Lince DPM Audit | Lince | Halborn Audit Reports

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

About this report

Assessment Type

Assurance Assessment

Date of Engagement

August 8th, 2025 - August 29th, 2025

Source Code

lince_dpm

Assessed Commit ID

a116f31

Severity Breakdown

0Acknowledged
0Risk Accepted
5Solved
5All Findings

Critical0
High0
Medium0
Low0
Informational5
- 5Solved

Introduction#

Lince engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Solana programs beginning on August 8th, 2025, and ending on August 29th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the Solana Programs provided in lince_dpm GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

Lince protocol is a Solana-based asset management system that allows users to deposit stablecoins into strategy-driven investment pools in exchange for LP tokens representing their share of the pool. Each pool specifies a target asset composition, and the protocol periodically rebalances allocations using Jupiter swaps investing stablecoins into various yield-generating assets and later converting them back. Users can withdraw at any time to receive their proportional share of stablecoins and underlying assets. The protocol manages fees, reserves, and valuations using oracle based snapshots, but currently relies heavily on off-chain infrastructure to manage user keys and execute rebalancing operations.

ASSESSMENT SUMMARY#

Halborn was provided 16 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of the assessment is to:

Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which has been addressed by the Lince team. The main ones were the following:

Enforce strict validation that the assets passed in during deposit and withdrawal match the original pool composition by verifying asset_type against the stored composition.
Validate that the provided reserve_ata_acc_infos via remaining_accounts are owned by the config PDA.
Include the constraint associated_token::token_program = token_program for transfer_admin, reserve_swap_jupiter and pool_swap_jupiter.
Update get_swap_data_amounts() to correctly parse quoted_in_amount and out_amount for shared_accounts_exact_out_route .
Enforce a runtime check to ensure both the stablecoin and LP mint use 6 decimals.

TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY#

Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:

Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
Mapping out possible attack vectors
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (cargo audit).
Local runtime testing (anchor test)

Risk Methodology#

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
Attack Origin (AO)	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N)	0
	Low (C:L)	0.25
	Medium (C:M)	0.5
	High (C:H)	0.75
	Critical (C:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical (A:C)	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium (Y:M)	0.5
	High (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:C)	1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C)	1.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
9 - 10	7 - 8.9	4.5 - 6.9	2 - 4.4	0 - 1.9

Scope#

(a) Repository:lince_dpm

(b) Assessed Commit ID:a116f31f13d03c70a03bbe71c193f18073ddea31

29 files

programs / dpm

29 files

src

27 files

instructions

15 files

admin_transfer.rs

rust

edit_asset.rs

rust

edit_strategy.rs

rust

initialize_config.rs

rust

initialize_pool.rs

rust

mod.rs

rust

pool_swap_jupiter.rs

rust

process_user_deposit.rs

rust

register_asset.rs

rust

Out-of-Scope:Economic attack vectors and external dependencies

dc420bd9b5afae05ffcdaacdb32bf636620849e47efa444e3b55aa44d49ff1c98b1be0b34e6355d9c5b3e28e6b7e5d0651565fbd6d267a3cce5c1304864d433fc921f4718eac3ff5c1060516e89e2d4b

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#

#	Title	Severity	Score	Status
HAL-01	Missing Assets Validation in Pool Allows for LP Value Manipulation	Informational	0.9	Solved08/29/2025
HAL-02	Missing Ownership Validation for Reserve ATA in withdraw instruction	Informational	0.5	Solved08/29/2025
HAL-03	Incompatible ATA Derivation for Token-2022 Mints	Informational	0.4	Solved08/14/2025
HAL-04	No decimal consistency check between stablecoin and LP mint	Informational	0.1	Solved08/25/2025
HAL-05	Incorrect Swap Amount Parsing for Exact-Out Instructions May Cause Transaction Failures	Informational	0.1	Solved08/27/2025

864d433fc921f4718eac3ff5c1060516e89e2d4b

8. Automated Testing#

Disclaimer#

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.