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Background

// Security Assessment

12.30.2024 - 01.22.2025

SSP Wallet, Relay and Key

InFlux

Halborn logotext
← Back to Audits

SSP Wallet, Relay and Key - InFlux

Prepared by:

Halborn Logo

HALBORN

Last Updated Unknown date

Date of Engagement: December 30th, 2024 - January 22nd, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

35

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

35

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Scope
  • 5. Risk methodology
  • 6. Scope
  • 7. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 8. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 8.1 Hal-26 - be - mnemonic phrase exposure in memory
    2. 8.2 Hal-04 - ios - insecure storage of pin
    3. 8.3 Hal-29 - harcoded secrets in git history
    4. 8.4 Hal-17 - ios - biometric authentication bypass
    5. 8.5 Hal-18 - android - fingerprint authentication bypass
    6. 8.6 Hal-31 - ios - allowing sensitive data to be copied to clipboard
    7. 8.7 Hal-07 - android - insecure trust of device-level biometric authentication
    8. 8.8 Hal-08 - ios - insecure trust of device-level biometric authentication
    9. 8.9 Hal-01 - vulnerable third-party dependencies
    10. 8.10 Hal-23 - api - lack of rate limitation on ssp relay endpoints
    11. 8.11 Hal-27 - api - lack of data sanitization and validation of limits
    12. 8.12 Hal-05 - ios - insecure accessibility attributes in keychain storage
    13. 8.13 Hal-22 - be - potential risk of sensitive data exposure through clipboard
    14. 8.14 Hal-10 - mobile - weak password policy
    15. 8.15 Hal-33 - android - exposure of sensitive data through clipboard
    16. 8.16 Hal-03 - be - unrestrictive content-security-policy (csp)
    17. 8.17 Hal-25 - be - potential risk due to third-party iframe
    18. 8.18 Hal-32 - android - risk of overlay attack
    19. 8.19 Hal-30 - api - outdated versions of tls supported
    20. 8.20 Hal-14 - api - cacheable https response
    21. 8.21 Hal-15 - ios - lack of jailbreak detection mechanism
    22. 8.22 Hal-16 - android - lack of root detection mechanism
    23. 8.23 Hal-02 - be - dependencies should be pinned to exact versions
    24. 8.24 Hal-12 - ios - certificate pinning bypass
    25. 8.25 Hal-13 - android - certificate pinning bypass
    26. 8.26 Hal-35 - ios - lack of anti-tampering and anti-hooking mechanisms
    27. 8.27 Hal-34 - android - lack of anti-tampering and anti-hooking mechanisms
    28. 8.28 Hal-28 - be - verbose logging in extension
    29. 8.29 Hal-06 - be - lack of password complexity and password policy
    30. 8.30 Hal-09 - ios - persistent keychain data
    31. 8.31 Hal-11 - ios - background screen caching
    32. 8.32 Hal-19 - android - background screen caching
    33. 8.33 Hal-24 - android - transaction data exposed in logs
    34. 8.34 Hal-21 - ios - application allows screenshots
    35. 8.35 Hal-20 - android - application allows screenshots

1. Introduction

InFlux Technologies engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment of their applications. The security assessment was scoped to their browser extension, their respective underlying API, and mobile applications (Android and iOS). Halborn was provided access to the application and its respective source code to conduct security testing using tools to scan, detect, and validate possible vulnerabilities found in the application and report the findings at the end of the engagement.

2. Assessment Summary

The team at Halborn was provided a timeline for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the assets in scope. The security engineer is a penetration testing expert with advanced knowledge in web, mobile, recon, discovery & infrastructure penetration testing.

The security assessment identified several vulnerabilities across the application ecosystem, affecting extension, backend, API, and mobile platforms. High-risk issues include the exposure of sensitive mnemonic phrases in memory and insecure storage of PINs on iOS, which could lead to unauthorized access and compromise user accounts. Hardcoded secrets found in public repositories further heighten the risk of exploitation. Medium-risk findings included biometric authentication bypass on Android and iOS, insecure trust in device-level biometrics, and the potential exposure of sensitive data due to insecure clipboard usage. Vulnerable third-party dependencies and lack of rate limitation on critical API endpoints were also observed, which could result in denial-of-service attacks or sensitive data leaks.

