Internal Exchange Re-Assessment - Dappos

Prepared by:

HALBORN

Last Updated Unknown date

Date of Engagement: November 12th, 2024 - November 28th, 2024

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

1. Introduction
2. Assessment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Incorrect fee determination
7.2 Reserved fee tier misuse
7.3 Decimals mismatch
7.4 Invalid fee values can cause underflow and dos
7.5 Lack of validation for duplicate entries and interface compliance
7.6 Missing validation and standardization
7.7 Improper initialization logic
7.8 Missing initializer disabling in constructor
7.9 Unsafe eth transfers
7.10 Resetting approvals after failed filling
7.11 Misaligned admin functionality
7.12 Centralization risk in admin withdrawal functions
7.13 Lack of validation for intenttoken
7.14 Hardcoded erc20 names
7.15 Debugging calls present in production code
7.16 Type mismatch in decoding functions
7.17 Inconsistent sorting and subset validation
7.18 Inefficient execution matchorders function
7.19 Inefficient external call
7.20 Duplicated role checks in batch functions
7.21 Inefficient initialization and missing validation in setters
7.22 Token intent state change impact
7.23 Insecure setter functions
7.24 Early validation for node whitelist
7.25 Filter zero balances

1. Introduction

dappOS engaged our security analysis team to conduct a comprehensive security assessment of their smart contract ecosystem. The primary aim was to meticulously assess the security architecture of the smart contracts to pinpoint vulnerabilities, evaluate existing security protocols, and offer actionable insights to bolster security and operational efficacy of their smart contract framework. Our assessment was strictly confined to the smart contracts provided, ensuring a focused and exhaustive analysis of their security features.

2. Assessment Summary

Our engagement with dappOS spanned a 2 week period, during which we dedicated one full-time security engineer equipped with extensive experience in blockchain security, advanced penetration testing capabilities, and profound knowledge of various blockchain protocols. The objectives of this assessment were to:

- Verify the correct functionality of smart contract operations.

- Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.

- Provide recommendations to enhance the security and efficiency of the smart contracts.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Our testing strategy employed a blend of manual and automated techniques to ensure a thorough evaluation. While manual testing was pivotal for uncovering logical and implementation flaws, automated testing offered broad code coverage and rapid identification of common vulnerabilities. The testing process included:

- A detailed examination of the smart contracts' architecture and intended functionality.

- Comprehensive manual code reviews and walkthroughs.

- Functional and connectivity analysis utilizing tools like Solgraph.

- Customized script-based manual testing and testnet deployment using Foundry.

This executive summary encapsulates the pivotal findings and recommendations from our security assessment of dappOS smart contract ecosystem. By addressing the identified issues and implementing the recommended fixes, dappOS can significantly boost the security, reliability, and trustworthiness of its smart contract platform.

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S)	1 0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H)	1 0.67 0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H)	1 0.67 0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Availability (A)	None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F)	1 0.5 0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U)	1.25 1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY

(a) Repository: IntentExchange

(b) Assessed Commit ID: 35b86d4

contracts/OrderBookVault.sol
contracts/Create2Factory.sol
contracts/OverBid.sol

↓ Expand ↓

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

Security analysis	Risk level	Remediation Date
Incorrect Fee Determination	High	Solved - 12/10/2024
Reserved Fee Tier Misuse	Medium	Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024
Decimals Mismatch	Medium	Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024
Invalid Fee Values Can Cause Underflow and DoS	Medium	Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024
Lack of Validation for Duplicate Entries and Interface Compliance	Low	Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024
Missing Validation and Standardization	Low	Solved - 12/10/2024
Improper Initialization Logic	Low	Solved - 12/10/2024
Missing Initializer Disabling in Constructor	Low	Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024
Unsafe ETH Transfers	Low	Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024
Resetting Approvals After Failed filling	Low	Risk Accepted - 12/10/2024
Misaligned Admin Functionality	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Centralization Risk in Admin Withdrawal Functions	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Lack of Validation for IntentToken	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Hardcoded ERC20 Names	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Debugging Calls Present in Production Code	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Type Mismatch in Decoding Functions	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Inconsistent Sorting and Subset Validation	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Inefficient Execution matchOrders Function	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Inefficient External Call	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Duplicated Role Checks in Batch Functions	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Inefficient Initialization and Missing Validation in Setters	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Token Intent State Change Impact	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Insecure setter Functions	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Early Validation for Node Whitelist	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024
Filter Zero Balances	Informational	Acknowledged - 12/10/2024

Remediation Comment

7.4 Invalid Fee Values Can Cause Underflow and DoS

Medium

Description

BVSS

AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:L/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.6)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

1. Introduction
2. Assessment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Incorrect fee determination
7.2 Reserved fee tier misuse
7.3 Decimals mismatch
7.4 Invalid fee values can cause underflow and dos
7.5 Lack of validation for duplicate entries and interface compliance
7.6 Missing validation and standardization
7.7 Improper initialization logic
7.8 Missing initializer disabling in constructor
7.9 Unsafe eth transfers
7.10 Resetting approvals after failed filling
7.11 Misaligned admin functionality
7.12 Centralization risk in admin withdrawal functions
7.13 Lack of validation for intenttoken
7.14 Hardcoded erc20 names
7.15 Debugging calls present in production code
7.16 Type mismatch in decoding functions
7.17 Inconsistent sorting and subset validation
7.18 Inefficient execution matchorders function
7.19 Inefficient external call
7.20 Duplicated role checks in batch functions
7.21 Inefficient initialization and missing validation in setters
7.22 Token intent state change impact
7.23 Insecure setter functions
7.24 Early validation for node whitelist
7.25 Filter zero balances

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Internal Exchange Re-Assessment

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