Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated Unknown date
Date of Engagement: March 11th, 2024 - March 22nd, 2024
Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
5
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
1
Low
0
Informational
4
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
The CoreDAO Team engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on 03/11/2024 and ending on 03/22/2024. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
2. Assessment Summary
Halborn was provided 2 weeks for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security experts with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some security that were mostly addressed by the CoreDAO team.
2.1 Test Approach and Methodology
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:
Research into architecture and purpose.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (
solgraph).Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions (
slither).Testnet deployment (
Foundry).
2.2 Out-of-scope
External libraries and financial-related attacks.
New features/implementations after/with the remediation commit IDs.
3. SCOPE
- contracts/BtcLightClient.sol
- contracts/CandidateHub.sol
- contracts/PledgeAgent.sol
4. Findings Overview
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation |
|---|---|---|
| Front-Running in delegateBtc Function | Medium | Solved - 03/21/2024 |
| Lack of Dynamic Governance Control Over CLAIM_ROUND_LIMIT in PledgeAgent Contract | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Missing Implementations in the IPledgeAgent Interface for BTC Delegation and Reward Distribution | Informational | Solved - 03/21/2024 |
| Typo in BtcExpireInfo Struct Mapping Name | Informational | Solved - 03/23/2024 |
| Lack of Reentrancy Protection in Public Functions transferBtc and claimBtcReward | Informational | Acknowledged |
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
Table of Contents
// Download the full report
BTC Staking
* Use Google Chrome for best results
** Check "Background Graphics" in the print settings if needed