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Background

// Security Assessment

12.22.2025 - 12.31.2025

Forever Money

Forever Money

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Forever Money


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 01/28/2026

Date of Engagement: December 22nd, 2025 - December 31st, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

12

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

4

Low

2

Informational

6


Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Scope
  • 4. Findings overview

1. Introduction

Creator Bid engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts from December 22nd, 2025 to December 31st, 2025. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.


The Creator Bid codebase in scope consists of smart contracts for creating ERC20-based Agent Key tokens, including single-sided liquidity pools, prediction markets, reward distribution, and a time-weighted BID locking NFT system with credit management.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was allocated 8 days for this engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineer is an expert in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.


The objectives of this assessment are to:

    • Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.

    • Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were partially addressed by the Creator Bid team. The main recommendations are:

    • To implement a slippage limiter in the exactInOnPool function.

    • Removing _tokenIds inside the burn function.

    • To manage the claim rewards from in the unstaking function explicitly before withdrawing a position.


3. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: smart-contracts-foundry
(b) Assessed Commit ID: cfaa319
(c) Items in scope:
  • src/types/TokenAmount.sol
  • src/types/AeroPositionDetails.sol
  • src/types/InitialPoolConfig.sol
  • src/types/MintParams.sol
  • src/types/PoolConfig.sol
  • src/types/EscrowType.sol
  • src/types/InitialPositionConfig.sol
  • src/fee/SimpleFeeSplit.sol
  • src/LiquidityManager.sol
  • src/SnLiquidityManager.sol
  • src/aero/AeroCLPositionManager.sol
  • src/aero/AeroCLPoolManager.sol
  • src/aero/AeroCLTeamPositionEscrow.sol
  • src/lib/Errors.sol
  • src/interfaces/IPoolManager.sol
  • src/interfaces/IPositionEscrow.sol
  • src/interfaces/IFeeSplit.sol
  • src/interfaces/ILiquidityManager.sol
  • src/interfaces/IPositionManager.sol
  • src/types/TokenAmount.sol
  • src/types/AeroPositionDetails.sol
  • src/types/InitialPoolConfig.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies, economic attacks and everything before commit 4513498.
Remediation Commit ID:
  • https://github.com/SN98-ForeverMoney/smart-contracts-foundry/blob/c3d545e6d40d3d84f39782330b1415f0b8d79215/src/aero/AeroCLPoolManager.sol#L197-L251
  • 982e18f
  • https://github.com/SN98-ForeverMoney/smart-contracts-foundry/blob/c3d545e6d40d3d84f39782330b1415f0b8d79215/src/aero/AeroCLTeamPositionEscrow.sol#L196-L212
  • https://github.com/SN98-ForeverMoney/smart-contracts-foundry/blob/c3d545e6d40d3d84f39782330b1415f0b8d79215/src/aero/AeroCLPositionManager.sol#L183
  • https://github.com/SN98-ForeverMoney/smart-contracts-foundry/blob/c3d545e6d40d3d84f39782330b1415f0b8d79215/src/aero/AeroCLPositionManager.sol#L578
  • 32f2379
  • https://github.com/SN98-ForeverMoney/smart-contracts-foundry/blob/c3d545e6d40d3d84f39782330b1415f0b8d79215/src/aero/AeroCLPoolManager.sol#L401
  • https://github.com/creatorbid/smart-contracts-foundry/blob/32f2379c559fd4e8cebb45764e7aca82f3392e38/src/LiquidityManager.sol#L372-L381
  • https://github.com/creatorbid/smart-contracts-foundry/blob/32f2379c559fd4e8cebb45764e7aca82f3392e38/src/aero/AeroCLPositionManager.sol#L364-L366
  • https://github.com/creatorbid/smart-contracts-foundry/blob/32f2379c559fd4e8cebb45764e7aca82f3392e38/src/aero/AeroCLPoolManager.sol#L215
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

4. Findings Overview

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation
Swaps have no on-chain slippage protectionMediumSolved - 01/08/2026
Burn operation fails to remove token ID from registryMediumSolved - 12/30/2025
Vesting bypass via spot price manipulationMediumSolved - 01/08/2026
Staking rewards permanently lost during unstake operationMediumSolved - 01/08/2026
Position manager initialization is permissionlessLowRisk Accepted - 01/09/2026
Non-atomic initialization of fee splitter creates DoS windowLowRisk Accepted - 01/09/2026
View functions revert on empty sets instead of returning empty valuesInformationalSolved - 01/08/2026
Operations on staked positions return unclear errorsInformationalSolved - 01/08/2026
Invalid escrow type values can permanently lock positionsInformationalSolved - 01/08/2026
Direct token transfers to LiquidityManager cannot be withdrawnInformationalSolved - 01/08/2026
Dangling token approvals in increaseLiquidityInformationalSolved - 01/08/2026
Misleading comment regarding bytes32 conversionInformationalSolved - 01/08/2026

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Scope
  • 4. Findings overview

// Download the full report

Forever Money

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