Kickoff Protocol Contracts - Kickoff.fun

Prepared by:

HALBORN

Last Updated 01/24/2026

Date of Engagement: January 6th, 2026 - January 9th, 2026

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

1. Introduction
2. Assessment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Nfts with zero voting power can permanently dos vote casting
7.2 Deactivated veaero nfts can permanently dos voting batches and trap funds
7.3 Emergency withdrawals break core accounting invariants and can permanently deadlock the pool
7.4 Kickoff pool can accept non-votable nfts due to epoch-start mismatch between kickoff and aerodrome
7.5 Pool creation can be front-run to steal privileged roles and block the intended launch
7.6 Liquidity finalization can be dosed due to manipulated pool ratios
7.7 Pools can finalize with zero participants and permanently lock project tokens
7.8 Unintended liquidity creation can permanently consume project tokens due to external weth transfers
7.9 Reward conversion may execute with unbounded slippage
7.10 Kickoff finalization can occur before aerodrome epoch completion, causing reward loss
7.11 Gauge status change between vote batches can permanently brick voting and trap nfts
7.12 Claim rounding leaves irrecoverable project token dust in the pool
7.13 Swap and liquidity operations lack meaningful deadline constraints
7.14 Rescue mechanism fails for tokens that do not return a boolean on successful transfers
7.15 Batch voting can span multiple aerodrome epochs, leading to inconsistent reward attribution
7.16 Locking veaero nfts allows kickoff to claim historical voting rewards
7.17 Lplocker fee distribution can be permanently dosed by restrictive project token behavior
7.18 Leftover liquidity allocation tokens can become permanently stuck after adding liquidity
7.19 Early emergency exit can permanently lock allocated project tokens and allow new locks into an unusable pool

1. INTRODUCTION

Kickoff.fun engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on January 6th, 2026 and ending on January 9th, 2026. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the kickoff-contracts GitHub repository, provided to the Halborn team. Commit hash and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The reviewed contracts implement a liquidity bootstrapping launchpad built on Aerodrome’s veAERO voting system. veAERO holders temporarily lock NFTs to direct gauge votes, after which rewards are claimed, swapped, and used to create permanently locked liquidity, while participants receive project tokens proportionally.

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Halborn was provided with 4 days for this engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts in scope. The assigned engineer possesses deep expertise in blockchain and smart contract security, including hands-on experience with multiple blockchain protocols.

The objective of this assessment is to:

Identify potential security issues within the Kickoff.fun protocol smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract of ````Kickoff.fun protocol functions operate as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were mostly addressed by the Kickoff.fun team. The main recommendations were:

Handle batch voting failures at the per‑NFT level to avoid single-point batch failures.
Require pool activation to be aligned with Aerodrome's epoch start.
Design liquidity finalization to safely handle pre‑existing pool state.
Provide a defined path for zero‑participant scenario to avoid project tokens becoming stranded in the pool.
Implement meaningful slippage protection when swapping reward tokens.

3. TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

Research into the architecture and purpose of the Kickoff.fun protocol.
Manual code review and walkthrough of the Kickoff.fun in-scope contracts.
Manual assessment of critical Solidity variables and functions to identify potential vulnerability classes.
Manual testing using custom scripts.
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither).
Local deployment and testing with (Foundry, Remix IDE).

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S)	1 0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H)	1 0.67 0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H)	1 0.67 0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Availability (A)	None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F)	1 0.5 0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U)	1.25 1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY

(a) Repository: kickoff-contracts

(b) Assessed Commit ID: f3b6390

script/Deploy.s.sol
src/interfaces/IERC20.sol
src/interfaces/IERC721Receiver.sol

↓ Expand ↓

Out-of-Scope: Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

Remediation Commit ID:

