Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
- 1Not Applicable
- 3Acknowledged
- 1Risk Accepted
- 5All Findings
- Critical0
- High0
- Medium0
- Low2
- 1Risk A.
- 1N/A
- Informational3
- 3Ack.
Introduction#
InFlux Technologies engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts revisions started on December 23th, 2024 and ending on January 3rd, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team.
Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
Assessment Summary#
The team at Halborn was provided 1 week and 2 days for the engagement and assigned a security engineer to evaluate the security of the smart contract.
The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of this assessment is to:
Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended.
Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly acknowledged by the InFlux Technologies team. The main ones were the following:
Add some checks for invalid time range.Limit message length return.Add some sanity checks.
Test Approach and Methodology#
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance code coverage and quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:
Research into architecture and purpose.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions. (
solgraph,draw.io)Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (
Slither)Testnet deployment. (
Hardhat,Foundry)
Risk Methodology#
4.1 EXPLOITABILITY
Attack Origin (AO):
Attack Cost (AC):
Attack Complexity (AX):
Metrics:
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) | 1 |
| Specific (AO:S) | 0.2 | |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AC:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AC:H) | 0.33 | |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AX:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AX:H) | 0.33 |
4.2 IMPACT
Confidentiality (C):
Integrity (I):
Availability (A):
Deposit (D):
Yield (Y):
Metrics:
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) | 0 |
| Low (C:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (C:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (C:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (C:C) | 1 | |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) | 0 |
| Low (I:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (I:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (I:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (I:C) | 1 | |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) | 0 |
| Low (A:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (A:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (A:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (A:C) | 1 | |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) | 0 |
| Low (D:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (D:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (D:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (D:C) | 1 | |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) | 0 |
| Low (Y:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (Y:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (Y:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (Y:C) | 1 |
4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT
Reversibility (R):
Scope (S):
Metrics:
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) | 1 |
| Partial (R:P) | 0.5 | |
| Full (R:F) | 0.25 | |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) | 1.25 |
| Unchanged (S:U) | 1 |
| Critical | High | Medium | Low | Informational |
| 9 - 10 | 7 - 8.9 | 4.5 - 6.9 | 2 - 4.4 | 0 - 1.9 |
Scope#
Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#
# | Title | Severity | Score | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Invalid Time Range can be returned by _intersectTimeRange | Low | 2.5 | Risk Accepted01/07/2025 | |
| Unbounded Error Message Length in Paymaster External Calls Creates Gas Unpredictability | Low | 2.5 | Not Applicable | |
| Missing sanity check for entryPoint | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged01/07/2025 | |
| Lack of Account Deployment Verification can lead to Unexpected Revert Behavior | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged01/07/2025 | |
| Overly Broad Unchecked Math Blocks in EntryPoint Contract | Informational | 0.0 | Acknowledged01/07/2025 |
Findings & Tech Details#
Description
Proof of Concept
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Description
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Description
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Description
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Description
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
8. Automated Testing#
Disclaimer#
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
