, Callee, SampleToken, utils).

    • Manual validation of state variables, entry points, and Odra annotations.

    • Verification of cross-module call integrity and state consistency during liquidity and swap operations.

    • Review of arithmetic operations, invariant maintenance (K-product), and price accumulator updates.

    • Automated static scanning of dependencies using cargo audit and code hygiene checks.

    • Analysis and execution of existing unit and integration tests to confirm functional behavior.


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: casper-trade
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 65efa8e
(c) Items in scope:
  • casper_trade_contracts/build.rs
  • casper_trade_contracts/src/callee.rs
  • casper_trade_contracts/src/factory.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

1

Low

1

Informational

6

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Missing access control on fee receiver allows protocol fee theftCriticalSolved - 11/20/2025
Reversed token order causes reserve mismatch in add_liquidityMediumSolved - 11/24/2025
Factory allows creating pairs with zero or identical token addressesLowSolved - 11/24/2025
Missing decimal-adjustment metadata for TWAP consumersInformationalSolved - 11/27/2025
Misleading authorization error on Pair.initializeInformationalSolved - 12/03/2025
Undistinguishable LP token metadata across all pairsInformationalSolved - 12/03/2025
Missing error handling in initial mintInformationalSolved - 11/24/2025
Non-canonical pair order on deployment labelInformationalSolved - 11/24/2025
Missing events on critical state changes reduces auditability and monitoringInformationalSolved - 11/26/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Missing access control on fee receiver allows protocol fee theft

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.2 Reversed token order causes reserve mismatch in add_liquidity

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.3 Factory allows creating pairs with zero or identical token addresses

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.4 Missing decimal-adjustment metadata for TWAP consumers

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.5 Misleading authorization error on Pair.initialize

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.6 Undistinguishable LP token metadata across all pairs

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.7 Missing error handling in initial mint

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.8 Non-canonical pair order on deployment label

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

7.9 Missing events on critical state changes reduces auditability and monitoring

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.