Other significant issues included weak password policies, unrestricted Content-Security-Policy configurations, and the use of insecure accessibility attributes in iOS keychain storage. The insecure handling of third-party iframes and risks associated with overlay attacks on Android were noted as medium to low risk but require attention to ensure robust protection against phishing and impersonation. Lower-severity issues, such as the support for outdated TLS versions, cacheable HTTPS responses, verbose logging, and lack of anti-tampering and anti-hooking mechanisms, were also documented. While these may not pose an immediate threat, addressing them will enhance the overall security posture. Mitigating these vulnerabilities will improve the overall security posture of the applications.

The InFlux Technologies team addressed most of the identified issues, with one partially resolved, some marked as risk accepted, and others scheduled for resolution in future builds of the application.

3. Test Approach and Methodology

Halborn followed Whitebox and Blackbox methodology as per the scope and performed a combination of manual and automated security testing with both to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of the pentest. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process and implementation; automated testing techniques assist enhance coverage of the infrastructure and can quickly identify flaws in it. The assessment methodology covered included but was not limited to a range of phases and employed various tools.

    • Mapping Content and Functionality of Applications

    • Application Logic Flaw

    • Reverse Engineering the applications

    • Access Handling

    • Authentication/Authorization Flaw

    • Transaction Flow

    • Rate Limitations Test

    • Input Handling

    • Source Code Review

    • Mobile Specific Vulnerabilities

    • Fuzzing of all input parameter

4. Scope

URL/API:

https://relay.ssp.runonflux.io/

Binaries:

    • Android APK: Version 1.5.1

    • iOS IPA: Version 1.5.1 Build 92

    • Browser Extension: v1.8.4



5. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

5.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_eme​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EEE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_eE=∏me​

5.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_ImI​)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact III is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}I=max(mI​)+4∑mI​−max(mI​)​

5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CCC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rrr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (sss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CCC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rsC=rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SSS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)S=min(10,EIC∗10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

6. SCOPE

REPOSITORIES
(a) Repository: ssp-relay
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 98a7d85
(a) Repository: ssp-key
(b) Assessed Commit ID: e346264
(a) Repository: ssp-wallet
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 4f8c894
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

7. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

0

Informational

35

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
HAL-26 - BE - MNEMONIC PHRASE EXPOSURE IN MEMORYInformationalSolved - 02/13/2025
HAL-04 - iOS - INSECURE STORAGE OF PINInformationalSolved - 02/18/2025
HAL-29 - HARCODED SECRETS IN GIT HISTORYInformationalSolved - 01/28/2025
HAL-17 - iOS - BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION BYPASSInformationalSolved - 02/16/2025
HAL-18 - ANDROID - FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION BYPASSInformationalSolved - 02/16/2025
HAL-31 - iOS - ALLOWING SENSITIVE DATA TO BE COPIED TO CLIPBOARDInformationalSolved - 02/16/2025
HAL-07 - ANDROID - INSECURE TRUST OF DEVICE-LEVEL BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATIONInformationalSolved - 02/16/2025
HAL-08 - iOS - INSECURE TRUST OF DEVICE-LEVEL BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATIONInformationalSolved - 02/12/2025
HAL-01 - VULNERABLE THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCIESInformationalSolved - 02/24/2025
HAL-23 - API - LACK OF RATE LIMITATION ON SSP RELAY ENDPOINTSInformationalSolved - 01/28/2025
HAL-27 - API - LACK OF DATA SANITIZATION AND VALIDATION OF LIMITSInformationalSolved - 01/28/2025
HAL-05 - iOS - INSECURE ACCESSIBILITY ATTRIBUTES IN KEYCHAIN STORAGEInformationalSolved - 02/18/2025
HAL-22 - BE - POTENTIAL RISK OF SENSITIVE DATA EXPOSURE THROUGH CLIPBOARDInformationalSolved - 02/13/2025
HAL-10 - MOBILE - WEAK PASSWORD POLICYInformationalSolved - 02/13/2025
HAL-33 - ANDROID - EXPOSURE OF SENSITIVE DATA THROUGH CLIPBOARDInformationalSolved - 02/16/2025
HAL-03 - BE - UNRESTRICTIVE CONTENT-SECURITY-POLICY (CSP)InformationalSolved - 01/29/2025
HAL-25 - BE - POTENTIAL RISK DUE TO THIRD-PARTY IFRAMEInformationalSolved - 01/14/2025
HAL-32 - ANDROID - RISK OF OVERLAY ATTACKInformationalPartially Solved - 02/24/2025
HAL-30 - API - OUTDATED VERSIONS OF TLS SUPPORTEDInformationalSolved - 01/28/2025
HAL-14 - API - CACHEABLE HTTPS RESPONSEInformationalSolved - 01/28/2025
HAL-15 - iOS - LACK OF JAILBREAK DETECTION MECHANISMInformationalSolved - 02/18/2025
HAL-16 - ANDROID - LACK OF ROOT DETECTION MECHANISMInformationalSolved - 02/18/2025
HAL-02 - BE - DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE PINNED TO EXACT VERSIONSInformationalSolved - 01/30/2025
HAL-12 - iOS - CERTIFICATE PINNING BYPASSInformationalFuture Release - 02/20/2025
HAL-13 - ANDROID - CERTIFICATE PINNING BYPASSInformationalFuture Release - 02/20/2025
HAL-35 - IOS - LACK OF ANTI-TAMPERING AND ANTI-HOOKING MECHANISMSInformationalFuture Release - 02/20/2025
HAL-34 - ANDROID - LACK OF ANTI-TAMPERING AND ANTI-HOOKING MECHANISMSInformationalFuture Release - 02/20/2025
HAL-28 - BE - VERBOSE LOGGING IN EXTENSIONInformationalSolved - 01/30/2025
HAL-06 - BE - LACK OF PASSWORD COMPLEXITY AND PASSWORD POLICYInformationalSolved - 01/30/2025
HAL-09 - iOS - PERSISTENT KEYCHAIN DATAInformationalSolved - 02/24/2025
HAL-11 - iOS - BACKGROUND SCREEN CACHINGInformationalSolved - 02/18/2025
HAL-19 - ANDROID - BACKGROUND SCREEN CACHINGInformationalSolved - 02/16/2025
HAL-24 - ANDROID - TRANSACTION DATA EXPOSED IN LOGSInformationalSolved - 02/16/2025
HAL-21 - iOS - APPLICATION ALLOWS SCREENSHOTSInformationalFuture Release - 02/18/2025
HAL-20 - ANDROID - APPLICATION ALLOWS SCREENSHOTSInformationalSolved - 02/16/2025

