CosmWasm Contracts - Oroswap

Prepared by:

HALBORN

Last Updated 08/26/2025

Date of Engagement: June 30th, 2025 - July 30th, 2025

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

All findings

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

1. Introduction
2. Assesment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Permissionless “collect” enables fee-harvest griefing
7.2 Unbounded external-schedule spam could enable gas dos
7.3 Pair keys can collide
7.4 Initial stake penalises first user
7.5 Burning small xoro amounts can result in no redemption
7.6 Over-allocation revert distribution due to wrong fees percentages
7.7 Permissionless decimal spoofing
7.8 Missing guard against stale pending operation
7.9 Owner can confiscate future reward tokens
7.10 Missing balance validation when bypassing amount check
7.11 Schedule-limit bypass via improper length check
7.12 Vesting schedules bypass validation when end_point is missing
7.13 Asset info deduplication ignores the font case
7.14 Formula deviation with reference contracts
7.15 Missing or incomplete instantiate attributes
7.16 Unbounded pagination in query endpoints
7.17 Malicious admin can seize all fees
7.18 Vesting withdraw from active schedule leaves a single token unit in the schedule
7.19 Redundant branch after minimum fee enforcement in funds splitting

1. Introduction

Oroswap engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their smart contracts beginning on June 30th, 2025 and ending on July 30th, 2025. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

2. ASSESMENT SUMMARY

Halborn was provided with 4 weeks for this engagement and assigned 2 security engineers to review the security of the smart contracts in scope. The assigned engineers possess deep expertise in blockchain and smart contract security, including hands-on experience with multiple blockchain protocols.

The objectives of this assessment were to:

Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.
Ensure that the smart contracts function as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were mostly addressed by the Oroswap team. The main ones were:

Restrict collect to an authorised role or enforce an internal minimum limit per asset.
Cap the number of future schedules per pool or token.
Apply length-prefix encoding to each AssetInfo.as_bytes().
Store new decimal registrations as pending and require explicit owner approval.
Enforce that governance_cut + second_receiver_cut + dev_fund_cut ≤ 100%.

3. TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the custom modules. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of structures and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the assessment :

Research into architecture and purpose.
Static Analysis of security for scoped repository, and imported functions.
Manual Assessment for discovering security vulnerabilities on the codebase.
Ensuring the correctness of the codebase.
Dynamic Analysis of files and modules in scope.

4. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S)	1 0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H)	1 0.67 0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H)	1 0.67 0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Availability (A)	None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C)	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F)	1 0.5 0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U)	1.25 1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Severity	Score Value Range
Critical	9 - 10
High	7 - 8.9
Medium	4.5 - 6.9
Low	2 - 4.4
Informational	0 - 1.9

5. SCOPE

REPOSITORIES

(a) Repository: oroswap-core

(b) Assessed Commit ID: 59f095b

contracts/periphery/pool_initializer/src/error.rs
contracts/periphery/pool_initializer/src/lib.rs
contracts/periphery/pool_initializer/src/state.rs