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

Security analysis	Risk level	Remediation Date
NFTs with zero voting power can permanently DoS vote casting	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Deactivated veAERO NFTs can permanently DoS voting batches and trap funds	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Emergency withdrawals break core accounting invariants and can permanently deadlock the pool	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Kickoff pool can accept non-votable NFTs due to epoch-start mismatch between Kickoff and Aerodrome	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Pool creation can be front-run to steal privileged roles and block the intended launch	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Liquidity finalization can be DoSed due to manipulated pool ratios	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Pools can finalize with zero participants and permanently lock project tokens	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Unintended liquidity creation can permanently consume project tokens due to external WETH transfers	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Reward conversion may execute with unbounded slippage	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Kickoff finalization can occur before Aerodrome epoch completion, causing reward loss	Medium	Solved - 01/13/2026
Gauge status change between vote batches can permanently brick voting and trap NFTs	Low	Solved - 01/13/2026
Claim rounding leaves irrecoverable project token dust in the pool	Low	Solved - 01/18/2026
Swap and liquidity operations lack meaningful deadline constraints	Low	Solved - 01/13/2026
Rescue mechanism fails for tokens that do not return a boolean on successful transfers	Low	Solved - 01/13/2026
Batch voting can span multiple Aerodrome epochs, leading to inconsistent reward attribution	Low	Solved - 01/16/2026
Locking veAERO NFTs allows Kickoff to claim historical voting rewards	Low	Risk Accepted - 01/19/2026
LPLocker fee distribution can be permanently DoSed by restrictive project token behavior	Low	Solved - 01/13/2026
Leftover liquidity allocation tokens can become permanently stuck after adding liquidity	Low	Solved - 01/18/2026
Early emergency exit can permanently lock allocated project tokens and allow new locks into an unusable pool	Low	Solved - 01/13/2026

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 NFTs with zero voting power can permanently DoS vote casting

Medium

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:M/Y:M (6.3)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

https://github.com/kickoffbase/kickoff-contracts/commit/98e47ac039330f31cdf2f1dfb2ef17b4a2f97d73

7.2 Deactivated veAERO NFTs can permanently DoS voting batches and trap funds

Medium

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:L (2.5)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

https://github.com/kickoffbase/kickoff-contracts/commit/1c968095a740750a03739712b7aed008f1944543

7.18 Leftover liquidity allocation tokens can become permanently stuck after adding liquidity

Low

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (2.5)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

https://github.com/kickoffbase/kickoff-contracts/commit/98e47ac039330f31cdf2f1dfb2ef17b4a2f97d73

7.19 Early emergency exit can permanently lock allocated project tokens and allow new locks into an unusable pool

Low

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:L/Y:N (2.5)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

https://github.com/kickoffbase/kickoff-contracts/commit/98e47ac039330f31cdf2f1dfb2ef17b4a2f97d73

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

1. Introduction
2. Assessment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Nfts with zero voting power can permanently dos vote casting
7.2 Deactivated veaero nfts can permanently dos voting batches and trap funds
7.3 Emergency withdrawals break core accounting invariants and can permanently deadlock the pool
7.4 Kickoff pool can accept non-votable nfts due to epoch-start mismatch between kickoff and aerodrome
7.5 Pool creation can be front-run to steal privileged roles and block the intended launch
7.6 Liquidity finalization can be dosed due to manipulated pool ratios
7.7 Pools can finalize with zero participants and permanently lock project tokens
7.8 Unintended liquidity creation can permanently consume project tokens due to external weth transfers
7.9 Reward conversion may execute with unbounded slippage
7.10 Kickoff finalization can occur before aerodrome epoch completion, causing reward loss
7.11 Gauge status change between vote batches can permanently brick voting and trap nfts
7.12 Claim rounding leaves irrecoverable project token dust in the pool
7.13 Swap and liquidity operations lack meaningful deadline constraints
7.14 Rescue mechanism fails for tokens that do not return a boolean on successful transfers
7.15 Batch voting can span multiple aerodrome epochs, leading to inconsistent reward attribution
7.16 Locking veaero nfts allows kickoff to claim historical voting rewards
7.17 Lplocker fee distribution can be permanently dosed by restrictive project token behavior
7.18 Leftover liquidity allocation tokens can become permanently stuck after adding liquidity
7.19 Early emergency exit can permanently lock allocated project tokens and allow new locks into an unusable pool

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Kickoff Protocol Contracts

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