Campaign Audit | Rally Foundation | Halborn Audit Reports

Summary

100% of all REPORTED Findings have been addressed

About this report

Assessment Type

Assurance Assessment

Date of Engagement

February 20th, 2026 - February 20th, 2026

Source Code

Rally

Assessed Commit ID

9f08844

Severity Breakdown

0Risk Accepted
1Acknowledged
6Solved
7All Findings

Critical0
High2
- 2Solved
Medium2
- 2Solved
Low0
Informational3
- 2Solved
- 1Ack.

INTRODUCTION#

Rally Foundation engaged Halborn to perform a security assessment of their smart contracts on February 20th, 2026. The assessment scope was limited to the smart contracts provided to Halborn. Commit hashes and additional details are available in the Scope section of this report.

The diff adds Merkle-proof-based reward claims to Campaign.sol, where a trusted bridge publishes per-period Merkle roots and users claim by proving their share against the root. The legacy per-user reward path is preserved alongside.

ASSESSMENT SUMMARY#

Halborn ⁣was allocated 1 day for this engagement and assigned 1 full-time security engineer to conduct a comprehensive review of the smart contracts within scope. The engineer is an expert in blockchain and smart contract security, with advanced skills in penetration testing and smart contract exploitation, as well as extensive knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The objectives of this assessment are to:

Identify potential security vulnerabilities within the smart contracts.
Verify that the smart contract functionality operates as intended.

In summary, Halborn identified several areas for improvement to reduce the likelihood and impact of security risks, which were mostly addressed by the Rally Foundation team. The main recommendations are:

Add a one-time termination flag and only recover tokens from periods that were never distributed.
Extend the processing window by one period so the final period's rewards can be submitted after it ends.
Replace legacy transfer() calls with safeTransfer() to handle tokens that don't return a boolean.
Check which periods were already refunded before calculating the termination withdrawal amount.

TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY#

Halborn conducted a combination of manual code review and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy within the scope of this assessment. While manual testing is crucial for identifying flaws in logic, processes, and implementation, automated testing enhances coverage of smart contracts and quickly detects deviations from established security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were employed throughout the term of the assessment:

Research into the platform's architecture, purpose and use.
Manual code review and walkthrough of smart contracts to identify any logical issues.
Comprehensive assessment of the safety and usage of critical Solidity variables and functions within scope that could lead to arithmetic-related vulnerabilities.
Local testing using custom scripts.
Fork testing against main networks.
Static security analysis of scoped contracts, and imported functions (Slither).

Risk Methodology#

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on two sets of Metrics and a Severity Coefficient. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two Metric sets are: Exploitability and Impact. Exploitability captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and Impact describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The Severity Coefficients is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: Reversibility and Scope. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

4.1 EXPLOITABILITY

Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

Metrics:

EXPLOITABILITY METRIC ( $m_e$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Attack Origin (AO)	Arbitrary (AO:A)	1
Attack Origin (AO)	Specific (AO:S)	0.2
Attack Cost (AC)	Low (AC:L)	1
	Medium (AC:M)	0.67
	High (AC:H)	0.33
Attack Complexity (AX)	Low (AX:L)	1
	Medium (AX:M)	0.67
	High (AX:H)	0.33

Exploitability

E

is calculated using the following formula:

$E = \prod m_e$

4.2 IMPACT

Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

IMPACT METRIC ( $m_I$ )	METRIC VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Confidentiality (C)	None (C:N)	0
	Low (C:L)	0.25
	Medium (C:M)	0.5
	High (C:H)	0.75
	Critical (C:C)	1
Integrity (I)	None (I:N)	0
	Low (I:L)	0.25
	Medium (I:M)	0.5
	High (I:H)	0.75
	Critical (I:C)	1
Availability (A)	None (A:N)	0
	Low (A:L)	0.25
	Medium (A:M)	0.5
	High (A:H)	0.75
	Critical (A:C)	1
Deposit (D)	None (D:N)	0
	Low (D:L)	0.25
	Medium (D:M)	0.5
	High (D:H)	0.75
	Critical (D:C)	1
Yield (Y)	None (Y:N)	0
	Low (Y:L)	0.25
	Medium (Y:M)	0.5
	High (Y:H)	0.75
	Critical (Y:C)	1

Impact

I

is calculated using the following formula:

$I = max(m_I) + \frac{\sum{m_I} - max(m_I)}{4}$

4.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

Metrics:

SEVERITY COEFFICIENT ( $C$ )	COEFFICIENT VALUE	NUMERICAL VALUE
Reversibility ( $r$ )	None (R:N)	1
	Partial (R:P)	0.5
	Full (R:F)	0.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Changed (S:C)	1.25
Scope ( $s$ )	Unchanged (S:U)	1

Severity Coefficient

C

is obtained by the following product:

$C = rs$

The Vulnerability Severity Score

S

is obtained by:

$S = min(10, EIC * 10)$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
9 - 10	7 - 8.9	4.5 - 6.9	2 - 4.4	0 - 1.9

Scope#

(a) Repository:Rally

(b) Assessed Commit ID:9f088445d91511cb5be54ab881b0694d485c1a38

1 files

smart-contracts / contracts

1 file

Campaign.sol

solidity

Out-of-Scope:External dependencies, economic attacks and code/files outside the provided diff.

eabc3538773767988bfc7a586323a8d2fa46257a0f729f774dec9696a316ab256b7a2aa05c6bd7ff28908f670acbff70006106d84374d654273a3e4baec55b7df28cfb962b80f88203d0a940a62058ad5d6b8d77ba98bc3a99d48735858ca4149a5b61ff5a4c250cd461c697aabd582a843437047601283fd61aab4156675b3e1be2a4d9a2c591d96c71ab04

Out-of-Scope: New features/implementations after the remediation commit IDs.

Assessment Summary & Findings Overview#

#	Title	Severity	Score	Status
HAL-01	terminateCampaign function callable multiple times thereby draining Merkle claim funds	High	7.5	Solved02/28/2026
HAL-02	Final period Merkle root can never be set after campaign ends	High	7.5	Solved02/02/2026
HAL-03	Inconsistent transfer() vs safeTransfer() across legacy and Merkle paths	Medium	6.3	Solved03/24/2026
HAL-04	Disconnected accounting between empty period refunds and campaign termination enables double withdrawal	Medium	5.0	Solved02/08/2026
HAL-05	Over-allocated leaf shares not validated on-chain	Informational	1.0	Solved02/08/2026
HAL-06	Unallocated period tokens permanently locked when Merkle tree shares sum below 100%	Informational	1.0	Solved02/08/2026
HAL-07	Indexed string event parameters are hashed and not recoverable from logs	Informational	0.0	Acknowledged03/24/2026

Findings & Tech Details#

HAL-01Solved

terminateCampaign function callable multiple times thereby draining Merkle claim funds

High

7.5AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:HAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/R:N/S:U/C:N/A:N/I:N/D:N/Y:H

Description

Proof of Concept

Recommendation

Remediation Comment

Addressed in:

Disclaimer#

Halborn strongly recommends conducting a follow-up assessment of the project either within six months or immediately following any material changes to the codebase, whichever comes first. This approach is crucial for maintaining the project’s integrity and addressing potential vulnerabilities introduced by code modifications.