Summary
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
- 1Partially Solved
- 7Acknowledged
- 3Risk Accepted
- 2Solved
- 13All Findings
- Critical0
- High0
- Medium0
- Low4
- 3Risk A.
- 1Solved
- Informational9
- 1P. Solved
- 7Ack.
- 1Solved
Introduction#
NUVA engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on October 29th, 2026 and ending on November 2nd, 2026. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.
The reviewed contracts are the new Benji subsystem (NvBenjiRouter, NvBenjiVault, IBenjiPool, INvBenjiDepositor) and the new ProvenanceVaultOracle with its consumer-facing IProvenanceVaultOracle.
NvBenjiRouter is the KYC/AML-gated entry point for nvBENJI and the address Franklin Templeton authorizes as a trader on its BenjiSwap pool, users escrow USDC or nvBENJI to request a deposit or redemption, and after the backend's off-chain screening a keeper settles it in one transaction through the pool and the vault, or rejects it and returns the escrow; users may cancel their own request after a delay fixed at request time, even while paused.
NvBenjiVault is the ERC-4626 share over iBENJI, restricted so only the router may deposit or withdraw, priced on its own iBENJI balance so Franklin Templeton's daily dividend lifts the share price unattended, and funded by a push callback because iBENJI restricts transferFrom; nvBENJI itself transfers freely. ProvenanceVaultOracle mirrors a Provenance vault's TVL, price per share and total shares as atomic keeper-written rounds under a heartbeat staleness rule, exposed through Chainlink-shaped getters; RemoteVault reads its TVL to enforce the deposit cap.
ASSESSMENT SUMMARY#
Halborn was provided with 3 days for this engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to assess the security of the smart contracts in scope. The assigned engineer possesses deep expertise in blockchain and smart contract security, including hands-on experience with multiple blockchain protocols.
The objective of this assessment is to:
Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.
Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks which some of them have been addressed by the NUVA team. The main recommendations are:
Accept an explicit _owner parameter in initialize and deploy atomically. Apply the same fix to PriceOracle, RemoteVault, CrossChainVault, and CrossChainManager.Either aggregate in-flight amounts across vaults in the oracle or partition the global cap on-chain.Override _update to restrict transfers to mint, burn, and router-leg only.Add ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable to the vault and mark deposit, mint, withdraw, and redeem as nonReentrant.
TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY#
Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the architecture and purpose of the in-scope contracts.
Manual code review and walkthrough of the in-scope contracts.
Manual assessment of critical Solidity variables and functions to identify potential vulnerability classes.
Manual testing using custom scripts.
Local deployment and testing with (Hardhat).
Risk Methodology#
4.1 EXPLOITABILITY
Attack Origin (AO):
Attack Cost (AC):
Attack Complexity (AX):
Metrics:
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) | 1 |
| Specific (AO:S) | 0.2 | |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AC:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AC:H) | 0.33 | |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) | 1 |
| Medium (AX:M) | 0.67 | |
| High (AX:H) | 0.33 |
4.2 IMPACT
Confidentiality (C):
Integrity (I):
Availability (A):
Deposit (D):
Yield (Y):
Metrics:
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) | 0 |
| Low (C:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (C:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (C:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (C:C) | 1 | |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) | 0 |
| Low (I:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (I:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (I:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (I:C) | 1 | |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) | 0 |
| Low (A:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (A:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (A:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (A:C) | 1 | |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) | 0 |
| Low (D:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (D:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (D:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (D:C) | 1 | |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) | 0 |
| Low (Y:L) | 0.25 | |
| Medium (Y:M) | 0.5 | |
| High (Y:H) | 0.75 | |
| Critical (Y:C) | 1 |
4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT
Reversibility (R):
Scope (S):
Metrics:
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) | 1 |
| Partial (R:P) | 0.5 | |
| Full (R:F) | 0.25 | |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) | 1.25 |
| Unchanged (S:U) | 1 |
| Critical | High | Medium | Low | Informational |
| 9 - 10 | 7 - 8.9 | 4.5 - 6.9 | 2 - 4.4 | 0 - 1.9 |
Scope#
Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#
# | Title | Severity | Score | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unrestricted initialize on ProvenanceVaultOracle Allows Permanent Proxy Hijack Under Non-Atomic Deployment | Low | 3.9 | Risk Accepted11/06/2026 | |
| Global TVL Oracle Allows Multi-Vault Deposit-Cap Overshoot | Low | 2.5 | Risk Accepted11/06/2026 | |
| NvBenjiVault allows nvBENJI transfers to non-allowlisted holders | Low | 2.5 | Risk Accepted11/06/2026 | |
| _deposit mints unbacked shares when onVaultDeposit re-enters deposit | Low | 2.3 | Solved11/06/2026 | |
| Role Grants Survive Ownership Transfers, Letting Stale Keepers, Pausers, and Resumers Outlive the Owner That Granted Them | Informational | 1.4 | Partially Solved11/06/2026 | |
| NvBenjiVault Lacks On-Chain Yield Vesting, Enabling Step-Up Yield Redistribution via Keeper Timing | Informational | 1.3 | Acknowledged11/06/2026 | |
| NvBenjiVault trusts unverified iBENJI yield, burn, and transfer behavior | Informational | 1.3 | Acknowledged11/06/2026 | |
| setPool redirects pending requests to an unvalidated pool | Informational | 0.8 | Solved11/06/2026 | |
| setVaultData accepts zero TVL and unbounded jumps between rounds | Informational | 0.6 | Acknowledged11/06/2026 | |
| Stale-Snapshot Race in `ProvenanceVaultOracle` Allows Deposit-Cap Overshoot | Informational | 0.5 | Acknowledged11/06/2026 | |
| _doAcceptDeposit Mints Transferable nvBENJI to USDC-Blacklisted Addresses, Breaching the KYC/AML Perimeter | Informational | 0.5 | Acknowledged11/06/2026 | |
| acceptDeposits and acceptRedemptions settle pool swaps with no deadline | Informational | 0.5 | Acknowledged11/06/2026 | |
| IBenjiPool omits the pool's minimum-input and authorization getters | Informational | 0.2 | Acknowledged11/06/2026 |
Findings & Tech Details#
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Disclaimer#
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
