Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
- 0Acknowledged
- 0Risk Accepted
- 3Solved
- 3All Findings
- Critical0
- High0
- Medium1
- 1Solved
- Low2
- 2Solved
- Informational0
Introduction#
HSuite engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of the new transaction-related updates to SilkDEX. The engagement was carried out between the 8th of September 2026 and the 16th of September 2026. The security assessment was scoped to the assets and environments agreed upon with the HSuite team.
Assessment Summary#
The team at Halborn was provided 7 days for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the assets in scope. The security engineer is a penetration testing expert with advanced knowledge in web, recon, discovery & infrastructure penetration testing.
The goals of our security assessments are to improve the quality of the systems we review and to target sufficient remediation to help protect users.
Scope
The security assessment was scoped to the two new updates to the DEX:
Pools may now be created between arbitrary asset pairs, with neither side being HSUITE, SILK, or any other hub token.
A set of improvements was made to the automated rebalancing engine.
The assessment identified weaknesses primarily relating to logic-level resource controls and information disclosure rather than direct exploitability. A resource exhaustion issue was identified coming from insufficient logic-level throttling, whereby repeated use of legitimate application functionality could exhaust backend resources, potentially resulting in degraded availability or Denial-of-Service conditions. A permissive pool creation was also observed, wherein the application allowed the creation of resource pools with insufficiently restrictive controls, which could be leveraged to create unintended attack surface over time. Finally, verbose error messages were identified that could disclose internal implementation details, potentially aiding an attacker in reconnaissance.
Addressing the identified findings is important in order to reduce the organization's exposure to both opportunistic and targeted adversarial campaigns.
Test Approach and Methodology#
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of the assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process and implementation; automated testing techniques assist enhance coverage of the infrastructure and can quickly identify flaws in it.
Testing was black-box against the isolated testnet environment, with no source access, only the public client API and funded test accounts. Custom tests covered tampering with transaction bytes between quote and execute, replay and cross-account signing, authentication abuse and parallel concurrency. Test cases spanned pool admission, routing, settlement atomicity and fees, the rebalancing engine, liquidity economics, concurrency, cross-pool contamination, access control, input validation, and resource abuse. All economic results were verified to confirm what actually settled on chain. Volumetric Denial-of-Service was out of scope.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Application logic flaws
Areas where insufficient validation allows for hostile input
Input handling
Fuzzing of input parameters
Technology stack-specific vulnerabilities and code assessment
Application Logic Flaw
Response Manipulation
Sensitive data leakage
Configuration review
Access controls
API subscription key bypass
Risk Methodology#
- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.
- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.
- 10 - CRITICAL
- 9 - 8 - HIGH
- 7 - 6 - MEDIUM
- 5 - 4 - LOW
- 3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL
Scope#
Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#
Findings & Tech Details#
Description
Proof of Concept
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Description
Proof of Concept
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Description
Proof of Concept
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Disclaimer#
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
