Bridge Contracts Audit | Rally Foundation

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

About this report

Assessment Type

Assurance Assessment

Date of Engagement

January 30th, 2026 - February 2nd, 2026

Source Code

Rally

Assessed Commit ID

eabc353

Severity Breakdown

0Acknowledged
0Risk Accepted
3Solved
3All Findings

Critical0
High0
Medium0
Low0
Informational3
- 3Solved

INTRODUCTION#

Rally Foundation engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts from January 30th, 2026 to February 2nd, 2026 . The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.

The Rally bridge contracts implement a cross-chain message relay system where a trusted backend service submits transaction payloads to a BridgeForwarder, which routes them either locally or through LayerZero V2 to a BridgeReceiver on the destination chain, which decodes and dispatches each message to the appropriate target contract for execution.

ASSESSMENT SUMMARY#

Halborn ⁣ assigned 1 full-time security engineer to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineer is an expert in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The objectives of this assessment are to:

Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.
Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of risks, which were completely addressed by the Rally Foundation team. The main recommendations were:

Add error handling to the message receiver so a failing target does not stall delivery.
Reject ETH sent with local calls to prevent funds from being permanently locked.
Fix a mislabeled error message that references the wrong contract name.

TEST APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY#

Halborn conducted a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is crucial for identifying flaws in logic, processes, and implementation, automated testing enhances coverage of smart contracts and quickly detects deviations from established security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were employed throughout the term of the assessment:

Research into the platform's architecture, purpose and use.
Manual code review and walkthrough of smart contracts to identify any logical issues.
Comprehensive assessment of the safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions within scope that could lead to arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.
Local testing using custom scripts.
Fork testing against main networks.
Static security analysis of scoped contracts, and imported functions (Slither).

Risk Methodology#

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
Attack Origin (AO)	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N)	0
	Low (C:L)	0.25
	Medium (C:M)	0.5
	High (C:H)	0.75
	Critical (C:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical (A:C)	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium (Y:M)	0.5
	High (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:C)	1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C)	1.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
9 - 10	7 - 8.9	4.5 - 6.9	2 - 4.4	0 - 1.9

Scope#

(a) Repository:Rally

(b) Assessed Commit ID:eabc3538773767988bfc7a586323a8d2fa46257a

2 files

bridge / smart-contracts / contracts

2 files

BridgeForwarder.sol

solidity

BridgeReceiver.sol

solidity

Out-of-Scope:Third party dependencies and economic attacks.

1e25f4f6754e38d6d0252c258d823780e372f33b

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#

#	Title	Severity	Score	Status
HAL-01	BridgeReceiver lacks error handling and recovery path for failed message forwarding	Informational	0.5	Solved02/08/2026
HAL-02	ETH sent during local message delivery is permanently locked with no recovery mechanism	Informational	0.0	Solved02/08/2026
HAL-03	Incorrect error string in BridgeForwarder local delivery path	Informational	0.0	Solved02/08/2026

Findings & Tech Details#

HAL-01Solved

BridgeReceiver lacks error handling and recovery path for failed message forwarding

Informational

0.5AO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:S/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:L/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Addressed in:

1e25f4f6754e38d6d0252c258d823780e372f33b

HAL-02Solved

ETH sent during local message delivery is permanently locked with no recovery mechanism

Informational

0.0AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Addressed in:

1e25f4f6754e38d6d0252c258d823780e372f33b

HAL-03Solved

Incorrect error string in BridgeForwarder local delivery path

Informational

0.0AO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:NAO:A/AC:L/AX:M/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:N

Description

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Addressed in:

1e25f4f6754e38d6d0252c258d823780e372f33b

Disclaimer#

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.