↓ Expand ↓

(a) Repository: oroswap-core

(b) Assessed Commit ID: 9042989

contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/tests/tube-based-e2e.rs
contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/examples/tokenfactory_tracker_schema.rs
contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/src/error.rs
contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/src/lib.rs
contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/src/query.rs
contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/src/state.rs
contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/src/contract.rs
contracts/periphery/fee_granter/tests/fee_granter_integration.rs
contracts/periphery/fee_granter/src/error.rs
contracts/periphery/fee_granter/src/lib.rs
contracts/periphery/fee_granter/src/query.rs
contracts/periphery/fee_granter/src/state.rs
contracts/periphery/fee_granter/src/contract.rs
contracts/periphery/native_coin_registry/tests/coin_registry_integration.rs
contracts/periphery/native_coin_registry/examples/native_coin_registry_schema.rs
contracts/periphery/native_coin_registry/src/error.rs
contracts/periphery/native_coin_registry/src/lib.rs
contracts/periphery/native_coin_registry/src/state.rs
contracts/periphery/native_coin_registry/src/contract.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/tests/pair_concentrated_integration.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/tests/pair_concentrated_simulation.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/tests/helper.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/examples/pair_concentrated_schema.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/src/error.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/src/lib.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/src/state.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/src/contract.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/src/queries.rs
contracts/pair_concentrated/src/utils.rs
contracts/pair_stable/tests/helper.rs
contracts/pair_stable/tests/stablepool_tests.rs
contracts/pair_stable/tests/integration.rs
contracts/pair_stable/examples/pair_stable_schema.rs
contracts/pair_stable/src/error.rs
contracts/pair_stable/src/lib.rs
contracts/pair_stable/src/state.rs
contracts/pair_stable/src/math.rs
contracts/pair_stable/src/contract.rs
contracts/pair_stable/src/testing.rs
contracts/pair_stable/src/utils.rs
contracts/pair_stable/src/mock_querier.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/tests/incentives_simulations.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/tests/incentives_integration_tests.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/tests/helper/broken_cw20.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/tests/helper/mod.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/tests/helper/helper.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/examples/serialization_cost.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/examples/incentives_schema.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/execute.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/error.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/lib.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/query.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/migrate.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/state.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/reply.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/traits.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/utils.rs
contracts/tokenomics/incentives/src/instantiate.rs
contracts/tokenomics/vesting/tests/integration.rs
contracts/tokenomics/vesting/examples/vesting_schema.rs
contracts/tokenomics/vesting/src/error.rs
contracts/tokenomics/vesting/src/lib.rs
contracts/tokenomics/vesting/src/state.rs
contracts/tokenomics/vesting/src/contract.rs
contracts/tokenomics/vesting/src/testing.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/tests/common/stargate.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/tests/common/mod.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/tests/common/helper.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/tests/staking_integration.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/examples/staking_schema.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/src/error.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/src/lib.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/src/migrate.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/src/state.rs
contracts/tokenomics/staking/src/contract.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/tests/maker_integration.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/examples/maker_schema.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/src/error.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/src/lib.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/src/state.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/src/contract.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/src/reply.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/src/migration.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/src/testing.rs
contracts/tokenomics/maker/src/utils.rs
contracts/factory/tests/factory_helper.rs
contracts/factory/tests/migration_test.rs
contracts/factory/tests/integration.rs
contracts/factory/examples/factory_schema.rs
contracts/factory/src/error.rs
contracts/factory/src/lib.rs
contracts/factory/src/state.rs
contracts/factory/src/contract.rs
contracts/factory/src/testing.rs
contracts/factory/src/querier.rs
contracts/factory/src/mock_querier.rs
contracts/pair/tests/integration.rs
contracts/pair/examples/pair_schema.rs
contracts/pair/src/error.rs
contracts/pair/src/lib.rs
contracts/pair/src/state.rs
contracts/pair/src/contract.rs
contracts/pair/src/testing.rs
contracts/pair/src/mock_querier.rs
contracts/router/tests/factory_helper.rs
contracts/router/tests/router_integration.rs
contracts/router/examples/router_schema.rs
contracts/router/src/error.rs
contracts/router/src/lib.rs
contracts/router/src/testing/mod.rs
contracts/router/src/testing/tests.rs
contracts/router/src/testing/mock_querier.rs
contracts/router/src/state.rs
contracts/router/src/contract.rs
contracts/router/src/operations.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/pair_xoro.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/vesting.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/pair_concentrated_inj.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/factory.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/xoro_token.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/maker.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/pair_concentrated_duality.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/restricted_vector.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/token.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/lib.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/asset.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/incentives.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/staking.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/observation.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/pair_xyk_sale_tax.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/injective_ext.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/pair.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/tokenfactory_tracker.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/router.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/fee_granter.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/oracle.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/cosmwasm_ext.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/pair_concentrated.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/testing.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/token_factory.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/native_coin_registry.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/querier.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/mock_querier.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/common.rs
packages/oroswap-core/src/oro_converter.rs
packages/circular_buffer/src/error.rs
packages/circular_buffer/src/lib.rs
packages/oroswap_pcl_common/src/consts.rs
packages/oroswap_pcl_common/src/error.rs
packages/oroswap_pcl_common/src/lib.rs
packages/oroswap_pcl_common/src/math/signed_decimal.rs
packages/oroswap_pcl_common/src/math/mod.rs
packages/oroswap_pcl_common/src/math/math_f64.rs
packages/oroswap_pcl_common/src/math/math_decimal.rs
packages/oroswap_pcl_common/src/state.rs
packages/oroswap_pcl_common/src/utils.rs
packages/oroswap_test/src/convert.rs
packages/oroswap_test/src/lib.rs
packages/oroswap_test/src/coins.rs
packages/oroswap_test/src/modules/stargate.rs
packages/oroswap_test/src/modules/mod.rs
packages/oroswap_test/src/modules/neutron_stargate.rs

contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/tests/tube-based-e2e.rs
contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/examples/tokenfactory_tracker_schema.rs
contracts/periphery/tokenfactory_tracker/src/error.rs

↓ Expand ↓

Out-of-Scope: Economic attacks and external dependencies.

