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Stratium HYPE Staking Vault - HorizonX

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 02/09/2026

Date of Engagement: December 8th, 2025 - December 24th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

12

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

3

Low

2

Informational

7

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

HorizonX engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on December 8th, 2025 and ending on December 24th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the strong-smart-contracts-internal Github repository, provided to the Halborn team. Commit hash and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


The Stratium Hyperliquid Vault is a liquid staking protocol where users deposit HYPE tokens to receive srHYPE, the vault delegates to validators via HyperCore precompiles, manages withdrawal queues with unbonding periods, and distributes collateral rewards.


Following the completion of the initial audit, two additional issues were identified during a re-scan of commit 4870a97 and subsequently remediated in commit 1604c64:

    • Accounting drift in totalUnstakingForWithdrawals during slashing events - The applySlash() function failed to update the totalUnstakingForWithdrawals tracking variable when reducing withdrawal amounts, causing incorrect liquidity calculations.

    • Batch processor DoS via non-existent HyperCore account - The processWithdrawalQueue() function would revert when encountering users without HyperCore accounts, permanently blocking the batch withdrawal processor.

Both issues have been successfully resolved in the remediation commit with appropriate accounting updates and graceful error handling.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided with 8 days for this engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts in scope. The assigned engineer possess deep expertise in blockchain and smart contract security, including hands-on experience with multiple blockchain protocols.


The objective of this assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the Stratium protocol smart contracts.

    • Ensure that smart contract of Stratium protocol functions operate as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were successfully addressed by the HorizonX team. The main recommendations were:

    • Decouple reward balance snapshotting from reward distribution by fixing eligible balances in a prior block, thereby preventing same-block manipulation.

    • Extend the slashing mechanism to support multiple events by allowing repeated slashing with appropriate safeguards and event logging.

    • Add a pre-transfer balance check to ensure the Core spot balance for the specified collateral is sufficient to cover the reward amount, reverting otherwise.

    • Include logic to refresh Core balances from L1Read before processing withdrawals.


3. Test approach and methodology

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.


The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture and purpose of the Stratium protocol.

    • Manual code review and walkthrough of the Stratium in-scope contracts.

    • Manual assessment of critical Solidity variables and functions to identify potential vulnerability classes.

    • Manual testing using custom scripts.

    • Static Analysis of security for scoped contracts and imported functions (Slither).

    • Local deployment and testing with Foundry


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: stratium-hyperliquid-vault
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 7b1ebd7
(c) Items in scope:
  • StakingVault.sol
  • RewardDistributor.sol
  • srHYPE.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Third-party dependencies and economic attacks.
FILE
(a) Submitted File: stratium-hyperliquid-vault-main (2).zip
(b) Items in scope:
  • /stratium-hyperliquid-vault-main/src/RewardDistributor.sol
  • /stratium-hyperliquid-vault-main/src/RoleRegistry.sol
  • /stratium-hyperliquid-vault-main/src/srHYPE.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

3

Low

2

Informational

7

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Front running reward distribution allows disproportionate reward captureMediumSolved - 01/05/2026
Single-use slashing flag prevents handling multiple slash eventsMediumSolved - 01/05/2026
Accounting drift in totalUnstakingForWithdrawals during slashing eventsMediumSolved - 02/08/2026
Missing core balance check before reward transferLowSolved - 01/05/2026
Unbounded loop over all historical withdrawal requests during slashingLowSolved - 01/05/2026
Gas limit denial of service in reward distribution loopInformationalSolved - 01/09/2026
Cancelled withdrawals leave unstaked HYPE idle in coreInformationalSolved - 01/09/2026
Lack of slippage protection on depositsInformationalAcknowledged - 01/09/2026
Syncing balances during unbonding can cause claim underflow and denial of serviceInformationalSolved - 01/09/2026
Lack of two-step ownership transferInformationalSolved - 01/09/2026
Batch processor denial of service via non-existent HyperCore accountInformationalSolved - 02/08/2026
Inconsistent / Floating pragma usageInformationalSolved - 01/09/2026

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Front running reward distribution allows disproportionate reward capture

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/ddd9c078c46224f64387f2748055e876574d6621

7.2 Single-use slashing flag prevents handling multiple slash events

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/6519e014d479e74d331103686ad98b2c21089533

7.3 Accounting drift in totalUnstakingForWithdrawals during slashing events

//

Medium

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/1604c6458fe92911f69370b6f3b67f655eebb93e

7.4 Missing core balance check before reward transfer

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/6fdfc3645bafc58b35d0fc412d1f0e6df761bc26

7.5 Unbounded loop over all historical withdrawal requests during slashing

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/6519e014d479e74d331103686ad98b2c21089533

7.6 Gas limit denial of service in reward distribution loop

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/691d9cb5c430efb8a38f56c55e8341259b7a44f3

7.7 Cancelled withdrawals leave unstaked HYPE idle in core

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/914cd0870a08609222cc5fb542cd87e4f2f21e12

7.8 Lack of slippage protection on deposits

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.9 Syncing balances during unbonding can cause claim underflow and denial of service

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/d0cc5d4a2c83024728482f6e92fa5d9efc1c0fec

7.10 Lack of two-step ownership transfer

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/51c5f23c2b44c91cce558a7c8ee9b05f4a8e66bf

7.11 Batch processor denial of service via non-existent HyperCore account

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/1604c6458fe92911f69370b6f3b67f655eebb93e

7.12 Inconsistent / Floating pragma usage

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/horizonx-tech/stratium-hyperliquid-vault/commit/b2d428aa4ffde899ce01c6aee071da5c1a8037e5

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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