Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated Unknown date
Date of Engagement: November 12th, 2024 - November 28th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
25
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
3
Low
6
Informational
15
dappOS engaged our security analysis team to conduct a comprehensive security assessment of their smart contract ecosystem. The primary aim was to meticulously assess the security architecture of the smart contracts to pinpoint vulnerabilities, evaluate existing security protocols, and offer actionable insights to bolster security and operational efficacy of their smart contract framework. Our assessment was strictly confined to the smart contracts provided, ensuring a focused and exhaustive analysis of their security features.
Our engagement with dappOS spanned a 2 week period, during which we dedicated one full-time security engineer equipped with extensive experience in blockchain security, advanced penetration testing capabilities, and profound knowledge of various blockchain protocols. The objectives of this assessment were to:
- Verify the correct functionality of smart contract operations.
- Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.
- Provide recommendations to enhance the security and efficiency of the smart contracts.
Our testing strategy employed a blend of manual and automated techniques to ensure a thorough evaluation. While manual testing was pivotal for uncovering logical and implementation flaws, automated testing offered broad code coverage and rapid identification of common vulnerabilities. The testing process included:
- A detailed examination of the smart contracts' architecture and intended functionality.
- Comprehensive manual code reviews and walkthroughs.
- Functional and connectivity analysis utilizing tools like Solgraph.
- Customized script-based manual testing and testnet deployment using Foundry.
This executive summary encapsulates the pivotal findings and recommendations from our security assessment of dappOS smart contract ecosystem. By addressing the identified issues and implementing the recommended fixes, dappOS can significantly boost the security, reliability, and trustworthiness of its smart contract platform.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
3
Low
6
Informational
15
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Incorrect Fee Determination | High | Solved - 12/10/2024 |
| Reserved Fee Tier Misuse | Medium | Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024 |
| Decimals Mismatch | Medium | Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024 |
| Invalid Fee Values Can Cause Underflow and DoS | Medium | Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024 |
| Lack of Validation for Duplicate Entries and Interface Compliance | Low | Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024 |
| Missing Validation and Standardization | Low | Solved - 12/10/2024 |
| Improper Initialization Logic | Low | Solved - 12/10/2024 |
| Missing Initializer Disabling in Constructor | Low | Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024 |
| Unsafe ETH Transfers | Low | Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024 |
| Resetting Approvals After Failed filling | Low | Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024 |
| Misaligned Admin Functionality | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Centralization Risk in Admin Withdrawal Functions | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Lack of Validation for IntentToken | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Hardcoded ERC20 Names | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Debugging Calls Present in Production Code | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Type Mismatch in Decoding Functions | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Inconsistent Sorting and Subset Validation | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Inefficient Execution matchOrders Function | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Inefficient External Call | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Duplicated Role Checks in Batch Functions | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Inefficient Initialization and Missing Validation in Setters | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Token Intent State Change Impact | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Insecure setter Functions | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Early Validation for Node Whitelist | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
| Filter Zero Balances | Informational | Acknowledged - 12/10/2024 |
//High
//Medium
//Medium
//Medium
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
// Download the full report
Internal Exchange Re-Assessment
* Use Google Chrome for best results
** Check "Background Graphics" in the print settings if needed
