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GoKite Contracts - Kite

Prepared by:

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HALBORN

Last Updated 10/21/2025

Date of Engagement: September 22nd, 2025 - September 25th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

6

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

1

Informational

5

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Kite AI engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on September 22, 2025 and ending on September 25, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.


Kite AI allows users to create subnets of account abstracted wallets, and the repository also feature an airdrop contract.

2. Assessment summary

Halborn was provided with 4 days for this engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The assigned engineer possess deep expertise in blockchain and smart contract security, including hands-on experience with multiple blockchain protocols.


The objectives of this assessment were to:

    • Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.

    • Ensure that the smart contracts function as intended.


In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were mostly addressed by the Kite AI team. The main ones were:

    • Check return values for ERC20 transfers.

    • Ensure deadlines are validated against the current block timestamp to prevent setting expired values.

    • Use safe token transfer methods to ensure compatibility across ERC20 implementations.

    • Avoid emitting redundant events and rely on standardized events to reduce log duplication and confusion.


3. Test approach and methodology

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.


The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

    • Research into the architecture and purpose of the smart contracts.

    • Manual code review and walkthrough of the smart contracts.

    • Manual assessment of critical Solidity variables and functions to identify potential vulnerability classes.

    • Manual testing using custom scripts.

    • Static security analysis of the scoped contracts and imported functions.

    • Local deployment and testing with Foundry & Hardhat.


4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.
The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.
The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.
The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):
Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.
Attack Cost (AC):
Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.
Attack Complexity (AX):
Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.
Metrics:
EXPLOITABILITY METRIC (mem_e)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)Arbitrary (AO:A)
Specific (AO:S)		1
0.2
Attack Cost (AC)Low (AC:L)
Medium (AC:M)
High (AC:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)Low (AX:L)
Medium (AX:M)
High (AX:H)		1
0.67
0.33
Exploitability EE is calculated using the following formula:

E=∏meE = \prod m_e

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):
Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.
Integrity (I):
Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.
Availability (A):
Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.
Deposit (D):
Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.
Yield (Y):
Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.
Metrics:
IMPACT METRIC (mIm_I)METRIC VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)None (C:N)
Low (C:L)
Medium (C:M)
High (C:H)
Critical (C:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Integrity (I)None (I:N)
Low (I:L)
Medium (I:M)
High (I:H)
Critical (I:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Availability (A)None (A:N)
Low (A:L)
Medium (A:M)
High (A:H)
Critical (A:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Deposit (D)None (D:N)
Low (D:L)
Medium (D:M)
High (D:H)
Critical (D:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Yield (Y)None (Y:N)
Low (Y:L)
Medium (Y:M)
High (Y:H)
Critical (Y:C)		0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Impact II is calculated using the following formula:

I=max(mI)+∑mI−max(mI)4I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):
Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.
Scope (S):
Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.
Metrics:
SEVERITY COEFFICIENT (CC)COEFFICIENT VALUENUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility (rr)None (R:N)
Partial (R:P)
Full (R:F)		1
0.5
0.25
Scope (ss)Changed (S:C)
Unchanged (S:U)		1.25
1
Severity Coefficient CC is obtained by the following product:

C=rsC = rs

The Vulnerability Severity Score SS is obtained by:

S=min(10,EIC∗10)S = min(10, EIC * 10)

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.
SeverityScore Value Range
Critical9 - 10
High7 - 8.9
Medium4.5 - 6.9
Low2 - 4.4
Informational0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORY
(a) Repository: contracts-external
(b) Assessed Commit ID: 00e3bd8
(c) Items in scope:
  • contracts/aa/GokiteAccount.sol
  • contracts/aa/GokiteAccount.sol
  • contracts/airdrop/KiteAirdrop.sol
↓ Expand ↓
Out-of-Scope: Economic attacks and external dependencies.
Remediation Commit ID:
Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

0

High

0

Medium

0

Low

1

Informational

5

Security analysisRisk levelRemediation Date
Subnets can resassign any user to any subnet or arbitrary addressLowSolved - 10/08/2025
Insufficient validation on airdrop claim deadline InformationalSolved - 10/16/2025
Missing two step process for ownership transferInformationalAcknowledged - 10/17/2025
Duplicate event emission in pause/unpause functionsInformationalSolved - 10/17/2025
Unchecked ERC20 transfer return valueInformationalAcknowledged - 10/09/2025
Unsafe token transfer pattern during airdrop claimInformationalAcknowledged - 10/17/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Subnets can resassign any user to any subnet or arbitrary address

//

Low

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/gokite-ai/contracts-external/commit/8f7abcd98f38d87201ee0cc910c6defdaffb46f6

7.2 Insufficient validation on airdrop claim deadline

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/gokite-ai/contracts-external/commit/734f869a77329706326dc72ae559bb93b5027cf9

7.3 Missing two step process for ownership transfer

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.4 Duplicate event emission in pause/unpause functions

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment
Remediation Hash
https://github.com/gokite-ai/contracts-external/commit/bb1add4cbc66639a74dd7a68cfb0aca7f5bc82bc

7.5 Unchecked ERC20 transfer return value

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

7.6 Unsafe token transfer pattern during airdrop claim

//

Informational

Description
BVSS
Recommendation
Remediation Comment

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

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