8. Findings & Tech Details

8.1 HAL-26 - BE - MNEMONIC PHRASE EXPOSURE IN MEMORY

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.2 HAL-04 - iOS - INSECURE STORAGE OF PIN

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.3 HAL-29 - HARCODED SECRETS IN GIT HISTORY

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.4 HAL-17 - iOS - BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION BYPASS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.5 HAL-18 - ANDROID - FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION BYPASS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.6 HAL-31 - iOS - ALLOWING SENSITIVE DATA TO BE COPIED TO CLIPBOARD

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.7 HAL-07 - ANDROID - INSECURE TRUST OF DEVICE-LEVEL BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.8 HAL-08 - iOS - INSECURE TRUST OF DEVICE-LEVEL BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.9 HAL-01 - VULNERABLE THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCIES

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.10 HAL-23 - API - LACK OF RATE LIMITATION ON SSP RELAY ENDPOINTS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.11 HAL-27 - API - LACK OF DATA SANITIZATION AND VALIDATION OF LIMITS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.12 HAL-05 - iOS - INSECURE ACCESSIBILITY ATTRIBUTES IN KEYCHAIN STORAGE

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.13 HAL-22 - BE - POTENTIAL RISK OF SENSITIVE DATA EXPOSURE THROUGH CLIPBOARD

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.14 HAL-10 - MOBILE - WEAK PASSWORD POLICY

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.15 HAL-33 - ANDROID - EXPOSURE OF SENSITIVE DATA THROUGH CLIPBOARD

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.16 HAL-03 - BE - UNRESTRICTIVE CONTENT-SECURITY-POLICY (CSP)

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://mikewest.org/2011/10/secure-chrome-extensions-content-security-policy/
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/default-src

8.17 HAL-25 - BE - POTENTIAL RISK DUE TO THIRD-PARTY IFRAME

//

Informational

Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/frame-src

8.18 HAL-32 - ANDROID - RISK OF OVERLAY ATTACK

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.19 HAL-30 - API - OUTDATED VERSIONS OF TLS SUPPORTED

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
References
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Transport_Layer_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html

8.20 HAL-14 - API - CACHEABLE HTTPS RESPONSE

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.21 HAL-15 - iOS - LACK OF JAILBREAK DETECTION MECHANISM

