AI Advisory
Strategic guidance for secure AI adoption
Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 06/29/2026
Date of Engagement: May 22nd, 2026 - May 29th, 2026
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
16
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
2
Low
4
Informational
9
Oro engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their CosmWasm contracts beginning on May 22nd, 2026 and ending on May 29th, 2026. The security assessment was scoped to the repository listed with commit hash, and further details in the Scope section of this report.
ORO is a multi-chain protocol, and the audited scope is the set of CosmWasm contracts implementing the on-chain portion of its token lifecycle — handling distribution, staking, and wrapped-asset issuance. It includes an airdrop module for allocating and vesting tokens to eligible users, a staking module where users deposit the staking token into a per-address stake registry and earn reward-stream payouts pro-rata against their stake balance, and a wrapper module that locks a source token and mints a corresponding wrapped denomination through the chain's tokenfactory. Together, these contracts support the core token lifecycle around distribution, staking incentives, unbonding, and wrapped-token issuance.
The team at Halborn assigned a full-time security engineer to verify the security of the smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The purpose of this assessment is to:
Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts
In summary, Halborn identified some improvements to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were mostly addressed by the Oro team. The main recommendations included:
Make reward accounting transfer aware, or use non-transferable staking positions while side rewards are active.
Reject zero-value claims before marking user eligibility as claimed.
Reject claim transactions that include unexpected attached native funds.
Define lifetime reward token limits clearly, or safely retire expired reward programs after all outstanding obligations are settled.
Align user-facing claim status with the actual conditions required for a successful claim.
Calculate bonus funding requirements from remaining unpaid obligations instead of total historical allocations.
Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the assessment:
Research into architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
Manual code read and walk through.
Manual Assessment of use and safety for the critical Rust variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
Architecture related logical controls.
Cross contract call controls.
Scanning of Rust files for vulnerabilities (cargo audit)
Review and improvement of integration tests.
Verification of integration tests and implementation of new ones.
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
1
Medium
2
Low
4
Informational
9
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Transferable shares allow duplicated side reward accrual | High | Solved - 06/04/2026 |
| Zero payout claims permanently consume user eligibility | Medium | Solved - 06/01/2026 |
| Cumulative burn accounting can permanently exhaust wrapper minting capacity | Medium | Solved - 06/05/2026 |
| Claims can silently retain attached native funds | Low | Solved - 06/01/2026 |
| Expired reward denoms permanently consume reward slots | Low | Solved - 06/03/2026 |
| Inactive airdrops can appear as claimable | Low | Solved - 06/01/2026 |
| APY bonus solvency checks overstate remaining obligations | Low | Solved - 06/01/2026 |
| Unbounded airdrop scans can make fund recovery increasingly expensive | Informational | Solved - 06/02/2026 |
| Denom admin handoff can leave the wrapper in exit only mode | Informational | Acknowledged - 06/10/2026 |
| Tokenfactory reply parsing does not validate the returned denom | Informational | Solved - 06/03/2026 |
| Migration handlers do not enforce forward only versioning | Informational | Solved - 06/02/2026 |
| Withdrawal guard relies on caller supplied token type | Informational | Solved - 06/02/2026 |
| Pause authority queries are not paginated | Informational | Acknowledged - 06/10/2026 |
| Release build configuration disables declared overflow checks | Informational | Solved - 06/02/2026 |
| Unbonding period increases take effect immediately | Informational | Acknowledged - 06/10/2026 |
| Hook destination is not validated before dispatch | Informational | Solved - 06/03/2026 |
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Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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Smart Contract Assessment
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