Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated Unknown date
Date of Engagement: May 27th, 2024 - June 19th, 2024
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
12
Critical
3
High
2
Medium
1
Low
4
Informational
2
The Elys Network team engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their cosmos appchain modules, beginning on 05/27/2024 and ending on 06/19/2024. The security assessment was scoped to the sections of code that pertain to the staking & masterchef modules of app chain. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
Halborn was provided 3 weeks for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the modules in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
- Ensure that the EStaking & MasterChef Modules operate as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the custom modules used in the Elys Chain.
In summary, Halborn identified some security issues that were mostly addressed by the Elys Network team.
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the custom modules. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of structures and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Static Analysis of security for scoped repository, and imported functions. (e.g., staticcheck, gosec, unconvert, codeql, ineffassign and semgrep)
- Manual Assessment for discovering security vulnerabilities on the codebase.
- Ensuring the correctness of the codebase.
- Dynamic Analysis of files and modules related to the Elys Network Modules.
External libraries and financial-related attacks.
New features/implementations after/with the remediation commit IDs
Changes that occur outside of the scope of PRs.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
3
High
2
Medium
1
Low
4
Informational
2
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Reward Inflation and Distribution Inconsistencies due to Improper LastUpdatedBlock Initialization | Critical | Solved - 06/17/2024 |
| Chain Halt due to Panic in MustAccAddressFromBech32 | Critical | Solved - 11/26/2024 |
| Potential Chain Halt Due to Blocked Protocol Revenue Address | Critical | Solved - 11/26/2024 |
| Integer Overflow in AddExternalIncentive Function | High | Solved - 06/17/2024 |
| Hardcoded Limit for Delegation Retrieval and Lack of Error Handling | High | Solved - 06/17/2024 |
| Misleading Error Messages and Comments in msgClaimRewards and performMsgClaimRewards Functions | Medium | Solved - 06/17/2024 |
| Lack of Event Emission in Message Handlers | Low | Solved - 06/17/2024 |
| Lack of spec on the modules | Low | Solved - 06/17/2024 |
| ASA-2024-004: Default Evidence Configuration Parameters May Limit Window of Validity for the Noble App Chain | Low | Risk Accepted |
| ASA-2023-002: Default BlockParams.MaxBytes Configuration May Increase Block Times and Affect Consensus Participation in the Noble App Chain | Low | Solved - 11/26/2024 |
| Missing Long Descriptions In Cli Affects Usability And User Experience | Informational | Acknowledged |
| Potential Incorrect Consensus Version in the estaking Module | Informational | Acknowledged |
//Critical
//Critical
//Critical
//High
//High
//Medium
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Low
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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