Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 02/19/2026
Date of Engagement: January 28th, 2026 - January 29th, 2026
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
14
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
1
Low
7
Informational
6
Chiliz engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on January 28th, 2026 and ending on January 29th, 2026. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the chiliz-chain/oracle-contracts Github repository, provided to the Halborn team. Commit hash and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
The reviewed contracts implement a centralized, push-based oracle system where authorized updaters manually publish asset prices on-chain for consumption by other contracts. A factory contract manages the deployment, upgrades, and role-based access control of individual price feed oracles, each exposing a Chainlink-compatible interface.
Halborn was provided with 2 days for this engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts in scope. The assigned engineer possess deep expertise in blockchain and smart contract security, including hands-on experience with multiple blockchain protocols.
The objective of this assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the Chiliz oracles system smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contracts of Chiliz Oracles system functions operate as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were fully addressed by the Chiliz team. The main recommendations were:
Implement a mechanism in the factory to upgrade the price feeds.
Allow timestamp age limit to be configurable per price feed.
Update the price/rounds getter functions of the price feeds to be non-reverting.
Apply consistent price validation rules across all update paths.
Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the architecture and purpose of the Chiliz Oracles system contracts.
Manual code review and walkthrough of the Chiliz Oracles in-scope contracts.
Manual assessment of critical Solidity variables and functions to identify potential vulnerability classes.
Manual testing using custom scripts.
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither).
Local deployment and testing with (Foundry, Remix IDE).
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
1
Low
7
Informational
6
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Incomplete upgrade mechanism | Medium | Solved - 02/02/2026 |
| Incompatible reentrancy guard choice in upgradeable design | Low | Solved - 02/03/2026 |
| Fixed timestamp age does not reflect asset volatility | Low | Solved - 02/03/2026 |
| Inconsistent price validation across update functions | Low | Solved - 02/03/2026 |
| Compatibility mismatch between claimed Chainlink behavior and revert read behavior | Low | Solved - 02/09/2026 |
| No storage gap defined for future upgrades | Low | Solved - 02/09/2026 |
| Round start timestamp is derived from previous round rather than explicit round start | Low | Solved - 02/09/2026 |
| Missing factory setters for oracle configuration | Low | Solved - 02/19/2026 |
| Factory updater role on price feeds can be revoked | Informational | Solved - 02/04/2026 |
| Unnecessary reentrancy protection in non-fund-handling functions | Informational | Solved - 02/04/2026 |
| Redundant pause and unpause event emissions | Informational | Solved - 02/04/2026 |
| Oracles can be removed without being paused first | Informational | Solved - 02/04/2026 |
| Pair name case sensitivity can lead to duplicate oracles | Informational | Solved - 02/09/2026 |
| PriceFeed allows multiple updaters without clarity | Informational | Solved - 02/09/2026 |
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Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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Oracle Contracts
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