Prepared by:
HALBORN
Last Updated 03/31/2026
Date of Engagement: February 20th, 2026 - February 20th, 2026
100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed
All findings
7
Critical
0
High
2
Medium
2
Low
0
Informational
3
Rally Foundation engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts on February 20th, 2026. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.
The diff adds Merkle-proof-based reward claims to Campaign.sol, where a trusted bridge publishes per-period Merkle roots and users claim by proving their share against the root. The legacy per-user reward path is preserved alongside.
Halborn was allocated 1 day for this engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineer is an expert in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.
The objectives of this assessment are to:
Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.
Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.
In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were mostly addressed by the Rally Foundation team. The main recommendations are:
Add a one-time termination flag and only recover tokens from periods that were never distributed.
Extend the processing window by one period so the final period's rewards can be submitted after it ends.
Replace legacy transfer() calls with safeTransfer() to handle tokens that don't return a boolean.
Check which periods were already refunded before calculating the termination withdrawal amount.
Halborn conducted a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is crucial for identifying flaws in logic, processes, and implementation, automated testing enhances coverage of smart contracts and quickly detects deviations from established security best practices.
The following phases and associated tools were employed throughout the term of the assessment:
Research into the platform's architecture, purpose and use.
Manual code review and walkthrough of smart contracts to identify any logical issues.
Comprehensive assessment of the safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions within scope that could lead to arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.
Local testing using custom scripts.
Fork testing against main networks.
Static security analysis of scoped contracts, and imported functions (Slither).
| EXPLOITABILITY METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Origin (AO) | Arbitrary (AO:A) Specific (AO:S) | 1 0.2 |
| Attack Cost (AC) | Low (AC:L) Medium (AC:M) High (AC:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| Attack Complexity (AX) | Low (AX:L) Medium (AX:M) High (AX:H) | 1 0.67 0.33 |
| IMPACT METRIC () | METRIC VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Confidentiality (C) | None (C:N) Low (C:L) Medium (C:M) High (C:H) Critical (C:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Integrity (I) | None (I:N) Low (I:L) Medium (I:M) High (I:H) Critical (I:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Availability (A) | None (A:N) Low (A:L) Medium (A:M) High (A:H) Critical (A:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Deposit (D) | None (D:N) Low (D:L) Medium (D:M) High (D:H) Critical (D:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| Yield (Y) | None (Y:N) Low (Y:L) Medium (Y:M) High (Y:H) Critical (Y:C) | 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 |
| SEVERITY COEFFICIENT () | COEFFICIENT VALUE | NUMERICAL VALUE |
|---|---|---|
| Reversibility () | None (R:N) Partial (R:P) Full (R:F) | 1 0.5 0.25 |
| Scope () | Changed (S:C) Unchanged (S:U) | 1.25 1 |
| Severity | Score Value Range |
|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 |
| High | 7 - 8.9 |
| Medium | 4.5 - 6.9 |
| Low | 2 - 4.4 |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 |
Critical
0
High
2
Medium
2
Low
0
Informational
3
| Security analysis | Risk level | Remediation Date |
|---|---|---|
| terminateCampaign function callable multiple times thereby draining Merkle claim funds | High | Solved - 02/28/2026 |
| Final period Merkle root can never be set after campaign ends | High | Solved - 02/02/2026 |
| Inconsistent transfer() vs safeTransfer() across legacy and Merkle paths | Medium | Solved - 03/24/2026 |
| Disconnected accounting between empty period refunds and campaign termination enables double withdrawal | Medium | Solved - 02/08/2026 |
| Over-allocated leaf shares not validated on-chain | Informational | Solved - 02/08/2026 |
| Unallocated period tokens permanently locked when Merkle tree shares sum below 100% | Informational | Solved - 02/08/2026 |
| Indexed string event parameters are hashed and not recoverable from logs | Informational | Acknowledged - 03/24/2026 |
//High
//High
//Medium
//Medium
//Informational
//Informational
//Informational
Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.
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