Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 09/25/2025
Date of Engagement: August 8th, 2025 - August 29th, 2025
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
5
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
5
Lince engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Solana programs beginning on August 8th, 2025, and ending on August 29th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the Solana Programs provided in lince_dpm GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
Lince protocol is a Solana-based asset management system that allows users to deposit stablecoins into strategy-driven investment pools in exchange for LP tokens representing their share of the pool. Each pool specifies a target asset composition, and the protocol periodically rebalances allocations using Jupiter swaps investing stablecoins into various yield-generating assets and later converting them back. Users can withdraw at any time to receive their proportional share of stablecoins and underlying assets. The protocol manages fees, reserves, and valuations using oracle based snapshots, but currently relies heavily on off-chain infrastructure to manage user keys and execute rebalancing operations.
Halborn was provided 16 days for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the Solana Programs.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which has been addressed by the Lince team. The main ones were the following:
Enforce strict validation that the assets passed in during deposit and withdrawal match the original pool composition by verifying asset_type against the stored composition.
Validate that the provided reserve_ata_acc_infos via remaining_accounts are owned by the config PDA.
Include the constraint associated_token::token_program = token_program for transfer_admin, reserve_swap_jupiter and pool_swap_jupiter.
Update get_swap_data_amounts() to correctly parse quoted_in_amount and out_amount for shared_accounts_exact_out_route .
Enforce a runtime check to ensure both the stablecoin and LP mint use 6 decimals.
Halborn performed a combination of a manual review of the source code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in business logic, processes, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual program source code review to identify business logic issues.
Mapping out possible attack vectors
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (cargo audit).
Local runtime testing (anchor test)
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
0
Informational
5
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Missing Assets Validation in Pool Allows for LP Value Manipulation | Informational | Solved - 08/29/2025 |
| Missing Ownership Validation for Reserve ATA in withdraw instruction | Informational | Solved - 08/29/2025 |
| Incompatible ATA Derivation for Token-2022 Mints | Informational | Solved - 08/14/2025 |
| No decimal consistency check between stablecoin and LP mint | Informational | Solved - 08/25/2025 |
| Incorrect Swap Amount Parsing for Exact-Out Instructions May Cause Transaction Failures | Informational | Solved - 08/27/2025 |
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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