Huma - PR 124 - Huma Finance


Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated 04/01/2025

Date of Engagement: December 27th, 2024 - January 2nd, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

20

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

7

Informational

13


1. Introduction

Huma engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of the Huma Protocol Solana program from September 9th, 2024, to January 2nd, 2025. Huma Protocol is an on-chain PayFi protocol that provides liquidity to payments financing use cases with an initial focus on business borrowers. It takes a modular approach to support diverse needs of Structured Finance. The protocol can be extended by adding additional modules to key functions such as tranche policies, fee managers, due managers, and calendar.


In December, Huma introduced three incremental features to the protocol:

    1. Monthly interest withdrawals for lenders (LPs)

    2. Ability for the pool owner to make payments on behalf of borrowers

    3. A system account (Sentinel) to automatically trigger redemption requests

Halborn then performed an incremental audit of these new features to ensure the continued security and reliability of the protocol.

2. Assessment Summary

Halborn was provided 3.5 weeks for the initial engagement and 6 and 4 days for the additional scope assessments, and assigned two full-time security engineer/s to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineers are blockchain and smart contract security experts with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

    • Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.

    • Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

 

In summary, Halborn identified some security concerns. The main ones were the following:

    • Lack of proper validation in Deposit

    • Incomplete new owner validation in Transfer Ownership process

    • Possibility to close started Credit with commitment

    • Lack of pool name length validation

    • Lack of pool currency code length validation

    • Receivable can be approved by different pool

    • Reallocating pools with new format will lead to data inconsistency


Most of the findings were addressed, and the corresponding fixes have been merged into the branches listed below. The final commits reflect the changes that solved the issues:

    • 80799a02665dab07f695e8c9aee03f50b99af26f on develop branch

    • 5da8c0ac3b6899557ba185379bf4eaa8aa9efe17 on main

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.

    • Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.

    • Mapping out possible attack vectors

    • Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.

    • Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (

      cargo audit
      ).
    • Local runtime testing (

      anchor-test
      )

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)
1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)
1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+mImax(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)
1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)
1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORIES
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 7d84086
(c) Items in scope:
  • 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/Anchor.toml
  • 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/Cargo.lock
  • 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/Cargo.toml
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/yarn.lock, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/Anchor.toml, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/Cargo.lock, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/Cargo.toml, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/Cargo.toml, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/Xargo.toml, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/calendar.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/calendar/tests.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/constants.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/errors.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/huma_config/instructions/create_huma_config.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/huma_config/instructions/liquidity_asset.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/huma_config/instructions/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/huma_config/instructions/pause.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/huma_config/instructions/update_huma_config.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/huma_config/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/huma_config/states.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/preconditions.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/common/utils.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/credit.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/due_manager.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/due_manager/tests.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/events.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/approve_credit.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/approve_receivable.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/close_credit.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/create_receivable.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/declare_payment.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/drawdown.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/make_payment.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/make_principal_payment.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/manage_credit.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/manage_credit_config.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/refresh_credit.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/start_committed_credit.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/submit_receivable.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/update_receivable.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/states.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/credit/test_utils.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/lib.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/epoch_manager.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/admin_fees.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/close_epoch.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/close_pool.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/create_pool.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/create_pool_accounts.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/disable_pool.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/enable_pool.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/mock_pnl.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/pool_operator.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/instructions/update_pool_config.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/pnl.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/pool.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/states.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/tranches_policy.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/tranches_policy/fixed_senior_yield_tranches_policy.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/pool/tranches_policy/risk_adjusted_tranches_policy.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/add_redemption_request.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/cancel_redemption_request.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/close_lender_accounts.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/create_lender_accounts.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/deposit.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/disburse.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/make_initial_deposit.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/manage_lender.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/transfer_hook.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/update_to_latest_redemption_record.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/withdraw_after_pool_closure.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/states.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/tranche_vault.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/tranche-token-hook/Cargo.toml, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/tranche-token-hook/src/constants.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/tranche-token-hook/src/errors.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/tranche-token-hook/src/instructions/mod.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/tranche-token-hook/src/instructions/transfer.rs, 00labs/huma-solana-programs/blob/audit/programs/tranche-token-hook/src/lib.rs
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(c) Items in scope:
  • huma/src/pool/instructions/update_pool_config.rs
  • huma/src/pool/states.rs
  • huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/add_redemption_request.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: huma/src/common/calendar/*, huma/src/common/calendar.rs, huma/src/common/constants.rs, huma/src/common/errors.rs, huma/src/common/mod.rs, huma/src/common/preconditions.rs, huma/src/common/utils.rs, huma/src/common/huma_config/instructions/*, huma/src/common/huma_config/mod.rs, huma/src/common/huma_config/states.rs, huma/src/credit/*, huma/src/pool/epoch_manager.rs, huma/src/pool/mod.rs, huma/src/pool/pnl.rs, huma/src/pool/pool.rs, huma/src/pool/tranches_policy/*, huma/src/pool/tranches_policy.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/admin_fees.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/close_epoch.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/close_pool.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/create_pool.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/create_pool_accounts.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/disable_pool.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/enable_pool.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/mock_pnl.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/mod.rs, huma/src/pool/instructions/pool_operator.rs, huma/src/tranche-vault/mod.rs, huma/src/tranche-vault/states.rs, huma/src/tranche-vault/tranche_vault.rs, huma/src/tranche-vault/instructions/, huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/close_lender_accounts.rs, huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/create_lender_accounts.rs, huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/disburse.rs, huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/make_initial_deposit.rs, huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/manage_lender.rs, huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/mod.rs, huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/update_to_latest_redemption_record.rs, huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/withdraw_after_pool_closure.rs, tranche-token-hook/src/constants.rs, tranche-token-hook/src/errors.rs, tranche-token-hook/src/lib.rs, tranche-token-hook/src/instructions/mod.rs, third party dependencies and economic attacks.
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/huma/src/common/constants.rs
  • programs/huma/src/lib.rs
  • programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/manage_lender.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Everything that was not changed within this PR, third party dependencies and economic attacks.
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/huma/src/common/errors.rs
  • programs/huma/src/common/preconditions.rs
  • programs/huma/src/lib.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Everything that was not changed within this PR, third party dependencies and economic attacks.
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/huma/src/pool/epoch_manager.rs
Out-of-Scope: Everything that was not changed within this PR, third party dependencies and economic attacks.
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/huma/src/tranche_vault/instructions/withdraw_yields.rs
Out-of-Scope: Everything that was not changed within this PR, third party dependencies and economic attacks.
(a) Repository: huma-solana-programs
(c) Items in scope:
  • programs/huma/src/credit/credit.rs
  • programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/make_payment.rs
  • programs/huma/src/credit/instructions/make_payment_on_behalf_of.rs
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Everything that was not changed within this PR, third party dependencies and economic attacks.
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

