Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 01/27/2026
Date of Engagement: January 13th, 2026 - January 19th, 2026
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
9
Critical
2
High
0
Medium
2
Low
2
Informational
3
Kite engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts starting on January 13th 2025 and ending on January 19th, 2026. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.
The Kite protocol implements a sophisticated cross-chain Proof-of-Stake (PoS) validator management system designed for Avalanche's Interchain Messaging (ICM) framework. It orchestrates validator/delegator lifecycle management, reward distribution, and uptime verification through Warp Messaging between the P-Chain and C-Chain.
Halborn was allocated 4 day for this engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineers to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineers are experts in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The objectives of this assessment are to:
Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.
Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were mostly addressed by the Kite team. The main recommendations were:
Add the nonReentrant modifier to prevent reentrancy.
Contract should initialize lastClaimUptimeSeconds to the validator's current during initialization.
Implement a period-based uptime evaluation system that assesses each reward claim window independently.
Make uptime proof submission mandatory to accept new delegators.
Halborn conducted a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is crucial for identifying flaws in logic, processes, and implementation, automated testing enhances coverage of smart contracts and quickly detects deviations from established security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were employed throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the platform's architecture, purpose and use.
Manual code review and walkthrough of smart contracts to identify any logical issues.
Comprehensive assessment of the safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions within scope that could lead to arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.
Local testing using custom scripts (Foundry).
Fork testing against main networks (Foundry).
Static security analysis of scoped contracts, and imported functions (Slither).
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
2
High
0
Medium
2
Low
2
Informational
3
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-Function Reentrancy Allowing Drainage of the Reward Vault | Critical | Solved - 01/22/2026 |
| Delegators Can Claim Excessive Rewards Due to Incorrect lastClaimUptime Initialization | Critical | Solved - 01/15/2026 |
| Cumulative Uptime Calculation Penalizes Delegators for Validator's Post-Claim Downtime | Medium | Solved - 01/22/2026 |
| Stale Uptime Data Benefits Delegators During Registration | Medium | Solved - 01/22/2026 |
| Missing Input Validation in Reward Calculator | Low | Solved - 01/22/2026 |
| Unused Error Definitions | Low | Solved - 01/22/2026 |
| Missing Ownership Transfer Security | Informational | Solved - 01/22/2026 |
| Outdated Compiler Pragma Version | Informational | Acknowledged - 01/23/2026 |
| Minimum Stake Duration Change Breaks Existing Delegators | Informational | Acknowledged - 01/23/2026 |
//Critical
//Critical
//Medium
//Medium
//Low
//Low
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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