//

Informational

Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.22 HAL-16 - ANDROID - LACK OF ROOT DETECTION MECHANISM

//

Informational

Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.23 HAL-02 - BE - DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE PINNED TO EXACT VERSIONS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.24 HAL-12 - iOS - CERTIFICATE PINNING BYPASS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.25 HAL-13 - ANDROID - CERTIFICATE PINNING BYPASS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.26 HAL-35 - IOS - LACK OF ANTI-TAMPERING AND ANTI-HOOKING MECHANISMS

//

Informational

Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.27 HAL-34 - ANDROID - LACK OF ANTI-TAMPERING AND ANTI-HOOKING MECHANISMS

//

Informational

Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.28 HAL-28 - BE - VERBOSE LOGGING IN EXTENSION

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.29 HAL-06 - BE - LACK OF PASSWORD COMPLEXITY AND PASSWORD POLICY

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.30 HAL-09 - iOS - PERSISTENT KEYCHAIN DATA

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.31 HAL-11 - iOS - BACKGROUND SCREEN CACHING

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.32 HAL-19 - ANDROID - BACKGROUND SCREEN CACHING

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.33 HAL-24 - ANDROID - TRANSACTION DATA EXPOSED IN LOGS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.34 HAL-21 - iOS - APPLICATION ALLOWS SCREENSHOTS

//

Informational

Description
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

8.35 HAL-20 - ANDROID - APPLICATION ALLOWS SCREENSHOTS

//

Informational

Description
Proof of Concept
Score
(0.0)
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Assessment summary
  • 3. Test approach and methodology
  • 4. Scope
  • 5. Risk methodology
  • 6. Scope
  • 7. Assessment summary & findings overview
  • 8. Findings & Tech Details
    1. 8.1 Hal-26 - be - mnemonic phrase exposure in memory
    2. 8.2 Hal-04 - ios - insecure storage of pin
    3. 8.3 Hal-29 - harcoded secrets in git history
    4. 8.4 Hal-17 - ios - biometric authentication bypass
    5. 8.5 Hal-18 - android - fingerprint authentication bypass
    6. 8.6 Hal-31 - ios - allowing sensitive data to be copied to clipboard
    7. 8.7 Hal-07 - android - insecure trust of device-level biometric authentication
    8. 8.8 Hal-08 - ios - insecure trust of device-level biometric authentication
    9. 8.9 Hal-01 - vulnerable third-party dependencies
    10. 8.10 Hal-23 - api - lack of rate limitation on ssp relay endpoints
    11. 8.11 Hal-27 - api - lack of data sanitization and validation of limits
    12. 8.12 Hal-05 - ios - insecure accessibility attributes in keychain storage
    13. 8.13 Hal-22 - be - potential risk of sensitive data exposure through clipboard
    14. 8.14 Hal-10 - mobile - weak password policy
    15. 8.15 Hal-33 - android - exposure of sensitive data through clipboard
    16. 8.16 Hal-03 - be - unrestrictive content-security-policy (csp)
    17. 8.17 Hal-25 - be - potential risk due to third-party iframe
    18. 8.18 Hal-32 - android - risk of overlay attack
    19. 8.19 Hal-30 - api - outdated versions of tls supported
    20. 8.20 Hal-14 - api - cacheable https response
    21. 8.21 Hal-15 - ios - lack of jailbreak detection mechanism
    22. 8.22 Hal-16 - android - lack of root detection mechanism
    23. 8.23 Hal-02 - be - dependencies should be pinned to exact versions
    24. 8.24 Hal-12 - ios - certificate pinning bypass
    25. 8.25 Hal-13 - android - certificate pinning bypass
    26. 8.26 Hal-35 - ios - lack of anti-tampering and anti-hooking mechanisms
    27. 8.27 Hal-34 - android - lack of anti-tampering and anti-hooking mechanisms
    28. 8.28 Hal-28 - be - verbose logging in extension
    29. 8.29 Hal-06 - be - lack of password complexity and password policy
    30. 8.30 Hal-09 - ios - persistent keychain data
    31. 8.31 Hal-11 - ios - background screen caching
    32. 8.32 Hal-19 - android - background screen caching
    33. 8.33 Hal-24 - android - transaction data exposed in logs
    34. 8.34 Hal-21 - ios - application allows screenshots
    35. 8.35 Hal-20 - android - application allows screenshots

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