7

Informational

13

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
LACK OF PROPER VALIDATION IN DEPOSITLowSolved - 09/25/2024
INCOMPLETE NEW OWNER VALIDATION IN THE TRANSFER OWNERSHIP PROCESSLowRisk Accepted
LACK OF POOL NAME LENGTH VALIDATIONLowSolved - 09/25/2024
POSSIBILITY TO CLOSE STARTED CREDIT WITH COMMITMENTLowSolved - 09/28/2024
RECEIVABLE CAN BE APPROVED BY DIFFERENT POOLLowSolved - 09/25/2024
LACK OF CURRENCY CODE LENGTH VALIDATIONLowSolved - 09/25/2024
REALLOCATING POOLS WITH NEW FORMAT WILL LEAD TO DATA INCONSISTENCYLowSolved - 12/02/2024
LACK OF EA AND POOL OWNER TREASURY VALIDATION IN POOL CREATIONInformationalAcknowledged
LACK OF DELEGATED AMOUNT VALIDATION IN ADD REDEMPTION REQUESTS FOR PREMATURE DEPOSITSInformationalSolved - 12/01/2024
POSSIBILITY OF INCONSISTENT LATE PAYMENT FEESInformationalAcknowledged
LACK OF VALIDATION FOR EXTENSIONS OF THE MINTInformationalSolved
RELIANCE ON MANUAL PROCESSInformationalAcknowledged - 12/30/2024
POTENTIAL DENIAL OF SERVICE IF POOLS USING NON-REALLOCATED POOLCONFIG WITH THE OLD FORMATInformationalAcknowledged - 11/28/2024
LACK OF VALIDATION FOR THE MINIMUM BORROW AMOUNT TO EXCEED THE FEESInformationalAcknowledged
POTENTIAL COMPLETE PROFIT CAPTURE VIA ADMIN FEESInformationalNot Applicable
MONEY MOVEMENT WHEN PROTOCOL IS PAUSED IN SOME INSTRUCTIONSInformationalSolved - 09/27/2024
EA AND POOL OWNER TREASURY WILL ALSO NEED TO APPROVE DELEGATE IF THEY WANT TO CALL DEPOSITInformationalSolved - 12/01/2024
LACK OF DELEGATE VALIDATION IN MAKE PAYMENTInformationalAcknowledged
PASSING SUPERFLUOUS SYSTEM PROGRAM ACCOUNTInformationalSolved - 09/27/2024
INCONSISTENCIES IN DOCUMENTATIONInformationalPartially Solved - 09/22/2024

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 LACK OF PROPER VALIDATION IN DEPOSIT

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.2 INCOMPLETE NEW OWNER VALIDATION IN THE TRANSFER OWNERSHIP PROCESS

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.3 LACK OF POOL NAME LENGTH VALIDATION

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.4 POSSIBILITY TO CLOSE STARTED CREDIT WITH COMMITMENT

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.5 RECEIVABLE CAN BE APPROVED BY DIFFERENT POOL

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 LACK OF CURRENCY CODE LENGTH VALIDATION

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.7 REALLOCATING POOLS WITH NEW FORMAT WILL LEAD TO DATA INCONSISTENCY

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.8 LACK OF EA AND POOL OWNER TREASURY VALIDATION IN POOL CREATION

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.9 LACK OF DELEGATED AMOUNT VALIDATION IN ADD REDEMPTION REQUESTS FOR PREMATURE DEPOSITS

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.10 POSSIBILITY OF INCONSISTENT LATE PAYMENT FEES

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.11 LACK OF VALIDATION FOR EXTENSIONS OF THE MINT

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.12 RELIANCE ON MANUAL PROCESS

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.13 POTENTIAL DENIAL OF SERVICE IF POOLS USING NON-REALLOCATED POOLCONFIG WITH THE OLD FORMAT

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.14 LACK OF VALIDATION FOR THE MINIMUM BORROW AMOUNT TO EXCEED THE FEES

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.15 POTENTIAL COMPLETE PROFIT CAPTURE VIA ADMIN FEES

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.16 MONEY MOVEMENT WHEN PROTOCOL IS PAUSED IN SOME INSTRUCTIONS

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.17 EA AND POOL OWNER TREASURY WILL ALSO NEED TO APPROVE DELEGATE IF THEY WANT TO CALL DEPOSIT

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7.18 LACK OF DELEGATE VALIDATION IN MAKE PAYMENT

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7.19 PASSING SUPERFLUOUS SYSTEM PROGRAM ACCOUNT

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7.20 INCONSISTENCIES IN DOCUMENTATION

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8. Automated Testing

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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Huma - PR 124

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