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Coordinator Program Assessment - CrunchDAO

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 04/11/2025

Date of Engagement: March 17th, 2025 - March 20th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

9

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

1

Informational

8

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

CrunchDAO engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on coordinator program beginning on March 14th, 2025 and ending on March 21th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository coordinator, commit hashes, and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The CrunchDAO team is releasing the coordinator program, a program to align incentives between customers and coordinators of the Crunch Network protocol.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 6 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the codebase.

    • Validate that only approved Coordinators has access to the functionalities of the platform

    • Check that the funds are safely stored in the corresponding rewards vaults

    • Verify that the funds assigned for the burn and foundation wallet are properly transferred

    • Look for any other significant bug or improvement to be implemented in the Coordinator code.


In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the CrunchDAO team. The main one was the following:

    • Implement a functionality to allow crunchers to claim rewards without permission of the Coordinator of the crunch.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual review and security testing based on scripts to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:

    • Research into architecture and purpose.

    • Differences analysis using GitLens to have a proper view of the differences between the mentioned commits

    • Graphing out functionality and programs logic/connectivity/functions along with state change


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: crunchdao-protocol
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 0c546a4
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/coordinator/src/constants.rs
  • programs/coordinator/src/errors.rs
  • programs/coordinator/src/events.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

1

Informational

8

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Crunchers Cannot Directly Claim Their RewardsLowSolved - 03/31/2025
No Mechanism Exists to Revoke an Approved CoordinatorInformationalSolved - 03/20/2025
Lack of 2-Step Ownership TransferInformationalSolved - 03/26/2025
Lack of validation of Burn and Foundation Margin Percentage valuesInformationalSolved - 03/25/2025
USDC Mint Should Not Be MutableInformationalSolved - 03/19/2025
Crunch account not closed after ending the CrunchInformationalAcknowledged - 04/10/2025
Unused account in payout_checkpoint_transfer entry pointInformationalSolved - 03/26/2025
The crunch account is not derived from the Coordinator Account KeyInformationalSolved - 03/21/2025
PDA Accounts Are Not Derived Using Explicit Seeds in Context AccountsInformationalSolved - 03/23/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Crunchers Cannot Directly Claim Their Rewards

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/pull/43

7.2 No Mechanism Exists to Revoke an Approved Coordinator

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/commit/d3e8653c58dbbe21296e0580f483f33d0562e99d

7.3 Lack of 2-Step Ownership Transfer

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/pull/40

7.4 Lack of validation of Burn and Foundation Margin Percentage values

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/commit/c292a1dbcfc7dfa1a697c186b16b791e083052c8

7.5 USDC Mint Should Not Be Mutable

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/commit/c4d75e5299716d6203407be765e5bc129436eca2

7.6 Crunch account not closed after ending the Crunch

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.7 Unused account in payout_checkpoint_transfer entry point

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/commit/5a67ccbe6c552e0b96f1f52bd75300b246a85460

7.8 The crunch account is not derived from the Coordinator Account Key

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/commit/8acecdee56499e0664f07cd730ded898fe6e23e9 , https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/commit/07cbfef914f9ac6d3eeed6614d2802a9661efa17

7.9 PDA Accounts Are Not Derived Using Explicit Seeds in Context Accounts

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Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/commit/1976579754bda3d14785640f8351aeda4a4176a0 , https://github.com/crunchdao/crunchdao-protocol/commit/63a658e2ae1b3074066403ab6d83b20cf803a6ae

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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Coordinator Program Assessment

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