Remediation Commit ID:

f756631
57590dd
b427a96
c50f110
2cb5a83
308d8c6
2fa02f9
280739c
e44c386
345aa61
6be1833
c0560b6
34806ab
722b9d2
29e87b6

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

6. Assessment Summary & Findings Overview

Critical

High

Medium

Low

Informational

Security analysis	Risk level	Remediation Date
Permissionless “Collect” enables fee-harvest griefing	Medium	Solved - 08/06/2025
Unbounded external-schedule spam could enable gas DoS	Low	Solved - 08/12/2025
Pair keys can collide	Low	Solved - 08/11/2025
Initial stake penalises first user	Low	Solved - 08/15/2025
Burning small xORO amounts can result in no redemption	Low	Solved - 08/15/2025
Over-allocation revert distribution due to wrong fees percentages	Low	Solved - 08/12/2025
Permissionless decimal spoofing	Informational	Acknowledged - 08/17/2025
Missing guard against stale pending operation	Informational	Solved - 08/25/2025
Owner can confiscate future reward tokens	Informational	Solved - 08/15/2025
Missing balance validation when bypassing amount check	Informational	Solved - 08/15/2025
Schedule-limit bypass via improper length check	Informational	Solved - 08/15/2025
Vesting schedules bypass validation when end_point is missing	Informational	Solved - 08/15/2025
Asset info deduplication ignores the font case	Informational	Solved - 08/11/2025
Formula deviation with reference contracts	Informational	Acknowledged - 08/17/2025
Missing or incomplete instantiate attributes	Informational	Solved - 08/12/2025
Unbounded pagination in query endpoints	Informational	Solved - 08/12/2025
Malicious admin can seize all fees	Informational	Solved - 08/12/2025
Vesting withdraw from active schedule leaves a single token unit in the schedule	Informational	Solved - 08/15/2025
Redundant branch after minimum fee enforcement in funds splitting	Informational	Solved - 08/25/2025

7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Permissionless “Collect” enables fee-harvest griefing

Medium

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:M/I:N/D:N/Y:M (6.3)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.2 Unbounded external-schedule spam could enable gas DoS

Low

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:M/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:H/I:N/D:N/Y:N (3.4)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.3 Pair keys can collide

Low

Description

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:F/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:H/D:N/Y:N (1.9)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

7.8 Missing guard against stale pending operation

Informational

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:H/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:M/I:N/D:N/Y:N (1.6)

Recommendation

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.13 Asset info deduplication ignores the font case

Informational

Description

Proof of Concept

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

7.14 Formula deviation with reference contracts

Informational

Description

BVSS

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N (0.0)

Recommendation

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Remediation Hash

https://github.com/oroswap/oroswap-core/commit/2fa02f9e30c3dbc80f84f47382ef73017ff0e8b9

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.

1. Introduction
2. Assesment summary
3. Test approach and methodology
4. Risk methodology
5. Scope
6. Assessment summary & findings overview
7. Findings & Tech Details

7.1 Permissionless “collect” enables fee-harvest griefing
7.2 Unbounded external-schedule spam could enable gas dos
7.3 Pair keys can collide
7.4 Initial stake penalises first user
7.5 Burning small xoro amounts can result in no redemption
7.6 Over-allocation revert distribution due to wrong fees percentages
7.7 Permissionless decimal spoofing
7.8 Missing guard against stale pending operation
7.9 Owner can confiscate future reward tokens
7.10 Missing balance validation when bypassing amount check
7.11 Schedule-limit bypass via improper length check
7.12 Vesting schedules bypass validation when end_point is missing
7.13 Asset info deduplication ignores the font case
7.14 Formula deviation with reference contracts
7.15 Missing or incomplete instantiate attributes
7.16 Unbounded pagination in query endpoints
7.17 Malicious admin can seize all fees
7.18 Vesting withdraw from active schedule leaves a single token unit in the schedule
7.19 Redundant branch after minimum fee enforcement in funds splitting

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