Introduction#
Moonwell engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on July 15th and ending on July 17th. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the moonwell-fi/moonwell-contracts-v2 GitHub repository. Commit hash and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
Assessment Summary#
Halborn was provided 2 days for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contract in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts in-scope:
xWELLRouter.solMultichainGovernor.solMultichainVoteCollection.solWormholeBridgeAdapter.solmip-m00.sol
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended, considering the modifications performed.
Review the modifications to the contracts to ensure no vulnerabilities or security hot-spots are added.
In summary, Halborn has not identified any security risk inherent to the contract under analysis, given the engagement scope.
Test Approach and Methodology#
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:
Research into architecture and purpose.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (
solgraph).Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic-related vulnerability classes.
Manual testing by custom scripts.
Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions (
slither).Testnet deployment (
Foundry).
Manual Testing#
The contracts in scope were thoroughly and manually analyzed for potential vulnerabilities and bugs, as well as known optimizations and best practices when developing Smart Contracts in Solidity programming language. The review notes of the assessment are the following:
The
MultichainGovernor.solcontract now has areceive() external payablefunction, and handles correctly the excess amount sent toproposefunction.The
MultichainVoteCollection.solcontract now refunds the excess amount sent toemitVotesfunction.The refactored
initializefunction in theWormholeBridgeAdaptercontract has the correct implementation, taking an array of trusted Wormhole chain id's and Trusted senders, and applies verification against array length mismatch, which is recommended.The call to_addTrustedSendertakes the correct parameters to the function call.In the
xWELLRouter.solcontract, hard-coded values forchainIdare removed, being now the destinationchaindIda parameter to be passed in function calls tobridgeToSenderandbridgeToRecipientfunctions. The allow-list mechanism used by the protocol applies the correct mitigation against permanent loss of funds, even if user provides a wrongchainId.All the contracts in-scope are employing thorough and organized NatSpec documentation, what enhances readability.
Best practices in terms of gas-saving are also being applied.
The scripts provided within the commit hash in scope are adherent to the modifications.
Risk Methodology#
5.1 EXPLOITABILITY
Attack Origin (AO):
Attack Cost (AC):
Attack Complexity (AX):
Metrics:
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) | 1 |
| Specific (AO:S) | 0.2 | |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AC:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AC:H) | 0.33 | |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AX:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AX:H) | 0.33 |
5.2 IMPACT
Confidentiality (C):
Integrity (I):
Availability (A):
Deposit (D):
Yield (Y):
Metrics:
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) | 0 |
| Low (C:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (C:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (C:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (C:C) | 1 | |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) | 0 |
| Low (I:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (I:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (I:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (I:C) | 1 | |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) | 0 |
| Low (A:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (A:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (A:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (A:C) | 1 | |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) | 0 |
| Low (D:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (D:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (D:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (D:C) | 1 | |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) | 0 |
| Low (Y:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (Y:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (Y:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (Y:C) | 1 |
5.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT
Reversibility (R):
Scope (S):
Metrics:
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) | 1 |
| Partial (R:P) | 0.5 | |
| Full (R:F) | 0.25 | |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) | 1.25 |
| Unchanged (S:U) | 1 |
| Critical | High | Medium | Low | Informational |
| 9 - 10 | 7 - 8.9 | 4.5 - 6.9 | 2 - 4.4 | 0 - 1.9 |
Scope#
Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#
# | Title | Severity | Score | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No findings recorded for this report. | ||||
Findings & Tech Details#
9. Automated Testing#
Disclaimer#
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
