Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 06/18/2025
Date of Engagement: May 5th, 2025 - May 8th, 2025
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
22
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
7
Informational
15
Ten Protocol engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on May 5th, 2025 and ending on May 8th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.
The Ten Protocol codebase in scope mainly consists of an infrastructure with an upgradeable token system, cross-chain messaging, and transaction processing mechanisms.
Halborn was provided 4 days for the engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of the assessment is to:
Identify potential security issues within the smart contracts.
Ensure that smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were partially addressed by the Ten Protocol team. The main ones are the following:
Add validation in the canReattemptCallback modifier to ensure the callbackId exists.
Consider adding functionality to allow callback originators to cancel their pending callbacks when they're no longer needed or desired.
Consider implementing a comprehensive callback management system.
Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into architecture, purpose and use of the platform.
Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.
Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions in scope that could led to arithmetic related vulnerabilities.
Local testing with custom scripts (Foundry).
Fork testing against main networks (Foundry).
Static analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions (Slither).
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
0
Medium
0
Low
7
Informational
15
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Missing validation of callbackId existence in canReattemptCallback modifier | Low | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Lack of callback cancellation and lifecycle controls | Low | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Inadequate callback array management | Low | Partially Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Single step ownership transfer process | Low | Partially Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Fixed token minting regardless of transaction value | Low | Risk Accepted - 06/11/2025 |
| Lack of transaction processing tracking mechanism | Low | Risk Accepted - 06/11/2025 |
| Missing error handling for callbacks | Low | Risk Accepted - 06/11/2025 |
| Unnecessary external call in _internalRefund when refund amount is zero | Informational | Acknowledged - 06/11/2025 |
| Missing input validation | Informational | Partially Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Use of low-level transfer method | Informational | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Floating pragma | Informational | Acknowledged - 06/11/2025 |
| Use of revert strings instead of custom errors | Informational | Acknowledged - 06/11/2025 |
| Unhandled return value in _payForCallback Function | Informational | Acknowledged - 06/11/2025 |
| Missing events | Informational | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Open To-Dos | Informational | Partially Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Redundant default value assignment | Informational | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Public functions can be marked external | Informational | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Commented functionality | Informational | Partially Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Missing variable visibility | Informational | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Lack of named mappings | Informational | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Unused import | Informational | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
| Unoptimized for loops | Informational | Solved - 05/20/2025 |
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Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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