Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 09/16/2025
Date of Engagement: August 18th, 2025 - August 26th, 2025
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
6
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
1
Informational
5
Decent Labs engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts from August 18th, 2025, to August 26th, 2025. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.
The Decent Labs codebase in scope consists of smart contracts implementing a modular token sale system with EIP-712-based buyer verification, a non-transferable ERC20 staking and rewards mechanism, and a system deployer contract for proxy deployments.
Halborn was allocated 7 days for this engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineer is an expert in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The objectives of this assessment were to:
Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.
Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of potential risks, which were partially addressed by the Decent Labs team:
Update the _distributeRewards() function to increment rewardsDistributed only by the amount actually allocated to stakers, not the full amountToDistribute.
Add a check in the initialize() function to ensure that protocolFeeReceiver is not the zero address.
Add a validation check in _validateHedgeyParams to ensure that cliff_ is greater than or equal to start_.
Halborn conducted a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is crucial for identifying flaws in logic, processes, and implementation, automated testing enhances coverage of smart contracts and quickly detects deviations from established security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were employed throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the platform's architecture, purpose and use.
Manual code review and walkthrough of smart contracts to identify any logical issues.
Comprehensive assessment of the safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions within scope that could lead to arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.
Local testing using custom scripts (Foundry).
Fork testing against main networks (Foundry).
Static security analysis of scoped contracts, and imported functions (Slither).
After the conclusion of this assessment, the Decent Labs team introduced a minor update to the VotesERC20Staked contract in commit d7137b1 in order to support compatibility with both version 0 and version 1 deployments. Specifically, a clockModeTimestamp boolean variable was added to storage and initialization, with corresponding updates to the CLOCK_MODE() and clock() functions. This change allows the contract to operate using either block timestamps or block numbers as the underlying clock mechanism.
Although this modification was introduced after the commit reviewed during the assessment and therefore falls outside the official scope of this engagement, Halborn reviewed the update at a high level. Based on this review, it was concluded that the change is limited in scope and does not appear to introduce any new security risks.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
1
Informational
5
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Suboptimal reward accounting can permanently lock dust amounts in contract | Low | Risk Accepted - 09/02/2025 |
| Missing validation for protocolFeeReceiver may result in lost funds | Informational | Acknowledged - 09/02/2025 |
| Vesting schedule allows cliff to be set before vesting start | Informational | Solved - 09/02/2025 |
| Staked token can be added as a reward token | Informational | Solved - 09/02/2025 |
| Missing input validation | Informational | Acknowledged - 09/02/2025 |
| Floating pragma | Informational | Acknowledged - 09/02/2025 |
//Low
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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Decent Contracts
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