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Background

// Security Assessment

10.31.2025 - 11.06.2025

StakedDUSD

Deploy Finance

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

StakedDUSD - Deploy Finance

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 12/03/2025

Date of Engagement: October 31st, 2025 - November 6th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

9

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

2

Informational

7

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Nonce truncation causes potential nonce collisions and order rejection
    2. 7.2 Mismatch between order struct definition and its eip-712 type string breaks signature verification
    3. 7.3 Lack of per-stable configuration may enable depegged stable exploitation
    4. 7.4 Missing minimum output enforcement leads to silent value loss for users
    5. 7.5 Centralized control over minting and redemption introduces trust risk
    6. 7.6 Ineffective staker restriction mechanism enables indirect deposits
    7. 7.7 Blacklist role updates may silently fail due to unchecked results
    8. 7.8 Dust donation can lock stakeddusd deposits permanently
    9. 7.9 non-standard erc-20 tokens are not supported

1. INTRODUCTION

Deploy Finance engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on October 31st, 2025 and ending on November 6th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the Deploy Finance Github repository, provided to the Halborn team. Commit hash and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


The reviewed contracts implement minting, redemption, and staking of the dUSD stablecoin, featuring per-asset mint/redeem limits, support for multiple signature types, and stable-specific validation mechanisms.

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Halborn was provided with 5 days for this engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts in scope. The assigned engineer possess deep expertise in blockchain and smart contract security, including hands-on experience with multiple blockchain protocols.


The objective of this assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the Deploy Finance protocol smart contracts.

    • Ensure that smart contract of ````Deploy Finance protocol functions operate as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were partially addressed by the Deploy Finance team. The main ones were:

    • Modify the ORDER_TYPE string to match the field types in the Order struct to prevent signature verification failures.

    • Include the full 128 bits of the nonce in order verification to prevent nonce collisions and order rejection.


3. TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture and purpose of the Deploy Finance protocol.

    • Manual code review and walkthrough of the Deploy Finance in-scope contracts.

    • Manual assessment of critical Solidity variables and functions to identify potential vulnerability classes.

    • Manual testing using custom scripts.

    • Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither).

    • Local deployment and testing with (Foundry, Remix IDE).


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4∑mI​−max(mI​)​

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EIC∗10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: dAssets
(b) Assessed Commit ID: c32fda0
(c) Items in scope:
  • src/dUSD.sol
  • src/StakedDUSD.sol
  • src/StakedDUSDV2.sol
  • src/DeployMinting.sol
  • src/dUSD.sol
  • src/StakedDUSD.sol
  • src/StakedDUSDV2.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Remediation Commit ID:
  • f80ef2e
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

2

Informational

7

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Nonce truncation causes potential nonce collisions and order rejectionLowSolved - 11/23/2025
Mismatch between Order struct definition and its EIP-712 type string breaks signature verificationLowSolved - 11/23/2025
Lack of per-stable configuration may enable depegged stable exploitationInformationalAcknowledged - 11/28/2025
Missing minimum output enforcement leads to silent value loss for usersInformationalAcknowledged - 11/28/2025
Centralized control over minting and redemption introduces trust riskInformationalAcknowledged - 11/26/2025
Ineffective staker restriction mechanism enables indirect depositsInformationalAcknowledged - 11/27/2025
Blacklist role updates may silently fail due to unchecked resultsInformationalAcknowledged - 11/28/2025
Dust donation can lock StakedDUSD deposits permanentlyInformationalAcknowledged - 11/28/2025
Non-standard ERC-20 tokens are not supportedInformationalAcknowledged - 11/28/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Nonce truncation causes potential nonce collisions and order rejection

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N (2.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/ash24r/dAssets/commit/f80ef2e66648725c7626f4317d62c86e20c7e897

7.2 Mismatch between Order struct definition and its EIP-712 type string breaks signature verification

//

Low

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:F/S:U/C:N/A:H/I:N/D:L/Y:N (2.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/ash24r/dAssets/commit/f80ef2e66648725c7626f4317d62c86e20c7e897

7.3 Lack of per-stable configuration may enable depegged stable exploitation

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:M/Y:L (1.1)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.4 Missing minimum output enforcement leads to silent value loss for users

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (0.5)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.5 Centralized control over minting and redemption introduces trust risk

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 Ineffective staker restriction mechanism enables indirect deposits

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.7 Blacklist role updates may silently fail due to unchecked results

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.8 Dust donation can lock StakedDUSD deposits permanently

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.9 Non-standard ERC-20 tokens are not supported

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Risk methodology
  • 5. Scope
  • 6. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 7. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 7.1 Nonce truncation causes potential nonce collisions and order rejection
    2. 7.2 Mismatch between order struct definition and its eip-712 type string breaks signature verification
    3. 7.3 Lack of per-stable configuration may enable depegged stable exploitation
    4. 7.4 Missing minimum output enforcement leads to silent value loss for users
    5. 7.5 Centralized control over minting and redemption introduces trust risk
    6. 7.6 Ineffective staker restriction mechanism enables indirect deposits
    7. 7.7 Blacklist role updates may silently fail due to unchecked results
    8. 7.8 Dust donation can lock stakeddusd deposits permanently
    9. 7.9 non-standard erc-20 tokens are not supported

// Download the full report

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