Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated Unknown date
Date of Engagement: January 8th, 2025 - January 21st, 2025
Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
12
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
1
Low
3
Informational
8
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
Neutral Trade engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Solana Validator program beginning on January 8th, 2025 and ending on January 21st, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository bundle-audit, commit hashes, and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
The Neutral Trade is releasing NT Bundle, a program that allows user to participate in a multi-strategy hedge fund that interacts with multiple protocols, initially with Drift vaults.
2. Assessment Summary
Halborn was provided 2 weeks for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to review the security of the Solana Programs in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the codebase.
Validate that the funds are properly managed by the program, avoiding unauthorized access to them
Verify that the system has implemented the access control principles to prevent malicious users to access permissioned functions
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of multiple risks, which were partially addressed by the Neutral Trade team. The main ones were the following:
Prevent calling the assign_profit_share entry point if POD token's total supply is zero.Prevent receivers to be allocated an excessive allocation bps.Require the manager of the Drift vaults' related functions to be only the bundle keeper.Prefer using Anchor's Context Accounts to provide accounts to a function.
3. SCOPE
- bundle-audit/programs/ntbundle/src/errors.rs
- bundle-audit/programs/ntbundle/src/events.rs
- bundle-audit/programs/ntbundle/src/lib.rs
4. Findings Overview
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation |
|---|---|---|
| First user allocating funds might drain underlying balance | Medium | Solved - 01/30/2025 |
| Centralization risk due to manager control over Receivers | Low | Risk Accepted - 01/30/2025 |
| Inconsistent constraints on manager for multiple entry points | Low | Solved - 01/30/2025 |
| Risk of passing key accounts as parameters in initialize_bundle | Low | Partially Solved - 02/07/2025 |
| Lack of validation of new authority on multiple functions | Informational | Acknowledged - 01/30/2025 |
| Arbitrage opportunity if NAV is predicted | Informational | Partially Solved - 02/06/2025 |
| Lack of global allocation BPS tracking in NTBundle program | Informational | Solved |
| Lack of validation for allocation_bps in Receiver setup | Informational | Solved - 01/30/2025 |
| Lack of functionality to re-enable a Receiver account | Informational | Solved - 01/30/2025 |
| Incorrect manager role validation in update_allocations and remove_strategy | Informational | Solved - 01/30/2025 |
| Redundant validation of allocation_bps in distribute_to_receivers | Informational | Solved - 01/30/2025 |
| Redundant validation of refill_amount in perform_refill | Informational | Solved - 01/30/2025 |
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
Table of Contents
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