← Back to Audits

Gorples IDO + Core - Entangle.fi

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated Unknown date

Date of Engagement: April 29th, 2024 - May 21st, 2024

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

7

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

2

Low

2

Informational

2

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This security assessment report for Gorples (ex-Borpa) examines the gorples-core and gorples-ido program's resilience against potential Solana's specifics threats, vulnerabilities and attack vectors. This includes a thorough examination of the logic and correct functionality of all the provided instructions, and also their security maturity.

The gorples-core program is responsible for core operations of the $GORPLES coin (ex $BORPA token), such as Mint, Burn and External Burn. The gorples-ido program is responsible for handling operations related to the Initial Dex Offering (IDO), involving administrative instructions such as Add Round, Add Whitelist, Airdrop and Withdraw, and also low-privileged users instructions, such as Buy, Claim and Refund.


Entangle team engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of their Solana programs, beginning on April 29th, 2024 and ending on May 19th, 2024. The security assessment was scoped to the Solana Programs provided in Entangle-Protocol/gorples-solana GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 2 weeks for the engagement and assigned two full-time security engineers to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. Engineers are blockchain and smart contract security experts with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.

    • Ensure that program functionality operates as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified some security concerns, which have been partially addressed by Entangle team. The main ones were the following:

    • Missing signer check - mint_gorples instruction.

    • Insecure initialization (missing signer checks) of both programs in-scope.

    • Multiple input validation enhancements.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.

    • Mapping out possible attack vectors.

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.

    • Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (cargo audit).

    • Local runtime testing (solana-test-framework).

3.1 Out-of-scope

    • External libraries and financial-related attacks.

    • New features/implementations after/with the remediation commit IDs.

    • Changes that occur outside of the scope of PRs/Commits.

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: gorples-solana
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 5a7e9b4
(c) Items in scope:
  • gorples-core/src/lib.rs
  • gorples-ido/src/instructions/start_tge.rs
  • gorples-ido/src/instructions/set_interval.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

1

High

0

Medium

2

Low

2

Informational

2

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Any account can mint infinite amount of $GORPLES tokens to any compatible vaultCriticalSolved - 05/19/2024
Program initializers can be front-runMediumSolved - 05/19/2024
Lack of input validations can lead to loss of $SOLMediumRisk Accepted
Multiple unsafe arithmetic operationsLowRisk Accepted
LP tokens can be minted disproportionatelyLowRisk Accepted
Airdrop thresholds are not enforcedInformationalAcknowledged
Unwarranted $GORPLES claimingInformationalAcknowledged

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Any account can mint infinite amount of $GORPLES tokens to any compatible vault

//

Critical

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation

7.2 Program initializers can be front-run

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation

7.3 Lack of input validations can lead to loss of $SOL

//

Medium

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation

7.4 Multiple unsafe arithmetic operations

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation

7.5 LP tokens can be minted disproportionately

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation

7.6 Airdrop thresholds are not enforced

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation

7.7 Unwarranted $GORPLES claiming

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
BVSS
Recommendation

8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

// Download the full report

Gorples IDO + Core

* Use Google Chrome for best results

** Check "Background Graphics" in the print settings if needed

© Halborn 2025. All rights reserved.